(Čl. 3) Zabrana torture
(Čl. 3 / CAT-16) Nečovečno postupanje
(Čl. 8) Pravo na poštovanje privatnog i porodičnog života
(Čl. 8) Pozitivne obaveze
(Čl. 8-1) Poštovanje privatnog života
(Čl. 13) Pravo na delotvorni pravni lek
(Čl. 14) Zabrana diskriminacije
(Čl. 41) Pravično zadovoljenje - opšte

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Sažetak

Ovaj predmet je formiran na osnovu predstavke protiv Republike Bugarske koju je Evropskoj komisiji za ljudska prava, koju je na osnovu ranijeg člana 25 Evropske konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda, uložila državljanka Bugarske M.C. (podnositeljka predstavke). U toku postupka pred Sudom predsednik Suda je prihvatio zahtev podnositeljke predstavke da se ne otkriva njeno ime.

Podnositeljka predstavke je navela da su joj povređena prava iz članov 3, 8, 13 i 14 Konvencije, obzirom da je bila žrtva silovanja, a Država ne obezbeđuje zakonsku zaštitu od silovanja i seksualnog zlostavljanja.

Podnositeljka predstavke je rođena 1980.godine. Tvrdila je da su je 31. jula i 01. avgusta 1995.godine silovala dva muškarca, kada je imala 14 godina i 10 meseci. U istrazi koja je usledila zaključeno je da nema dovoljno dokaza da je podnositeljka predstavke bila primorana na seksualni odnos.

Ona je 31.jula 1995.godine čekala da sa drugaricom uđe u disko klub, kada su se tri muškarca dovezli automobilom. A., dvadeset godina, je bio stariji brat njenog školskog druga. Pristala je da sa njima ode do disko kluba u mestu udaljenom 17 km, pod uslovom da se vrati do 23h. Pri povratku ih je na putu zaustavila policija zbog rutinske provere. A. je predložio da se zaustave i odu na plivanje u obližnjem veštačkom jezeru. Prema izjavi podnositeljke predstavke, otišli su do jezera uprkos njenom protivljenju. Izjavila je da nije sumnjala u njihove namere.

Ostala je na suvozačevom mestu. Došao je P., dvadeset i jedna godina, koji je je delimično obnažio i primorao na seksualni odnos. Nije imala snage da mu se snažno odupire i da vrišti. P. je tvrdio da je ona pristala na odnos. On je izašao iz kola, otišao po A. i V. (nepoznate godine), vratili su se u kola i odvezli dalje. Otišli su u restoran, navodno na predlog podnositeljke predstavke, gde je ona kratko razgovarala sa izvesnom gospođom T., pevačicom. Ona je izjavila da je podnositeljka predstavke delovala veselo i da nije bilo ničeg čudnog u njenom ponašanju. Podnositeljka predstavke je tvrdila da nisu bili u restoranu. Prema rečima podnositeljke predstavke, otišli su u jednu kuću, pekar g.S im je dao ključ, svi osim P koji se nekud odvezao kolima. V.je negde otišao a A. ju je naterao na seksualni odnos. A. je pred policijom tvrdio da je ona pristala na odnos.

Podnositeljka predstavke je sa majkom otišla u bolnicu, gde je pregledana. Ustanovljeno je da je himen sveže rascepan, a ustanovljene su i ozlede na vratu. Prema rečima lekara, ona je prijavila samo jedno silovanje.

Prem rečima P., majka podnositeljke predstavke ga je bila nagovarala na seksualni odnos sa podnositeljkom, tražeći novac zauzvrat.

U ovom predmetu od novembra 1995.godine do novembra 1996.godine nisu sprovedene nikakve istražne radnje, niti je podignuta optužnica. Inače, krajem oktobra 1995.godine policijski službenik je sačinio izveštaj iz kog proziliazi da ne veruje verziji koju su dale podnositeljka predstavke i njena majka. Uperiodu između početka novembra i početka decembra 1996.godine istražni organ je saslušao podnositeljku predstavke, njenu majku i svedoke. Svi su ostali pri svojim izjavama.

Okružni tužilac je januara 1997.godine naložio doadatnu istragu. U nalogu je istakao da dotadašnja istraga nije bila objektivna, detaljna i potpuna. Istražni organ je izmešu ostalog angažovao psihijatra i psihologa. Veštaci su bili mišljenja da, zbog naivnosti i neiskustva, podnositeljka predstavke očigledno nije razmišljala o tome da može biti silovana. Imajući u vidu njen uzrast u vreme kada se događaj desio ona „ nije mogla da ima izgrađene čvrste stavove i ubeđenja“. Što se tiče činjenice da je izašla sa P. nekoliko dana posle incidenta, to se može objasniti željom njene porodice da pruži socijalno prihvatljivo objašnjenje incidentu. Istražni organ je zaključio da ne postoje dokazi koji bi ukazali na primenu sile ili pretnje. Posebno nije ustanovljeno da je podnositeljka predstavke pružala otpor ili pokušala da traži pomoć od drugih.
Podnositeljka predstavke je uložila uzastopne žalbe regionalnom tužilaštvu i Vrhovnom javnom tužilaštvu. Žalbe su odbačene.

Podnositeljka predstavke se žalila da bugarsko zakonodavstvo i praksa ne pružaju delotvornu zaštitu od silovanja i seksualnog zlostavljanja obzirom da su krivični postupci pokretani samo u slučajevima kada su žrtve pružale otpor, kao i da nadležni organi nisu efikasno istražili događaje od 31. jula i 01. avgusta 1995.godine.

Sud jednoglasno
1. Odlučuje da je tužena Država prekršila svoje pozitivne obaveze prema članovima 3 i 8 Konvencije;
2. Odlučuje da nije nastalo posebno pitanje prema članu 13 Konvencije;
3. Odlučuje da nije potrebno ispitati žalbe podnositeljke predstavke u odnosu na član 14 Konvencije;

Preuzmite presudu u pdf formatu

EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA

PRVO ODELJENJE

PREDMET M. C. protiv BUGARSKE

(Predstavka br. 39272/98)

PRESUDA

Strazbur,

4. decembra 2003.

U predmetu M. C. protiv Bugarske, Evropski sud za ljudska prava (Prvo odeljenje), zasedajući u veću koje čine:

g. C. L. ROZAKIS, predsednik,
gđa F. TULKENS,
gđa N. VAJIĆ,
g. E. LEVITS,
gđa S. BOTUČAROVA (BOTOUCHAROVA),
g. A. KOVLER,
g. V. ZAGREBELSKI (ZAGREBELSKY), sudije,
i g. S. NILSEN (NIELSEN), zamenik sekretara odeljenja,

nakon većanja na zatvorenoj sednici, 13. novembra 2003. godine, izriče sledeću presudu, donetu pomenutog datuma:

POSTUPAK

Ovaj predmet је formiran na osnovu predstavke (br. 39272/98) protiv Republike Bugarske koju je uputila Evropska komisija za ljudska prava (u da ljem tekstu: Komisija), koju je na osnovu ranijeg člana 25 Evropske konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (u daljem tekstu: Konvencija) uložila državljanka Bugarske M. C. (u daljem tekstu: podnositeljka predstavke), 23. decembra 1997. godine. U toku postupka pred Sudom, predsednik Suda je prihvatio zahtev podnositeljke predstavke da se ne otkriva njeno ime (pravilo 47, st. 3 Poslovnika Suda).
Podnositeljku predstavke, kojoj je dodeljena pravna pomoć, zastupao je g. I. Grozev (Y. Grozev), advokat iz Sofije. Gospodin Grozev je 27. novembra 1997. godine dostavio punomoćje s potpisima podnositeljke predstavke i njene majke. Zastupnici gđa V. Điđeva, gđa M. Dimova i gđa M. Kotzeva iz bugarskog Ministarstva pravde su zastupali državu Bugarsku (u daljem tekstu: Država).
Podnositeljka predstavke je navela da su joj povređena prava iz članova 3, 8, 13 i 14 Konvencije utoliko što domaći zakon i praksa u slučajevima silovanja, kao i istraga u vezi sa silovanjem, čega je ona bila žrtva, ne obezbeđuje poštovanje pozitivne obaveze Države da obezbedi zakonsku zaštitu od silovanja i seksualnog zlostavljanja.
Predstavka je prosleđena Četvrtom odeljenju Suda 1. novembra 1998. godine, kada je na snagu stupio Protokol 11 Konvencije (čl. 5 st. 3 Protokola 11).
Predstavka je prvobitno bila dodeljena Četvrtom odeljenju Suda (pravilo 52, st. 1).
Sud je promenio sastav Četvrtog odeljena 1. novembra 1998. godine (pravilo 25, st. 1). Predmet je dodeljen novom sastavu Prvog odeljenja (pravilo 52, st. 1). U skladu s pravilom 26, stav 1, u okviru tog Odeljenja osnovano je veće koje će razmatrati predmet (čl. 27 st. 1 Konvencije).
Odlukom od 5. decembra 2002. godine, veće je proglasilo predstavku prihvatljivom.
Podnositeljka predstavke i Država su priložili podneske o suštini spora (pravilo 59, st. 1). Nakon konsultacija sa stranama u postupku, veće je odlučilo da nema potrebe za raspravom o suštini spora (pravilo 59, st. 3 in fine). Pored toga, mišljenje trećeg lica su dobijeni od Interights, nevladine organizacije sa se dištem u Londonu, kojoj je predsednik Suda dozvolio da interveniše i podnese pismene komentare u vezi s ovim predmetom (čl. 3 st. 2 Konvencije i ranije pra vilo 61, st. 3).

ČINJENICE

I OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA

Podnositeljka predstavke je državljanka Bugarske, rođena 1980. godine.
Ona je tvrdila da su je 31. jula i 1. avgusta 1995. godine silovala dva muškarca kada je imala 14 godina i 10 meseci. U istrazi koja je usledila zaključeno je da nema dovoljno dokaza kojim bi se potvrdilo da je podnositeljka predstavke bila primorana na seksualni odnos.

A. Događaji od večeri 31. jula do 1. avgusta 1995. godine

1. Veče 31. jula

Podnositeljka predstavke je 31. jula 1995. godine zajedno sa svojom drugaricom čekala da uđe u disko klub u mestu K. kada su se tri muškarca, P. (tada star 21 godinu), A. (tada star 20 godina) i V. A. (starost se ne navodi) dovezla automobilom koji je bio u vlasništvu P. koga je podnositeljka predstavke upoznala ranije u istom klubu i jednom pesala s njim. A. je bio stariji brat njenog školskog druga.
A. je pozvao podnositeljku predstavke da pođe s njim i njegovim drugovima u disko klub koji se nalazio u jednom malom mestu udaljenom 17 km. Prema rečima podnositeljke predstavke, ona je pristala pod uslovom da se vrati kući pre 23.00 časa.
Jedan ili dvojica su u klubu naručili piće. Podnositeljka predstavke je videla neke svoje prijatelje i nakratko popričala s njima. Prema njenim rečima, ona je uporno ponavljala da je vreme da se krene, pošto je prilično kasno.
U jednom momentu, kasno uveče, grupa je otišla iz kluba i vratila se u mesto K. Na putu do mesta K., nakratko ih je zaustavila policija i izvršila rutinsku proveru.
A. je predložio da se zaustave i odu na plivanje u obližnjem veštačkom jezeru. Prema izjavi podnositeljke predstavke, uprkos njenom protivljenju otišli su do jezera. Izjavila je da nije sumnjala u njihove namere.

2. Događaji na jezeru

Kada su stigli do jezera, podnositeljka predstavke je ostala u automobi lu na suvozačkom mestu, rekavši da ne želi da se kupa. Tri muškarca su krenula ka jezeru. Ubrzo se P. vratio i seo na sedište pored nje.
Prema izjavama koje je dala istražnim organima, P. je tada pritisnuo svoje telo uz njeno, predložio joj da „postanu prijatelji“ i počeo da je ljubi. Ona je odbijala njegove pokušaje i molila ga da prestane. P. ju je uporno ljubio dok je ona pokušavala da ga odgurne. Zatim je spustio sedište u horizontalan položaj, zgrabio je za ruke i pritisnuo ih iza njenih leđa. Podnositeljka predstavke je bila uplašena, zbunjena i bilo ju je sramota što je sebe dovela u takvu situaciju. Nije imala snage da se žestoko odupire ili da vrišti. Njeni pokušaji da ga odgurne nisu bili uspešni jer je P. bio mnogo jači od nje. P. ju je, zatim, delimično obnažio i primorao na seksualni odnos.
U svom iskazu, podnositeljka predstavke je rekla: „Bilo mi je prvi put i jako je bolelo. Bilo mi je muka, povraćalo mi se. Počela sam da plačem.“
Prema iskazu P., on je imao seksualni odnos s podnositeljkom predstavke u kolima uz njen pun pristanak. Prema njemu, ona je odgovorila na njegove poljupce, zatim je on bezuspešno pokušao da joj otkopča farmerke i raskopča kaiš, posle čega je ona to uradila sama i skinula gaćice.
Kada je P. završio s njom, izašao je iz automobila i krenuo ka A. i V. A. A. je u svojoj izjavi policiji rekao da im je P. tada rekao da je „razbio“ podnositeljku predstavke. Odmah zatim su se tri muškarca vratila u automobil i odvezli se dalje.
U svojoj izjavi pred istražnim organima, podnositeljka predstavke je rekla da je kasnije posumnjala da su ova tri muškarca planirala da imaju seksualne odnose s njom i da su plivanje smislili kao izgovor kako bi se odvezli na mesto gde nema nikoga. Iako su insistirali na kupanju, ona se nije sećala da su A. i V. A. bili mokri kada su ušli u automobil.

3. Navodno drugo silovanje

Podnositeljka predstavke je kasnije izjavila da je posle prvog silovanja bila veoma uznemirena i da je skoro sve vreme plakala. Prema verziji događaja koju su opisali P. i A. u kasnijem ispitivanju, podnositeljka predstavke je bila od lično raspoložena i počela je da miluje A., što je iritiralo P., i predložila da svrate u neki bar ili restoran. Grupa je zatim otišla u jedan restoran gde je podnositeljka predstavke kratko razgovarala s gospođom T. pevačicom koja je tamo nastupala. Gospođa T. je sedela za stolom s izvesnim gospodinom M.
Gospođa T., pevačica, izjavila je da je 1. avgusta 2005. godine bila u restoranu s gospodinom M. Odmah posle ponoći podnositeljka predstavke, koju je ona slabo poznavala, prišla joj je i pitala da li će njena grupa nastupati sledećih nekoliko dana. Gospođa T. se setila da je u tom trenutku videla čoveka kako čeka ispred vrata. Pošto ju je saslušala, podnositeljka predstavke je otišla. Gospođa T. je izjavila da je podnositeljka predstavke delovala veselo i da nije bilo ničeg čudnog u njenom ponašanju.
Policija je saslušala i gospodina M. On je rekao da vrlo dobro poznaje podnositeljku predstavke, ali da se ne seće da ju je video te noći.
Podnositeljka predstavke je osporila izjave P, A, V. A. i gospođe T., tvr deći da nisu išli u restoran, kao i da ne poznaje gđu. T. Podnositeljka predstavke i njena majka su kasnije optužile gđu. T za lažno svedočenje. (vidi dole stavove 66–88).
Umesto da se vrati u mesto K., u tri sata posle ponoći grupa je otišla u susedni grad gde su rođaci V. A. imali kuću. A, V. A. i podnositeljka predstavke su izašli iz automobila, a vlasnik automobila P. se odvezao dalje.
Tri muškarca i pekar, g. S. koga su trojica pozvali za svedoka, tvrdili su da su u međuvremenu kratko boravili u pekari. Pekar je navodno imao ključ od kuće. Kada je saslušan, g. S. je rekao da je oko dva sata posle ponoći dao ključ V. A. i da je video podnositeljku predstavke kako čeka u automobilu u očigledno dobrom raspoloženju. Iz automobila se čula glasna muzika. Podnositeljka pred stavke je negirala da su išli u pekaru i optužila pekara za lažno svedočenje. P., A. i V. A. su u svojim izjavama rekli da su odlučili da odu u tu kuću zato što im je podnositeljka predstavke rekla da se posvađala s majkom i da ne želi da se vrati kući.
Podnositeljka predstavke je rekla policiji da se osećala bespomoćno i da joj je bila potrebna zaštita. Kako je A. bio brat njenog druga iz razreda, očeki vala je da će je on zaštititi, pa je ušla s njim i V. A. u sobu u prizemlju kuće.
U sobi se nalazio jedan krevet i podnositeljka predstavke je sela na njega. Dva čoveka su jedno vreme pušili i razgovarali and onda je V. A. izašao iz sobe.
Podnositeljka predstavke je tvrdila da je tada A. seo pored nje, naterao je da legne, skinuo je odeću i primorao je na seksualni odnos. Podnositeljka predstavke nije imala snage da se bori s njim. Samo ga je molila da prestane. Kasnije je u svojoj izjavi rekla:

„Počela sam da plačem i molila sam ga da prestane .... Počeo je da mi miluje grudi i da mi ljubi vrat ... onda mi je stopalom skinuo farmerke i gaćice, razdvojio noge svojim nogama i ušao u mene ... [Pošto je završio] počela sam da plačem, plakala sam do nekog doba ujutro, kad sam zaspala... [V. A.] me je probudio i rekao da je [A.] otišao da nađe neki automobil da bi me odvezao u K. Sela sam na krevet i opet počela da plačem.“

A. je pred policijom izjavio da je imao seksualni odnos s podnositelj kom predstavke uz njen pun pristanak.

4. Jutro 1. avgusta 1995. godine

Sledećeg jutra, oko 7 sati majka podnositeljke predstavke je našla svoju kćerku u kući rođaka V. A. Majka podnositeljke predstavke je izjavila da je, nakon što je čula da je njena kćerka viđena u društvu A. prethodne večeri, krenula ka njegovoj kući i da je na ulici videla V. A. Prema njenim rečima V. A. je pokušao da je zavara kako bi imao vremena da upozori A. Međutim, ona je insisitirala.
U izjavama tokom istrage, podnositeljka predstavke i njena majka su uporno tvrdile da je podnositeljka predstavke odmah rekla majci da je silovana. A., koji je bio prisutan, rekao je majci podnositeljke predstavke da je jedan „vozač kamiona“ prethodne noći imao seksualni odnos s njenom kćerkom.
Prema verziji događaja koju je dao A, podnositeljka predstavke i njena majka su se tada posvađale, a podnositeljka predstavke je odbila da pođe s njom i rekla joj da ide. Sused, koga su kao svedoka imenovali A. i V. A., izjavio je da je on čuo svađu, kao i to da je podnositeljka predstavke odbila da napusti kuću s majkom, kao i da je majci rekla da joj se ništa nije desilo. Podnositeljka predstavke je optužila svedoka za davanje lažnog iskaza.
Podnositeljka predstavke i njena majka su odatle otišle pravo u bolnicu, gde je upućena kod lekara, speciajliste sudske medicine. Podnositeljka predstavke je pregledana oko 16 sati.
Lekar je ustanovio da je himen sveže rascepan. Takođe je ustanovio površinske ozlede na vratu podnositeljke predstavke, veličine 35mm s 4 mm, kao i četiri male modrice ovalnog oblika. U lekarskom izveštaju navedeno je da je podnositeljka predstavke prijavila samo jedno silovanje tvrdeći da se desilo između 22.30 i 23.00 sati prethodnog dana na jezeru.

B. Događaji od 1. do 11. avgusta 1995. godine

Podnositeljka predstavke je izjavila da je sledećih nekoliko dana odbijala da razgovara s majkom o incidentu. Nije iznosila nikakve detalje niti je pomenula drugo silovanje. Objasnila je kako ona živi u konzervativnom okruženju malog mesta gde se nevinost smatra kao nešto veoma važno za brak. Stidela se što „nije uspela da zaštiti svoju nevinost“ i onoga „šta će ljudi reći“.
Prve večeri posle incidenta, tj. 1 avgusta 1995. godine P. je posetio po rodicu podnositeljke predstavke. Podnositeljka predstavke i njena majka su tvrdi le da je te večeri P. molio za oproštaj i rekao da će se njome oženiti kada postane punoletna. Majka je smatrala da bi u datim okolnostima bilo razumno prihvatiti takvu ponudu. To je uticalo na prvobitno ponašanje podnositeljke predstavke, koja je prihvatila majčinu ideju da se šteta svede na najmanju moguću meru.
Jedne od narednih večeri, podnositeljka predstavke je izašla s P. i njegovim prijateljima.
P. i V. A., od kojih je potonji tvrdio da je bio prisutan kada je 1. avgusta 1995. uveče P. posetio podnositeljku predstavke u njenoj kući, tvrdili su da im je njena majka rekla „da se svako zadovoljstvo mora platiti“, i da je pokušala da iznudi novac od njih.
P.ova baba je takođe dala izjavu u policiji. Ona je tvrdila da ju je jednog dana (datum nije naveden) posetila majka podnositeljke predstavke i pokušala da joj iznudi novac.
Dajući izjavu u vezi s posetom i drugim relevantnim događajima, gđa D., komšinica i prijateljica majke podnositeljke predstavke je rekla da je majka bila jako uznemirena zbog svega i da se složila da njena kćerka izlazi s P. jer je on uporno tvrdio da voli podnositeljku predstavke. Ipak, majka podnositeljke predstavke je odlučila da razgovara s njegovim roditeljima. Jednog dana (datum nije naveden) gđa D. je s komšinicom došla do kuće porodice P. ali ih je njegova baba oterala, tvrdeći da je podnositeljka predstavke spavala ne samo s P. već i s A. Tada je naišao A. Gđa D. ga je pitala da li je istina da je on spavao s podnositeljkom predstavke. On je potvrdio da je to tačno i dodao da on ima i novac i moć da radi šta mu je volja. Do tog momenta majka podnositeljke predstavke nije znala za drugo silovanje.
Podnositeljka predstavke je izjavila da ju je slomila poseta A.ovog oca 8.avgusta 1995. Tada se poverila majci i priznala i drugo silovanje. Nakon odsu stva od nekoliko dana, 10. avgusta 1995. godine otac podnositeljke predstavke se vratio kući. Posle razgovora o problemu, porodica je odlučila da podnese tužbu. Majka podnositeljke predstavke je to učinila 11. avgusta 1995. godine.

C. Istraga

1. Inicijalna policijska istraga

Podnositeljka predstavke je 11. avgusta 1995. godine dala pismenu izjavu o događajima od 31. jula i 1. avgusta 1995. godine. Istog dana P. i A. su dali pismene izjave. U izjavama su tvrdila da je podnositeljka predstavke svojevoljno stupila u seksualne odnose s njima. Obojica su pušteni na slobodu. Pismene izja ve su takođe dali V. A. i lice koje je živelo odmah do kuće u kojoj se desilo drugo navodno silovanje. Policijski službenik je 25. avgusta 1995. godine sačinio nov izveštaj i prosledio predmet nadležnom tužilaštvu.
Okružni tužilac je 14. novembra 1995. godine pokrenuo krivičnu istragu za navodno silovanje i prosledio predmet istražnom organu. Optužnica nije podignuta.
Od novembra 1995. do novembra 1996. po ovom predmetu nisu sprovedene nikakve istražne radnje, niti je podignuta optužnica.

2. Postupci koje se odnose na žalbe P. i A. o navodnom davanju lažnih iskaza

P. i A. su 24. avgusta 1995. godine podneli prijavu okružnom tužilaštvu tvrdeći da ih podnositeljka prijave i njena majka maltretiraju javno iznoseći lažne optužbe.
Okružni tužilac je na osnovu ovih prijava 28. avgusta 1995. godine na ložio policijsku istragu. Septembra i oktobra 1995. godine saslušano je nekoliko lica koji su dali pismene izjave.
Policijski službenik je 25 oktobra 1995. godine sačinio izveštaj u kome je rekao da smatra da su tvrdnje P. A. verodostojne, kao i da ne veruje verziji koju su dale podnositeljka predstavke i njena majka.
Predmet je 27. oktobra 1995. godine prosleđen okružnom tužilaštvu koje je nadležno da odluči da li će pokretati krivični postupak protiv podnositeljke predstavke i njene majke. Predmet je verovatno ostavljen po strani jer nije doneta nikakva odluka.

3. Nastavak istrage po predmetu silovanja

U periodu između 2. novembra i 9. decembra 1996. godine, istražni organ je saslušao podnositeljku predstavke, njenju majku i druge svedoke. P. i A. su saslušani kao svedoci.
Podnositeljka predstavke je detaljno opisala činjenice, ponavljajući da je P. savladao njen otpor pritiskujući je uz automobilsko sedište i zavrćući joj ruke, kao i da je posle toga bila u stanju šoka zbog čega nije bila u stanju da pruža otpor kada ju je A. silovao.
U svom iskazu, P. je tvrdio da je podnositeljka predstavke aktivno odgovorila na njegovo udvaranje. Potvrdio je i to da je podnositeljka predstavke razgovarala s g. M. u restoranu u koji su otišli nakon seksualnog odnosa.
I A. i P. su, između ostalog, izjavili da je podnositeljka predstavke ubrzo posle seksa s P. počela da miluje A. još u automobilu.
Istražni organ je 18. decembra 1996. završio rad na ovom predmetu. Napisao je izveštaj u kome je rekao da nema dokaza da su P. i A. pribegli pretnjama i nasilju i predložio da tužilaštvo zatvori predmet.
Okružni tužilac je 7. januara 1997. godine naložio dodatnu istragu. U nalogu je istakao da dotadašnja istraga nije bila objektivna, detaljna i potpuna.
Istražni organ, kome je predmet vraćen 16. januara 1997. godine, ime novao psihijatra i psihologa radi iznalaženja odgovora na neka pitanja iz pred meta. Veštaci su, između ostalog, upitani da li je verovatno da je podnositeljka prestavke mogla da mirno razgovara s gđom T., pevačicom u restoranu, a potom da sluša muziku u automobilu ako je neposredno pre toga bila silovana i da li je verovatno da nekoliko dana posle navodnog silovanja izađe u grad s osobom koja ju je silovala.
Veštaci su bili mišljenja da, zbog naivnosti i neiskustva, podnositeljka predstavke očigledno nije razmišljala o tome da može biti silovana. Nije bilo indikacija da joj je prećeno niti da je povređena, ili da je bila u stanju šoka tokom samih događaja s obzirom da se jasno sećala svega što se desilo. Veštaci su smatrali da je ona bila iznenada suočena s unutrašnjim sukobom između prirodnog interesovanja za seks i osećaja da se takva radnja osuđuje, što je „smanjilo njenu sposobnost da pruži otpor i odbrani se“. Pored toga, ustanovili su da je ona psihički zdrava osoba i da je razumela značenje ovih događaja. Imajući u vidu njen uzrast u vreme kada se događaj desio ona „nije mogla da ima izgrađene čvrste stavove i ubeđenja.“
Veštaci su takođe bili mišljenja da je, ako je zaista došlo do susreta između podnositeljke predstavke i gđe. T. posle događaja na jezeru – a ovo je osporavano – ipak bilo moguće da je podnositeljka predstavke na kratko razgovarala s gđom T. posle silovanja. Što se tiče činjenice da je podnositeljka predstavke izašla s P. nekoliko dana posle događaja, ovo se lako može objasniti željom njene porodice da pruži socijalno prihvatljivo značenje incidentu.
Istražni organ je 28. februara 1997. godine završio s radom po ovom predmetu i sačinio izveštaj i ponovo predložio da se predmet zatvori. Zaključio je da mišljenje veštaka nije uticalo na njegove prethodne nalaze, te da ne postoje dokazi koji bi ukazali na primenu sile ili pretnji.
Okružni tužilac je 17. marta 1997. godine naložio obustavljanje kri vične istrage. On je, između ostalog, izjavio da nije ustanovljena, van razumne sumnje, primena sile i pretnji. Posebno, nije ustanovljeno da je podnositeljka predstavke pružala otpor ili pokušala da traži pomoć drugih.
Podnositeljka predstavke je uložila uzastopne žalbe regionalnom tužilaštvu i Vrhovnom javnom tužilaštvu. Žalbe su odbačene odlukama od 13. maja, odnosno 24. juna 1997. godine.
Tužioci su se, između ostalog, oslonili na izjave navodnih počinilaca i V. A. da podnositeljka predstavke nije pokazivala nikakve znake uznemirenosti posle seksualnog odnosa s P. kod jezera, i na izjave tri muškarca i gđe. T. da je gđa T. videla podnositeljke predstavke i razgovarala s njom te večeri. U pogledu primedbe podnositeljke predstavke da te izjave nisu istinite i da ih stoga treba odbaciti, u odluci od 13. maja 1997. rečeno je da se odluka „tužilaštva ne može zasnivati na pretpostavkama, te da se izjave svedoka ne mogu odbacivati samo na osnovu sumnje i bez drugih dokaza....“
U odluci od 13. maja 1997. godine se takođe kaže:

„Tačno je da su, što se može videti i iz izveštaja forenzičkih psihijatrijskih ve štaka, mladost i odsustvo životnog iskustva podnositeljke predstavke imali uticaja na to da ona nije mogla da pokaže da im čvrsta uverenja i stavove, odnosno da ja sno pokaže da ne želi da stupi u seksualni odnos. Prema članu 152 stavovi 1 (2) i 3 Krivičnog zakonika, ovde ne može biti govora o krivičnom delu, osim ako pod nositeljka predstavke nije bila prisiljena na seksualni odnos primenom fizičke sile ili pretnji. Ovo, pretpostavlja pružanje otpora, a u ovom konkretnom slučaju ne postoji dokaz o pružanju otpora. P. i A. bi se mogli smatrati krivično odgovornim samo u slučaju da su shvatili da se upuštaju u seksualni odnos bez pristanka pod nositeljke predstavke i ako su primenili silu ili pretnje upravo s ciljem da imaju seksualni odnos s njom, a protiv njene volje. Nema dovoljno dokaza kojima bi se ustanovilo da je podnositeljka predstavke pokazala nespremnost da ima seksualni odnos, kao i da su P. i A. primenili pretnje ili silu.“

Dalje je navedeno da je podnositeljka predstavke objasnila da su ozlede na njenom vratu izazvane sisanjem.

Odlukom od 24. juna 1997. godine nalazi su ponovo potvrđeni, uz napomenu da izjave gđe. T, pevačice u restoranu, nisu bile od presudnog značaja. Pored toga istaknuto je sledeće:

„Ono što je od presudnog značaja za ovaj predmet jeste činjenica da nije ustanovljeno, van razumne sumnje, da je primenjena fizička sila protiv podnositeljke predstavke, odnosno da se seksualni odnos desio protiv njene volje i uprkos njenom opiranju. Nisu utvrđeni tragovi fizičke prisile, kao što su povrede, pocepana odeća, itd...

Istina je da je neoubičajeno da maloletna devojka i devica ima dva puta seksualni odnos u kratkom vremenskom periodu s dva različita muškarca, ali sama ta činjenica, u odsustvu drugih dokaza i imajući u vidu da nije bilo moguće prikupiti druge dokaze, nije dovoljna da se ustanovi krivično delo.“

4. Drugi postupci

Juna ili jula 1997. godine podnositeljka predstavke i njena majka su tražile pokretanje krivičnog postupka protiv gđe. T. i drugih svedoka, uključu jući i V. A., tvrdeći da su oni navodno izvršili krivično delo dajući tokom istrage lažne izjave o silovanju podnositeljke predstavke.
Isti tužilac Okružnog tužilaštva koji je naložio prekidanje istrage o silovanju, 14. jula 1997. godine odbacio je taj zahtev tvrdeći da je neosnovan, pa čak i uvredljiv, s obzirom da su sve činjenice već razjašnjene u prethodnim postupanjima.
Regionalno tužilaštvo je takođe odbacilo narednu žalbu podnositeljke predstavke 6. februara 1998. godine.

D. Mišljenje stručnjaka koje je podnositeljka predstavke podnela

Podnositeljka predstavke je u junu 2001. godine podnela pismeno mišljenje dva bugarska stručnjaka, dr Svetozara Vasileva, psihijatra, i g. Valerija Ivanova, psihologa, koje je advokat podnositeljke predstavke zamolio da daju svoje mišljenje o ovom predmetu.
Pozivajući se na naučne radove iz više zemalja, stručnjaci su u tom mi šljenju izneli da su poznata dva obrasca reagovanja žrtava silovanja na napadača i to: žestok fizički otpor i tzv. “ukočenost od straha“ (poznat i kao „sindrom tra umatskog psihološkog infantilizma“). Ovaj potonji se objašnjava činjenicom da je svaki način reagovanja ili ponašanja koji se zasniva na iskustvu neadekvatan kada je žrtva suočena sa silovanjem koje ne može izbeći. Kao rezultat toga, žrtva često pasivno reaguje, odnosno potčinjava se, što je karakteristično ponašanje u detinjstvu, ili pokušava da se psihički distancira od onoga što se dešava, kao da se sve to i ne događa.
Stručnjaci su izjavili, da svi naučni radovi koje su proučavali ukazuju na to da je ovde preovladao obrazac „ukočenosti od straha“. Pored toga, oni su i sami, pozivajući se na naučne radove iz nekoliko zemalja, za svrhu izveštaja o ovom slučaju, sproveli istraživanje. Proučili su sve slučajeve mladih žena uzrasta od 14 do 20 godina koje su učestvovale u dva specijalizovana programa lečenja žrtava silovanja u Bugarskoj u periodu 1996–2001, a koje su tvrdile da su bile silovane. Isključili su slučajeve koji su bili sasvim drugačiji od slučaja podno siteljke predstavke. Na kraju su izdvojili dvadeset pet slučajeva, od kojih se u dvadeset i četiri slučaja žrtve nisu žestoko opirale, već su reagovale pasivnim potčinjavanjem.

II RELEVANTNO DOMAĆE PRAVO I PRAKSA

Shodno članu 151 stav 1 Krivičnog zakonika, seksualni odnos s oso bom mlađom od 14 godina se smatra kažnjivim krivičnim delom (silovanje ma loletnog lica). U ovakvim slučajevima, pristanak se ne smatra za valjanom odbranom.
Isto tako, pristanak žrtve koja je starija od 14 godina je irelevantan ako ona ne shvata „suštinu i značenje onog što se dešava“ (čl. 151 st. 2 Zakoni ka). Ova odredba se primenjivala u slučajevima kada žrtva nije shvatala značenje onog što joj se dogodilo zbog mentalnog poremećaja (vidi presudu br. 568 od 18. avgusta 1973. godine, predmet br. 540/73, Vrhovni sud–I).
Član 152 stav 1 Krivičnog zakonika definiše silovanje kao:

„seksualni odnos sa ženom

(1) koja nije u stanju da se odbrani, u slučaju kada nije dala pristanak;

(2) koja je na to bila primorana primenom sile ili pretnji;

(3) koju je počinilac učinio bespomoćnom.“

Iako je odsustvo pristanka eksplicitno pomenuto samo u prvoj tački, Vrhovni sud je smatrao da je taj element inherentan odredbi u celini (vidi gore pomenutu presudu br. 568).
Prema sudskoj praksi, svaka od tri tačke člana 152, stav 1 se može primenjivati samo alternativno, pošto se svaka odnosi na različito činjenično sta nje. Vrhovni sud je stao na stanovište da se ne može generalno pozivati na dve ili sve tri tačke člana (vidi presudu br. 247 od 24. aprila 1974. godine, predmet br. 201/74, Vrhovni sud–I; presudu br. 59 od 19. maja 1992. godine, predmet br. 288/90, Vrhovni sud–I; i mnoge druge).
Prema tome, optuženo lice se može proglasiti krivim samo ako se utvrdi da je imalo seksualni odnos sa ženom pod okolnostima koje su obuhvaćene jednom od ove tri tačke.
Prva i treća tačka se tiču određenih faktičkih situacija kada je žrtva bespomoćna u momentu seksualnog odnosa. Treća tačka se odnosi na slučajeve kada počinilac dovodi žrtvu u stanje bespomoćnosti pre silovanja, dok se prva tačka odnosi na slučajeve kada počinilac iskorišćava već postojeću bespomoćnost žrtve.
Sudovi su rekli da je žrtva bespomoćna („nesposobna da se sama bra ni“ ili „da je dovedena u stanje bespomoćnosti“) samo u situacijama kada nije sposobna da fizički pruži otpor usled invaliditeta, starosti ili bolesti (vidi presu du br. 484 od 29. jula 1983. godine, predmet br. 490/83, i gore pomenutu presu du br. 568), usled upotrebe alkohola, lekova ili narkotika (vidi presudu br. 126 od 11 aprila 1977. godine, predmet br. 69/77, Vrhovni sud–II).
Druga tačka se primenjuje kod svih ostalih slučajeva navodnog silovanja. Tako, ako se ne ukaže na postojanje bilo kakvih posebnih okolnosti kao što je stanje bespomoćnosti žrtve, istraga o navodnom silovanju bi trebalo da ustanovi da li je žrtva bila primorana ili nije na seksualni odnos primenom sile ili pretnjama.
U sudskoj praksi i pravnoj teoriji uobičajeno je stanovište da je silovanje prema drugoj tački člana 152, stav 1 Krivičnog zakonika krivično delo u „dva koraka“‘ odnosno, počinilac prvo primenjuje silu ili pretnju nad žrtvom, a zatim vrši akt penetracije.
Strane u postupku su dale svoja mišljenja o značenju reči „primena sile i pretnji“, kao i njihovog tumačenja u praksi (vidi dole stavove 113, 122 i 123).
Vrhovni sud je smatrao da odsustvo pristanka treba izvesti iz činjenice da je utvrđena jedna od situacija koje su obuhvaćene tačkama člana 152 stav 1, ili na osnovu stanja bespomoćnosti žrtve ili iz činjenice da je primenjena fizička ili psihička sila (vidi gore pomenutu presudu br. 568)
U jednom slučaju, Vrhovni sud je rekao da se pod „silom“ ne podrazu meva samo direktno nasilje, već i situacija u kojoj žrtva ne nalazi drugo rešenje već se, iako protiv svoje volje, potčini (vidi presudu br. 520 od 19. jula 1973. godine, predmet br. 414/73). U tom konkretnom slučaju počinilac je nakon što je iskazao želju za bliskim odnosom sa žrtvom, svojim ponašanjem u periodu od dva ili tri dana (prateći je i pokušavajući da je grli i ljubi), ušao u sobu, zaključao vrata i rekao joj da se skine. Ona je odbila, pa je počinilac pokušao da joj raširi noge. Shvativši da nema drugog izbora, žrtva je otvorila prozor i skočila zadobiv ši tešku telesnu povredu. Počinilac je osuđen za pokušaj silovanja koje je dovelo do teške telesne povrede.
Zauzimajući stanovište da je to pitanje stvar sudskog tumačenja, pravni stručnjaci nisu dali detaljnije tumačenje situacija u kojima se može utvrditi pri sustvo prinude usled primene sile ili pretnje (Al, Stoynov), Наказателно право, Особена част, 1997; A. Girginov, Наказателно право, Особена част, 2002). Jedan stručnjak je rekao da je odsustvo pristanka žrtve suštinska karakteristika silovanja i da tri tačke člana 152 stav 1 Krivičnog zakonika obuhvataju različite situacije gde ne postoji pristanak žrtve. Pored toga, on napominje da se u prošlim vekovima tražio dokaz o žestokom fizičkom opiranju žrtve, ali da je danas ovo stanovište prevaziđeno. Bez pozivanja na sudsku praksu, on je bio mišljenja da danas nije potrebno ništa više od utvrđivanja nesumljivog otpora kao dokaza da žrtva nije dala svoj pristanak. (N. Antov, Проблеми на изнасилването, 2003).
Prema članu 152 stav 1 Krivičnog zakonika, za krivično delo silovanja žene od strane muškarca može se izreći kazna zatvora u trajanju od dve do osam godina. U vreme izvršenja ovog dela, prema članu 157 stav 1 Krivičnog zakonika za slučajeve prisilnog seksualnog odnosa s osobom istog pola bila je predviđena kazna zatvora u trajanju od jedne do pet godina. Zaprećena kazna prema ovoj odredbi je 2000. godine izmenjena i izjednačena s kaznom koja se izriče u sluča jevima silovanja prema članu 152 stav 1 i sada je to kazna zatvora u trajanju od dve od osam godina.
U vreme izvršenja ovog dela minimalna starosna granica za svojevolj no stupanje u seksualne odnose s osobom istog pola je bila 16 godina starosti (čl. 157 st. 2 Zakonika). Ta granica je snižena na 14 godina starosti 2002. godine.

III. RELEVANTNO UPOREDNO I MEĐUNARODNO PRAVO I PRAKSA

A. Odredbe koje se odnose na silovanje u zakonima pojedinih evropskih država

U pravnim sistemima jednog broja evropskih država, silovanje i seksualni napad su „rodnoneutralna“ krivična dela, dok u drugim zemljama silovanje može da počini samo muškarac u odnosu na ženu.
U većini država donja starosna granica za dobrovoljno stupanje u sek sualne odnose je 14, 15 ili 16 godina. U nekim zemljama postoji različita donja starosna granica za dobrovoljno stupanje u seksualne odnose bez penetracije i za odnose s penetracijom, kao i različite kazne zavisno od uzrasta žrtve. Pristup ovom problemu se razlikuje od države do države.
Član 375 stavovi 1 i 2 belgijskog Krivičnog zakonika (na koji se poziva Interights), kako je izmenjen 1989. godine, glasi:

„Svaki čin seksualne penetracije, bez obzira na oblik i prirodu tog čina, počinjen nad licem koje nije dalo svoj pristanak predstavlja krivično delo silovanja.

Posebno, ne postoji pristanak kada je čin nametnut nasiljem, prinudom ili lukavstvom, ili ako je takav čin moguć zbog psihičkog ili fizičkog invaliditeta žrtve“.

Član 241 stav 1 Krivičnog zakonika Češke (Zakon br.140/1961, u iz menjenom obliku) predviđa:

„Lice koje prinudi drugog na čin seksualne penetracije ili na sličnu seksual nu radnju nasiljem ili pretnjom nasiljem, ili koje zloupotrebi bespomoćnost žrtve podleže kazni zatvora u trajanju od dve do osam godina“.

Poglavlja 216 (1) i 217 danskog Krivičnog zakonika (na koga se poziva yainteresovana strana) predviđa:

„Svako lice koje primora drugo lice na seksualni odnos nasiljem ili pretnjom nasiljem smatra se krivim za silovanje i podleže kazni zatvora u trajanju ne više od osam godina. Stavljanje drugog lica u položaj u kojem ono nije sposobno da pruži otpor smatraće se jednakom nasilju...“

„Svako lice koje nezakonitom prinudom ima seksualni odnos (shodno po glavlju 26 ovog zakona), a koja ne predstavlja nasilje ili pretnju nasiljem, podleže kazni zatvora u trajanju od ne više od četiri godine“.

Poglavlje 20, odeljci 1 i 3, finskog Krivičnog zakonika (kako je izmenjen 1998. godine) predviđa:

„Član 1: Silovanje

(1) Svako lice koje prinudi drugo lice na seksualni odnos nasiljem ili pretnjom nasiljem biće osuđeno na kaznu zatvora od najmanje jedne, a najviše šest godina.

(2) Smatraće se krivim za silovanje svako lice koje iskoristi nesposobnost drugog lica da se brani i ima s njim/njom seksualni odnos, pošto ju/ga je onesvestio, ili prouzrokovao/la kod žrtve stanje nesposobnosti usled straha ili nekog sličnog razloga....“

Poglavlje 3: Prinuda na seksualni odnos

(1) Ako se utvrdi da je silovanje, u smislu niskog nivoa prinude ili pretnje i drugih pojedinosti dela, počinjeno pod olakšavajućim okolnostima, počinilac krivičnog dela biće osuđen za prinudu na seksualni odnos kaznom zatvora u trajanju od najviše tri godine.

(2) Svako lice koje prinudi drugo lice na seksualni čin nekom drugom pret njom od one iz člana 1 (1) gore, smatraće se krivim za prinudu na seksualni odnos“.

Članovi 222–223 i 225–227 francuskog Krivičnog zakonika predviđaju sledeće:

„Seksualna agresije je svaki seksualni napad izvršen nasiljem, prinudom, pretnjom ili prepadom“.

„Svaki čin seksualne penetracije, ma koje prirode, počinjen nad drugim licem nasiljem, prinudom, pretnjama ili prepadom smatraće se silovanjem. Za krivično delo silovanja predviđena je kazna zatvora u trajanju od petnaest godina.

„Seksualni čin izvršen od strane punoletnog lica nad maloletnim licem mla đim od 15 godina, bez primene sile, prinude, pretnji i prepada kazniće se kaznom zatvora u trajanju od pet godina i novčanom kaznom u iznosu od EUR 75.000.“

Sledeće informacije o sudskoj praksi u Francuskoj se mogu dobiti iz uvažene publikacije JurisClasseur (2002):

(i) U praksi izrazi „nasilje, prinuda, pretnja ili prepad“ imaju široko zna čenje. Na primer, u jednom predmetu je navedeno da činjenica da je žrtva molila počinioca da prestane, bez daljeg opiranja, pri čemu je prethodno pristala da uđe u njegov automobil i da je ljubi, bila do voljna da se utvrdi postojanje krivičnog dela silovanja (presuda Ka sacionog suda, krivično odeljenje („Cass. crim.“), od 10. jula 1973. godine, Bulletin Criminel („Bull. crim.“) br. 322; Revue de Science Cri minelle, 1974, str. 594, zapažanja Levasera (Levasseur); vidi i suprotno stanovište, Crim., od 11. oktobra 1978. godine, Dalloz 1979. IR, 120). Odbijanje žrtve se može izvesti iz okolnosti, kao što su paralizirajući šok, usled čega žrtva nije bila u stanju da protestuje ili pobegne (Cass. crim., 13. mart 1984. godine, Bull. crim. br. 107).

(ii) „Prepad“ postoji kada žrtva nije u stanju dâ slobodno da svoj prista nak usled fizičkog ili psihičkog invaliditeta (Cass. crim., 8. jun 1984, Bull. crim. br. 226), ili je u posebnom psihičkom stanju, uključujući i depresiju, slabost ili jednostavno uznemirenost (Cass. crim., 12. novembar 1997. godine, JurisData br 2000–005087; Apelacioni sud u Parizu, 30. mart 2000. godine, JurisData br. 2000–117239), ili kada se počinilac koristi lukavstvom da bi prevario žrtvu u odnosu na stvar nu situaciju (Cass. crim., 14. april 1995. godine, JurisData br. 1995–002034).

(iii) Po mišljenju sudova postoji „prepad“, pa shodno tome i silovanje, kada je žrtva toliko mlada da ne razume koncept seksualnosti i prirodu radnji kojima je izložena (Cass. crim., 11. jun 1992. godine, Bull. crim. br. 228; Apelacioni sud u Limonu, 5. april 1995. godine, JurisData br. 1995–042693; Apelacioni sud u Parizu, 14. novembar 2000. godine, JurisData br. 2000–134658). Međutim, u nekim drugim predmetima tvrdilo se da se samo na osnovu uzrasta žrtve, u načelu, i bez dodat nih elemenata ne može utvrditi postojanje „prepada“ (Cass. crim., 1. mart 1995. godine, Bull. crim. br. 92).

Relevantni deo člana 177 (seksualna prinuda, silovanje) Krivičnog zakonika Nemačke glasi:

„1. Svako ko prinudi drugo lice

(1) silom,

(2) pretnjom neposredne opasnosti po život ili sakaćenjem, ili

(3) koristeći situaciju u kojoj je žrtva bespomoćna i prepuštena na milost počiniocu da pristane na seksualnu radnju koju izvršava počinilac ili treće lice, ili da obavlja te radnje počiniocu ili trećem licu, kazniće se zatvorom u trajanju od najmanje godinu dana“.

Član 197 stav 1 Krivičnog zakonika Mađarske (Zakon br. 4 iz 1978) predviđa:

„Lice koje nasilnim činom ili direktnom pretnjom po život ili telo primora drugu osobu na seksualni odnos, ili koristi nesposobnost druge osobe da se brani ili da izrazi svoju nespremnost da ima seksualni odnos, smatraće se krivim za teš ko krivično delo koje podleže kazni zatvora u trajanju od dve do osam godina.“

Član 2 (1) (silovanje) Krivičnog zakonika Irske iz 1981. godine i član 9 Krivičnog zakona (silovanje) (amandman) iz 1990. godine (na koji se poziva Interights) predviđa:

„Muškarac je počinio delo silovanja ako je (a) imao seksualni odnos sa že nom koja u vreme seksualnog odnosa na njega nije pristala (b) u slučaju da zna da ona ne pristaje svojom voljom na seksualni odnos ili ne mari za to da li je ona pristala ili ne.“

„Ovim se utvrđuje da u odnosu na krivično delo koje se sastoji od, ili obu hvata izvršenje seksualnog čina nad licem koje nije dalo pristanak, svaki propust ili omaška da to lice pruži otpor takvom činu, samo po sebi ne predstavlja prista nak na tu radnju“.

Član 180 stav 1 slovenačkog Krivičnog zakonika glasi:

„Svako ko primorava osobu istog ili suprotnog pola na seksualni odnos si lom ili pretnjom neposrednog napada na život i telo biće osuđen na kaznu zatvo ra u trajanju od jedne do deset godina.“

Član 1 (1) Zakona o seksualnim prekršajima Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva iz 1976. godine (amandman), kako navodi Interights, predviđa:

„Muškarac je počinio delo silovanja ako je (a) imao seksualni odnos sa ženom koja u vreme seksualnog odnosa na njega nije pristala (b) u slučaju da zna da ona ne pristaje svojom voljom na seksualni odnos ili ne mari za to da li je ona pristala ili ne.“

B. Preporuka (2002)5 Komiteta ministara Saveta Evrope o zaštiti žena od nasilja

Komitet ministara preporučuje da svaka država članica usvoji i pri meni, na način koji je najprimereniji za okolnosti u toj zemlji, niz mera u borbi protiv nasilja nad ženama. Stav 35 priloga uz Preporuku utvrđuje da, u oblasti krivičnog prava, svaka država članica treba, između ostalog, da:

„– kazni svaki seksualni čin koji je izvršen nad licima koja nisu dala svoj pristanak, čak i kada žrtva ne pokaže nikakve znake otpora;

– kazni svaku zloupotrebu položaja od strane počinioca, a posebno punoletne osobe visàvis deteta.“

C. Međunarodni krivični sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju

U predmetu Tužilaštvo protiv Anta Furundžije (predmet br. IT–95–17/1–T, presuda od 10. decembra 1998. godine), u smislu pitanja da li se može, prema međunarodnom pravu, prisilna oralna seksualna penetracija okarakterisati kao silovanje, sudsko veće je dalo sledeće relevantne napomene o silovanju prema međunarodnom krivičnom pravu:

„Sudsko veće ukazuje na neosporno stanovište ... da je silovanje čin prinude: to znači da je delo učinjeno „primenom sile ili pretnjama prinude protiv žrtve ili trećeg lica, bilo da su te pretnje eksplicitne ili implicitne ali koje izazivaju razu man strah kod žrtve da će on, ona ili treće lice biti predmet nasilja, zatvaranja, zastrašivanja ili psihičke represije...

...sve jurisdikcije koje je sudsko veće razmataralo zahtevaju element sile, prinude, pretnje ili delovanje bez pristanka žrtve: pojmu „sila“ dato je široko tumačenje tako da obuhvata zloupotrebu bespomoćnosti žrtve.“

Sudsko veće je definisalo silovanje kao:

„seksualnu penetraciju ... pod prinudom ili silom ili pretnjom protiv žrtve ili trećeg lica.“

Konstatujući da pojmovi „prinuda“, „sila“ ili „pretnja silom“ u defi nicijama u predmetu Furundžija nisu bili namenjeni za usko tumačenje, sudsko veće je u jednom drugom predmetu (Tužilaštvo protiv Kunarca, Kovača i Vukovića, predmet br. IT–96–23, presuda od 22. februara 2001. godine) reklo:

„Tvrdeći da relevantni čin seksualne penetracije čini silovanje samo ako je praćeno prinudom ili silom ili pretnjom silom protiv žrtve ili trećeg lica, defi nicija u predmetu Furundžija ne ukazuje na druge činioce koji mogu dovesti do seksualne penetracije za koju nije data saglasnost i koja se vrši protiv volje žrtve, što predstavlja ... kako se obrazlaže niže, po mišljenju ovog sudskog veća, tačan delokrug ovog aspekta definicije u međunarodnom pravu.

....osnovno načelo koje je zajednički (za nacionalne pravne sisteme koji su proučeni) jeste da seksualna penetracija predstavlja silovanje ako zaista nije bila dobrovoljna ili je bila bez pristanka žrtve... Sila, pretnja silom i prinuda su sva kako relevantne konsideracije u brojnim pravnim sistemima, ali pun opseg (re levantnih) odredaba ....ukazuju da stvarni zajednički imenitelj koji ujedinjuje različite sisteme može biti veći i sveobuhvatniji osnovni princip sankcionisanja kršenja seksualne autonomije.“

U predmetu Kunarac, Kovač i Vuković, naoružani vojnici su u oku piranoj zoni odveli muslimansku devojku u zgradu koja je služila kao vojni štab. Pošto su je dva vojnika tamo silovali, odvedena je u sobu gde je sama inicirala seksualni kontakt s glavnokomandujućim oficirom, optuženim Kunarcem. Sud sko veće je konstatovalo da su vojnici rekli žrtvi da bi trebalo da seksualno za dovolji komandanta ili rizikuje život. Zbog toga, ne može se smatrati da žrtva „nije slobodnom voljom pristala na seksualni odnos s Kunarcem [s obzirom] da je bila zarobljena i strahovala za svoj život. Sudsko veće je odbacilo odbranu Kunarca da nije znao da je žrtva inicirala seksualni odnos s njim zog toga što se bojala za svoj život. Sudsko veće je zaključilo da čak i da Kunarac nije čuo pret nje drugih vojnika, nije mogao biti „zbunjen“ ponašanjem žrtve, imajući u vidu opšti kontekst u ratnoj situaciji, a posebno specifično delikatnu situaciju u kojoj su se muslimanske devojke nalazile u toj oblasti.

U smislu gornjih činjenica, sudsko veće je iznelo sledeća zapažanja u vezi elemenata silovanja prema međunarodnom pravu:

„Osnovno načelo koje je zaista zajedničko za [proučene] pravne sisteme jeste da treba kažnjavati teška kršenja seksualne autonomije. Seksualna autonomije se povređuje kad god lice koje je predmet radnje za koju nije dalo pristanak slobod nom voljom ili na drugi način nije dobrovoljni učesnik u toj radnji.

„U praksi, odsustvo iskrenog i slobodno izraženog pristanka ili dobrovoljnog učešća se može dokazati postojanjem raznih drugih činilaca koji su nabrojani u drugim jurisdikcijama – kao što su sila, pretnje silom, ili iskorišćavanje lica koje nije u stanju da pruži otpor. Jasan pokazatelj da ovakvi činioci negiraju postojanje pravog pristanka nalazi se u onim jurisdikcijama u kojima je odsustvo saglasnosti element silovanja i gde je eksplicitno definisano da pristanak ne postoji kada [su prisutne] činjenice kao što je primena sile, nesvest, nesposobnost žrtve da pruži otpor ili kada počinilac pogrešno protumači situaciju.

...prinuda, sila ili pretnja silom [se ne smeju] usko tumačiti ... posebno pri nuda bi morala da obuhvati ukupno ponašanje kojim se poriče saglasnost...

U svetlu gornjih razmatranja, sudsko veće je mišljenja da actus reus krivič nog dela silovanja u međunarodnom pravu čini .... seksualna penetracija ...kada se dešava bez saglasnosti žrtve. Za ovu svrhu, saglasnost mora biti dobrovoljno izražena, data slobodnom voljom žrtve, koja se procenjuje u kontekstu postojećih okolnosti. Mens rea je namera da se izvrši seksualna penetracija i svest o tome da se ona vrši bez saglasnosti žrtve.“

U istom predmetu, po žalbi koju su uložili počinioci a koja se, iz među ostalog, zasnivala na argumentu da nema silovanja bez primene sile ili pretnje silom i „stalnog“ ili „stvarnog“ otpora žrtve, Apelaciono veće je u svojoj presudi od 12. juna 2002. godine izjavilo:

„To što podnositelji žalbe drsko tvrde da ništa osim kontinuiranog otpora ne može ukazati počiniocu na to da njegovi nasrtaji nisu poželjni, pravno je pogrešno i po činjenicama apsurdno.

Drugo, u odnosu na ulogu sile u definisanju silovanja, Apelaciono veće je izjavilo da se čini da je sudsko veće odstupilo od ranijih definicija krivičnog dela silovanja datih od strane Suda. Međutim, objašnjavajući svoju usredsređenost na nepostojanje pristanka kao conditio sine qua non silovanja, sudsko veće ne odbacuje raniju praksu Suda, već pokušava da objasni odnos između sile i pristanka. Primena sile ili pretnja silom su jasan dokaz nepostojanja pristanka, ali sila nije silovanje per se. Sudsko veće je posebno htelo da objasni da postoje „faktori (pored sile) koji mogu da dovedu do čina seksualne penetracije na koji žrtva nije pristala ili u kojem žrtva ne učestvuje dobrovoljno. Usko usredsređivanje na silu ili pretnju silom može dovesti do toga da počinioci izbegnu odgovornost za seksualnu radnju na koju druga strana nije pristala, koristeći okolnosti prinude bez primene fizičke sile...

U najvećem broju slučajeva, podnosioci žalbe u ovom predmetu, su bili osuđeni za silovanja žena koje su de facto držane u vojnim objektima, zatvorima i stanovima koji su se vodili kao stanovi vojnika. Najstrašniji aspekt je činjenica da su žrtve smatrane legitimnim seksualnim plenom njihovih otmičara.

Žene je silovalo više počinilaca i to toliko često da je to skoro nezamislivo. (Žene koje su u početku tražile pomoć ili pružale otpor bile su izložene još većoj brutalnosti). Takva pritvaranja ukazuju na okolnosti koje su toliko prisilne da ne giraju svaku mogućnost pristanka.“

D. Komitet Ujedinjenih nacija za eliminisanje diskriminacije prema ženama

Komitet je u svojoj Opštoj preporuci od 19. i 29. januara 1992. godine o nasilju prema ženama dao sledeću preporuku u stavu 24:

„(a) Države ugovornice bi trebalo da preduzmu odgovarajuće i delotvorne mere za prevazilaženje svih oblika nasilja zasnovanih na polu i rodu, bilo da je to javni ili privatni čin.

(b) Države ugovornice treba da obezbede da zakonima protiv ...zlostavljanja, silovanja, seksualnog napada, i drugog nasilja koje se zasniva na polu i rodu, pruži adekvatna zaštita svih žena, kao i da se poštuje njihov integritet i dostojanstvo...“

PRAVO

I NAVODNA KRŠENJA ČLANOVA 3, 8 i 13 KONVENCIJE

Podnositeljka predstavke se žalila da bugarsko zakonodavstvo i praksa ne pružaju delotvornu zaštitu od silovanja i seksualnog zlostavljanja, s obzirom da su krivični postupci pokretani samo u slučajevima kada su žrtve pružale otpor, kao i da nadležni organi nisu na efikasan način istražili događaje od 31. jula i 1. avgusta 1995. godine. Prema njenom mišljenju to predstavlja kršenje pozitivnih obaveza od strane države da štiti fizički integritet pojedinca i njegov privatni život, kao i da obezbedi delotvorne pravne lekove u tom smislu.
Relevantne odredbe Konvencije glase:

Član 3

„Niko ne sme biti podvrgnut mučenju, ili nečovečnom ili ponižavajućem postupanju ili kažnjavanju.“

Član 8 stav 1

„Svako ima pravo na poštovanje svog privatnog ... života.“

Član 13

„Svako kome su povređena prava i slobode predviđeni ovom Konvencijom ima pravo na delotvoran pravni lek pred nacionalnim vlastima, bez obzira jesu li povredu izvršili lica koja su postupala u službenom svojstvu.“

A. Podnesci stranaka

1. Podnositeljka predstavke

Podnositeljka predstavke je bila mišljenja da, u slučajevima silovanja, domaće pravo i praksa treba da utvrde postojanje ili odsustvo pristanka na seksualni odnos na osnovu svih relevantnih činjenica. Prema njenom mišljenju, pravni okvir i praksa koji zahtevaju da se pruži dokaz o fizičkom otporu od stra ne žrtve nisu adekvatni, pa tako neka silovanja ostaju nekažnjena.
Podnositeljka predstavke se pozvala na mišljenje stručnjaka koje je podnela (ističući da većina dece i mladih koji su žrtve silovanja doživljavaju pasivne psihičke reakcije panike – videti gore stavove 69–71), kao i na razvoj međunarodnog i uporednog pravu vezan za elemente krivičnog dela silovanja.
Podnositeljka predstavke je dala svoju analizu bugarskog zakona i prakse koji se tiču silovanja i seksualnog zlostavljanja. Podnela je sledeće argumente:

(i) Prema praksi bugarskih istražnih organa i organa gonjenja, krivični postupak za silovanje je moguć samo ako prostoje dokazi o primeni fizičke sile i fizičkom otporu. U odsustvu tih dokaza, dolazi se do zaključka o pristanku na seksualni odnos.

(ii) Pošto odluke istražnog organa i tužioca nisu bile javno dostupne, nije bilo moguće podržati gornju tvrdnju direktno uz pomoć analize nekog drugog slučaja iz sudske prakse; one su se mogle naći u relevantnim predmetima, a nije postojao ni sistem klasifikacije, izveštavanja ili analiza koji bi mogli da posluže kao osnov za analizu. Pored toga, praksa osporavanja se ne bazira na pisanim instrukcijama, već na institucionalnoj tradiciji i kulturi.

(iii) S obzirom na postojeću politiku da organi gonjenja ne podižu optužnicu kada ne postoje dokazi o primeni sile i fizičkom otporu, predmet i nije mogao da se rešava na sudu.

(iv) Ipak, pregledom izveštaja o presudama Vrhovnog suda i Vrhovnog kasacionog suda (nije bilo izveštaja o presudama sudova niže instance) dolazi se do posrednog dokaza o vrsti slučajeva koje organi gonjenja verovatno prosleđuju sudu. Podnositeljka predstavke je istražila sve presude u predmetima silovanja i podnela primerke dvadeset i jedne presude za koje je njen advokat smatrao da su relevantne.

(v) Skoro svi prijavljeni slučajevi su se odnosili na silovanje u kojima je primenjena značajna fizička sila i/ili pretnje. Ti slučajevi su uglavnom uključivali sledeće nasilne radnje: odvlačenje žrtve iz automobila u kuću i njeno zatvaranje; cepanje odeće i udaranje; zadavanje udaraca u glavu, šutiranje; davljenje žrtve; izazivanje potresa mozga i preloma nosa; ili udaranje koje izaziva veliko krvarenje. U nekoliko slučajeva žrtvi se pretilo nasiljem i drugim posledicama. U tri slučaja, žrtve su ili pokušale ili izvršile samoubistvo.

Proučavanje predmeta je ukazalo na samo dva slučaja u kojima se mogao uočiti širi, za sam kontekst vezan, pristup. U jednom slučaju nastavnik, posle pokušaja da flertuje s učenicom, primorao ju je na seksualni odnos više puta u određenom vremenskom periodu, preteći joj nasiljem i negativnim posledicama po nju u školi. Vrhovni sud je, u ovom slučaju, utvrdio da je bilo ponovljenih radnji silovanja primenom pretnji, kao i da je žrtva vremenom dovedena u stanje psihičke zavisnosti. U drugom slučaju, četrnaestogodišnju devojčicu koja je bolovala od epilepsije i bila mentalno retardirana je silovao poznanik njene porodice; sudovi su konstatovali da je devojčica pružala slab otpor (pokušala je da ustane nakon što ju je počinilac gurnuo na pod), ali su zaključili da je taj „stepen otpora“, posmatrano u kontekstu uzrasta i zdravlja devojčice, bio „dovoljan da pokaže devojčicinu nespremnost na seks“.

Podnositeljka predstavke je podnela kopiju pisma bugarskog psihoterapeutkinje koja radi sa žrtvama seksualnog nasilja u kome kaže da, prema njenom iskustvu, organi gonjenja podižu optužnicu samo u slučajevima kada je napadač nepoznat žrtvi, u slučaju teže povreda i u slučaju kada ima svedoka. Prema mišljenju podnositeljke predstavka, to potvrđuje njene tvrdnje da se u praksi predominanto zaključuje da postoji pristanak žrtve ako nema dovoljno dokaza o pružanju otpora.
Pored toga, ona je izjavila da postavivši minimalnu starosnu granicu od 14 godina za stupanje u seksualne odnose uz pristanak, i ograničavanjem na gonjenje iskuljučivo slučajeva silovanja gde je žrtva pružila žestok otpor, organi nisu dovoljno zaštitili decu od silovanja.
Podnositeljka predstavke je tvrdila da su, u njenom slučaju, tužioci dali neprimereno velik značaj odsustvu fizičkog nasilja i da nisu uzeli u obzir činjenicu da do tada, sa 14 godina, nikada nije samostalno donosila važne odlu ke, a posebno ne pod pritiskom. Tužioci nisu uzeli u obzir činjenicu da je malo verovanto da bi četrnaestogodišnja devojčica, koja do tada nije imala seksualne odnose, pristala na seks s dva muškarca zaredom.
Dalje, istraga nije bila temeljna i kompletna. Nije istraženo najvažnije pitanje vremenskih intervala u kretanju tri muškarca i podnositeljke predstavke sporne noći – čime bi se mogla dokazati tvrdnja da oni nisu bili u restoranu po sle silovanja kraj jezera. Zanemarena su protivrečnosti u dokazima. Nije utvrđe no ko je bio u policijskoj patroli koja ih je nakratko zaustavila na putu ka jezeru. Istražni organ je prihvatio da je svedočenje navodnih počinilaca istinito, kao i svedoka koje su oni predložili, i nije proverovao ili je ignorisao iskaze drugih svedoka, kao i izjavu podnositeljke predstavke o događanjima te noći.
Prema mišljenju podnositeljke predstavke, posmatrano u kontekstu svih relevantnih činjenica, njeno jasno i dosledno svedočenje da je preklinjala P. da prestane i da ga je gurala od sebe sve dok joj nije zavrnuo ruke, kao i njena izjava o tome da je osećala veliku uznemirenost – razumno u datim okolnosti ma – trebalo je da vode gonjenju i kažnjavanju počinilaca samo da se primenilo tačno tumačenje „silovanja“ u skladu s pozitivnim obavezama Države prema čla novima 3, 8 i 13 Konvencije.

2. Država

Zastupnici države su izjavili da je istraga bila temeljna i efikasna. Prema njima, preduzeti su svi mogući potrebni koraci: saslušano je sedamnaest lica, neki od njih i više puta, imenovani su veštaci iz oblasti psihijatrije i psi hologije, svi aspekti slučaja su istraženi. Država je stoga bila mišljenja da je u potpunosti osnovan zaključak nacionalnih organa da su P. i A. delovali na osno vu pretpostavke da postupaju uz pristanak podnositeljke predstavke. Posebno, državni organi su zasnovali svoj stav na osnovu svih dokaza o događajima koji su se odigrali 31. jula i 1. avgusta 1995. godine, kao na saznanjima o ponašanju podnositeljke predstavke. Pored toga, podnositeljka predstavke je izašla s P. na kon spornih događanja i svedoci su izjavili da je njena majka pokušala da iznudi novac od P. i A. u zamenu da odustane od tvrdnji o silovanju.
Prema izjavama Države, činjenice iz ovog slučaja se, prema tome, ne mogu odnositi na pitanje zaštite integriteta ličnosti niti na zlostavljanje, pa shod no tome, ne može se govoriti o pozitivnim obavezama na osnovu članova 3 i 8 Konvencije.
Država je smatrala, da, u svakom slučaju, bugarski zakon i praksa u slučajevima silovanja, kao i njihova primena u ovom predmetu ne predstavlja povredu pozitivnih obaveza iz Konvencije.
Opisujući domaće pravo i praksu, u svojim prvobitnim podnesci ma, u fazi utvrđivanja prihvatljivosti predstavke, Država je izjavila da se dokaz o pruženom fizičkom otporu traži u slučajevima silovanja, štaviše, da je prema „međunarodnoj praksi, uključujući i francusku“ silovanje moguće samo između nepoznatih lica, dok je podnositeljka predstavke poznavala navodne počinioce.
U podnescima u fazi merituma, Država je ispravila svoje ranije tvrdnje i izjavila da je, prema bugarskom zakonu, odsustvo pristanka jedan od suštinskih elemenata za dokazivanje silovanja. Dokaz o odsustvu pristanka proističe iz dokaza koji ukazuju na to da je žrtva bila u bespomoćnom stanju ili da ju je počinilac doveo u takvo stanje, ili iz dokaza o fizičkom i psihičkom nasilju od strane počinilaca. Država je podnela kopije nekoliko relevantnih presuda Vrhovnog suda. Država nije osporavala pouzdanost analize bugarske sudske prakse od strane podnositeljke predstavke.
U slučaju podnositeljke predstavke – Država je tvrdila – da, nakon detaljne i nepristrasne istrage organi nisu ustanovili onoliko dokaza koliko bi bilo potrebno da se utvrdi da je krivično delo silovanja izvršeno i koje treba krivično kazniti. S druge strane, podnositeljka predstavke je mogla da podnese građansku tužbu protiv navodnih počinilaca za naknadu štete. Podnositeljka predstavke bi morala da dokaže nezakonitost radnji počinilaca, ali ne bi se tražio dokaz o mens rea.
Na kraju, Država je izjavila da je podnositeljka predstavke imala na raspolaganju delotvorne krivične i građanske pravne lekove, kako je predviđeno članom 13 Konvencije.

3. Primedbe Interightsa

(a) Opšte primedbe

Treće lice u postupku je izjavilo da je u poslednje dve decenije tradi cionalna definicija silovanja promenjena kako u jurisdikcijama kontinentalnog i precedentnog prava, tako i u međunarodnom pravu. Ovo je rezultat prome ne u shvatanju prirode ovog krivičnog dela i načina na koji ga žrtva doživljava. Istraživanja su pokazala da žene, a posebno maloletnice, često ne pružaju fizički otpor silovanju zbog parališućeg straha, ili zato što su želele da se na taj način zaštite od rastućeg nivoa sile koja se primenjivala nad njima.
Interights je izjavio da je reforma zakonodavstva o krivičnom delu silovanja odraz promene pristupa u odnosu na pristanak žrtve, s „istorijskog pri stupa“ na „pristup pravičnosti“. Silovanje je bilo krivično delo protiv autonomije žene i njegov suštinski element je bio nepostojanje pristanka žrtve. Ono što je podstaklo reforme zakonodavstva koje se odnosi na silovanje, bila je potreba da se jasno predvidi da za dokazivanje odsustva pristanka nije neophodno utvrditi da li je optuženi savladao fizički otpor žrtve.
Takva tendencija je imala uticaja na promene u međunarodnom krivičnom pravu. Međunardni krivični sudovi za Ruandu i bivšu Jugoslaviju su okarakterisali silovanje kao seksualnu penetraciju „u okolnostima u kojima se primenjuje prinuda“ ili radnje koje su izvršene „pod prinudom, uz primenu sile ili pretnji silom“. Ovaj pristup je prihvaćen i unet u Statut Međunarodnog krivičnog suda, kao i u nacrt njegovog Poslovnika.

(b) Podnesci o pravu nekoliko zemalja

Interights je podneo kao primer kopije izveštaja o relevantnom pravu u nekoliko evropskih i neevropskih zemalja, koje su pripremili profesori prava i stručnjaci, ili saradnici koji su učestvovali u istraživanjima. Saznanja i procene koji su u izveštajima sadržani mogu se sumirati na sledeći način:

(i) Belgija

Spisak situacija iz člana 375 Krivičnog zakonika Belgije, kako je izme njen 1989. godine, u kojima nije bilo pristanka je sastavljen kako bi se očuvala sudska praksa od pre 1989. godine. Ovaj spisak situacija se ne smatra iscrpnim i može se proširivati, iako je jedan komentator bio suprotnog mišljenja.
U prošlosti, da bi se dokazalo silovanje, bilo je potrebno pružiti dokaz o dovoljno ozbiljnim i fizički nasilnim radnjama koje imaju za cilj da slome, parališu i unište otpor žrtve. Izmenama iz 1989. godine pojam „ozbiljna pretnja“ (koji je postojao u Krivičnom zakoniku od 1867) je zamenjen širim pojmom „prinuda“, koji obuhvata ne samo nečji strah za fizički integritet, već i bilo koji vid straha.
Danas se od tužioca traži da dokaže seksualnu penetraciju i odsustvo pristanka. Svi elementi koji mogu da dokažu nepostojanje pristanka se uzimaju u obzir, ali tužilaštvo će najčešće pokušati da dokaže prisustvo bar jednog činioca koji „negira postojanje pristanka“, kako se navodi u drugom stavu člana 375, odnosno postojanje nasilja, prinude, lukavstva ili invaliditeta.
Smatra se da je dokazano da ne postoji pristanak ako postoji dokaz da je pružen fizički otpor. Međutim, čak i kada nema dokaza o fizičkom nasilju ili pružanju fizičkog otpora, dovoljan je dokaz o postojanju prinude. Kod utvr đivanja da li je postojala prinuda ili ne, potrebno je proceniti sposobnosti žrtve (uzrast, stvarno stanje u vreme izvšenja dela).
Postoji razlika u minimalnom uzrastu za pristanak na seksualne rad nje svih vrsta (zakonom predviđene bludne radnje), s jedne strane i za radnje koje uključuju seksualnu penetraciju (obljuba maloletnog lica), s druge. Minimalna starosna granica za pristanak na seksualnu penetraciju je 14 godina, a minimalni uzrasti za pristanak na seksualne radnje svake vrste je 16 godina. Shodno tome, seksualni odnos s licem između 14 i 16 godina starosti kada ne postoje dokazi o nepostojanju pristanka kažnjavaće se kao zakonom kažnjive bludne radnje. U praksi, kada je žrtva uzrasta između 14 i 16 godina, daleko više ima optužbi za zakonom predviđene bludne radnje nego optužnica za silovanje.

(ii) Danska

Danas se pojam prinude shvata šire i ne ograničava se samo na pretnje teškim nasiljem.
Dokaz o odsustvu pristanka posebno je važan u slučajevima kada se optuženi i žrtva poznaju. Iako bi samo izgovoreno „ne“ trebalo da bude dovoljno da se shvati da nema pristanka, može biti veoma teško dokazati da je „ne“ ozbilj no shvaćeno i da je žrtva tako i mislila.
U predmetu iz 1982. godine, čovek koji je optužen za silovanje šesna estogodišnje devojke oslobođen je na osnovu toga što nije shvatio da odnos nije bio dobrovoljan. Optuženi je poveo devojku da se provozaju kombijem. Tvrdio je da je devojka želela da je odveze njenoj kući. Devojka je tvrdila da je ona bila primorana da prihvati ponudu da je odvede kući jer je optuženi uneo njen bicikl u kombi. Tokom vožnje optuženi je pričao o svojim seksualnim problemima i potrebama. Optuženi je shvatio činjenicu da mu je devojka dozvolila da priča o takvim temama kao prihvatanje i da je situacija vodila ka intimnom kontak tu. Žrtva se plašila da će on postati nasilan ako mu ona ne dozvoli da priča. U jednom momentu optuženi je zaustavio vozilo i tražio od nje da uđe u prtljaž nik, gde je i došlo do seksualnog odnosa. Optuženi je više puta pitao žrtvu da li pristaje ili ne. Žrtva je kasnije tvrdila da joj je stao mozak i da je bila uplašena. Prvostepeni sud je proglasio optuženog krivim smatrajući da devojka nije prista la, kao i da je optuženi delovao s namerom, s obzirom da je imao razloga da pita žrtvu za pristanak samo ako je sumnjao da ona pristaje na seksualni odnos. Međutim, Apelacionu sud je stao na stanovište da izjava optuženog da je pasivnost žrtve shvatio kao pristanak se ne može zanemariti i oslobodio ga.

(iii) Irska

Načelo da tužilaštvo mora da dokaže odsustvo pristanka, a ne postaja nje primene sile, dobro je poznato. Odsustvo pristanka je pitanje činjeničnog sta nja o čemu odlučuje porota, na osnovu svih relevantnih okolonosti i na osnovu uputstva sudije. U pogledu mens rea, optuženi ima mogućnost da se brani doka zivanjem postojanja „iskrenog uverenja“, tako da on ima pravo na oslobađajuću presudu ako dokaže da zaista nije znao da žrtva nije dala svoj pristanak.

(iv) Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo

Definicija silovanja u precedentnom pravu, pre 1976. godine, glasila je „nezakonit seksualni odnos sa ženom bez njenog pristanka, uz upotrebu sile, zastrašivanja i prevarom“. Ranije su se kao dokaz o upotrebi sile i pružanju otpora tražile telesne povrede.
Prema sadašnjem zakonu, posle 1976. godine, na tužilaštvu je da do kaže da žrtva nije dala svoj pristanak. Odsustvo pristanka je ključni element actus reus. Teret dokazivanja je na tužilaštvu. Ne postoji zakonska definicija pristanka ili odsustva istog. „Nije bilo pristanka“ je pitanje činjeničnog stanja o kojem od lučuje porota poštujući instrukcije sudije. U vodećem predmetu Olugboja [1982], Queenćs Bench [1981] All England Law Reports 443, optuženi i njegov prijatelj su odvezli kolima dve tinejdžerke. Umesto da ih odvezu kući, odvezli su ih u jednu drugu kuću u kojoj je prijatelj optuženog silovao jednu od devojaka, kojoj je bilo 16 godina. Nakon toga, i optuženi je imao seksualni odnos s njom. Rekao joj je da skine pantalone. Ona je to uradila jer je bila uplašena i soba je bila u mraku. Ona mu je rekla, „zašto me ne ostaviš na miru“. On ju je gurnuo na kauč i imao seksualni odnos s njom. Nije plakala niti se borila. Optuženi je osuđen za silovanje. Sudija lord Dan (Dunn) je izjavio:

„[Porota] bi trebalo da obrati pažnju na to da pristanku ili odsustvu pri stanka treba dati uobičajeno značenje i, ako je potrebno, primera radi, da postoji razlika između pristanka i pokoravanja; svaki pristanak uključuje i pokoravanje, ali ni u kom slučaju to ne znači da samo pokoravanje podrazumeva pristanak... [Porota] bi trebalo da se usredsredi na stanje duha žrtve neposredno pre seksu alnog odnosa, uzimajući u obzir sve relevantne okolnosti, a posebno događanja koja su prethodila tom činu, kao i žrtvinu reakciju na iste koja ukazuje na to kako su ti događaji uticali na njeno stanje duha“.

Prema nekim pravnim tumačenjim, uprkos predmetu Olugboja, malo je verovatno da bi tužilaštvo pokrenulo postupak u slučajevima kada se žene pokore u okolnostima sa sličnom pshihičkom prinudom i namamljivanjem kao u predmetu Olugboja, ali bez pretnji.
Tužilaštvo, takođe, mora da dokaže mens rea za silovanje, odnosno da je počinilac znao da žrtva ne pristaje ili je pokazao nemar u odnosu na to da li ona pristaje ili ne. Smatra se da je počinilac nemaran ako „o tome uopšte nije razmišljao“, ili je svestan da drugo lice „možda nije pristalo ali je on ipak nastavio“ (R. protiv. Gardiner [1994] Criminal Law Reports 455).

(v) Sjedinjene Američke Države

Pedeset država SAD definiše ono što se uobičajeno naziva „silovanje“ na nekoliko različitih načina, ali uprkos značajnim razlikama u formulaciji, sve države se fokusiraju na to da li je bilo pristanka. Posebno je ustanovljeno načelo da se od žrtve ne traži da dokaže da je pružala otpor kako bi dokazala da nije pristala na taj čin. Dovoljno je da dokaže da je verbalno izrazila neslaganje. U predmetu Commonwelth v. Berkovitz (641 A.2d 1161 (Pensilvanija, 1994)), optuženi je imao seksualni odnos s poznanicom u svojoj sobi u studentskom domu iako je ona izgovarala reč „ne“ za vreme odnosa. Sudovi Pensilvanije su, u ovom predmetu, stali na stanovište da je nekoliko puta izrečeno „ne“ od strane žrtve dovoljan dokaz nepostojanja njenog pristanka.
U trideset sedam država, seksualni odnos bez pristanka, a bez pri mene sile kojoj se ne može odupreti (dodatna sila u poređenju s uobičajenom koja je potrebna da se izvrši seksualna penetracija) se izričito, po zakonu, smatra teškim krivičnim delom, seksualnim zločinom najvišeg reda, ili prekršajem. Iako se, prema formulacijama korišćenim u zakonima preostalih dvanaest država, čini da se može tražiti dokaz o primeni dodatne sile, sudovi u tih dvanaest država su prihvatili da je, na primer, zakonski uslov da se dokaže primena sile ispunjen u slučaju da optuženi samo gurne ili pritisne žrtvu nadole ili na neki drugi način fizički manipuliše njom; za utvrđivanje postojanja sile traži se odgovor na pitanje „da li je radnja izvršena protiv volje [žrtve]“ (Freeman v. State, 959 S.W.2d 401 (Arkanzas 1998)). Prema tome, „sila“ je utvrđena kada počinilac „pritisne svo jom telesnom težinom žrtvu“ i kada je počinilac „krupan“ i „snažan“, a žrtva „sitna“ i niska“ (State v. Coleman, 727 A.2d 246 (Konetikat, 1999) i State v. Plunkett, 934 P.2d 113 (Kanzas, 1997)). Vrhovni sud Nju Džersija je zaključio: „[S]vaki čin seksualne penetracije .... bez potvrdne i slobodno izražene do zvole žrtve... je krivično delo seksualnog napada. Prema tome, fizička sila koja je veća od one koja je svojstvena činu seksualne penetracije se ne mora dokazati da bi penetracija bila nezakonita (U interesu M. T. S. (In the Interest of M. T. S.), 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N. J. 1992)).“
U prošlosti brojne države su tražile da žrtva dokaže pružanje „izu zetnog otpora“. Danas to više nije uslov. Samo dve države (Alabama i Zapadna Virdžinija) i dalje traže da žrtva seksualnog napada dokaže da je pružala „ozbi ljan“ otpor; ali one ne traže da žrtva pruža otpor ako veruje da pružanjem otpora neće ništa promeniti ili otpor može za posledicu da ima telesnu povredu (Richar ds v. State, 457 So.2d 893 (Alabama, 1985) – gde je dokazano pružanje ozbiljnog otpora njenim molbama da je ostavi i prekine).
Sudovi u Sjedinjenim Državama sve više uzimaju u obzir podatke re levantih naučnih mišljenja koji upućuju na to da žrtve seksualnih napada reagu ju na nepredvidive načine u uslovima psihičkog i fizičkog zlostavljanja. Na pri mer, Vrhovni sud Nju Džersija se 1992. godine, prilikom odustajanja od primene zahteva za dokazivanjem pružanja otpora u osudi za seksualni napad, pozvao na „empirijska istraživanja“ koja su osporila „pretpostavku da je najžešći otpor ili maksimalni otpor koji žrtva može da pruži najrazumija i najracionalnija reakcija na silovanje“. Tačno je da počinioci često pribegavaju suptilnim obilicima prinu de ili maltretiranju kada je to dovoljno da savladaju žrtve. U većini slučajeva silo vanja dece, primena sile nije ni potrebna da bi se postiglo potčinjavanje. Sudovi takođe prihvataju da se neke žene od početka seksualnog napada parališu od straha pa nisu sposobne da pruže otpor (People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183, 1189 (Kalifornija, 1994)).

(vi) Drugi pravni sistemi

Interights je takođe podneo analize relevantnog prava Australije, Ka nade i Južnoafričke Republike, zaključujući da odsustvo saglasnosti predstavlja elemenat kojim se utvrđuje silovanje i seksualno zlostavljanje u ovim zemljama, pa se ne zahteva dokaz o primeni fizičke sile od strane počinioca niti o pruže nom otporu od strane žrtve.

B. Procena Suda

1. Opšti pristup

(a) Postojanje pozitivne obaveze da se kazni silovanje i istraže slučajevi silovanja

S obzirom na prirodu i suštinu žalbi podnositeljke predstavke u ovom konkretnom predmetu, Sud je mišljenja da se one prvenstveno moraju razmotri ti u vezi sa članovima 3 i 8 Konvencije.
Sud ponavlja da obaveza prema članu 1 Konvencije Visokih strana ugovornica da obezbede svakom prava i slobode koje su predviđene Konvenci jom u okrivu njihove nadležnosti, uzeto skupa sa članom 3, zahteva da Visoka strana ugovornica preduzme sve predviđene mere kako bi obezbedila pojedin cima da, u okviru njene nadležnosti, ne budu predmet zlostavljanja, uključujući zlostavljanje od strane drugih privatnih pojedinaca (vidi A. v the United King dom, presuda od 23. septembra 1998. godine, Reports on Judgments and Deci sions 1998–VI, str. 2699, st. 22; Z. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], br. 29392/95, st. 73–75, ECHR 2001– V; i E. and Others v the United Kingdom, br. 33218/96, 26. novembar 2002. godine).
U skladu sa članom 8 Konvencije, pozitivne obaveze Države čine sa stavni deo prava na poštovanje privatnog života: ove obaveze mogu usloviti usva janje mera čak i u sferi odnosa između pojedinaca. Iako izbor sredstava kojima se obezbeđuje poštovanje člana 8 u oblasti zaštite od dela pojedinaca, u načelu u okviru polja slobodne procene države, delotvorno sprečavanje teških krivičnih dela kao što je silovanje, kada su u pitanju osnovne vrednosti i vitalni aspekti privatnog života, zahteva delotvorne odredbe krivičnog prava. Posebno deca i drugi ugroženi pojedinci imaju pravo na delotvornu zaštitu (vidi X. and Y. v. The Netherlands, presuda od 26. marta 1985. godine, Series A No. 91. str. 11–13, st. 23–24 i 27, i August v. the United Kingdom (odl.), br. 36505/02, 21. januar 2003)
U više slučajeva, član 3 Konvencije utvrđuje pozitivnu obavezu drža ve da se sprovede zvanična istraga (vidi presudu u predmetu Assenov and others v. Bulgaria, presuda od 28. oktobra 1998, Reports 1998–VIII, str. 3290, st. 102). Ne može se smatrati da je ta pozitivna obaveza, u načelu, ograničena samo na slučajeve zlostavljanja od strane službenih lica države (videti, mutatis mutandis, Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], br. 32967/96, ECHR 2002–I).
Dalje, Sud ne isključuje mogućnost da se pozitivna obaveza države u skladu sa članom 8 Konvencije koja pruža zaštitu fizičkog integriteta pojedinca može proširiti i na pitanja koja se odnose na delotvornost krivičnih istraga (vidi Osman v. the United Kingdom, presuda od 28. oktobra 1998, Reports 1998–VIII, str. 3164, st. 128).
Po tom osnovu, Sud smatra da države imaju pozitivnu obavezu koja je sastavni deo članova 3 i 8 Konvencije da donesu krivičnopravne odredbe koje predviđaju delotvorno kažnjavanje dela silovanja, kao i da ih primenjuje kroz sprovođenje delotvorne istrage i krivičnog gonjenja.

(b) Moderan koncept elemenata silovanja i njegov uticaj na suštinu pozitivne obaveze država da pruže adekvatnu zaštitu

U pogledu načina pružanja adekvatne zaštite od silovanja, države svakako imaju široko polje slobodne procene. Posebno se moraju uzeti u obzir kultura, lokalne okolnosti i tradicionalni pristupi.
Odredbe Konvencije ipak određuju granice polja slobodne procene nacionalnih organa. Pošto Konvencija predstavlja prvi i glavni sistem zaštite ljudskih prava, Sud u tumčenju njenih odredbi mora voditi računa o okolnostima koje se menjaju unutar država ugovornica, i reagovati, na primer, na svako primećeno odstupanje od standarda koji treba da se postigne (vidi Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], br. 28957/95, st. 74, ECHR 2002–VI).
Sud konstatuje da se ranije, po zakonima i sudskoj praksi više zema lja, tražio dokaz o pružanju fizičkog otpora u slučajevima silovanja. Međutim, poslednjih decenija primećeno je da se u Evropi i nekim drugim delovima sveta jasno i sigurno napuštaju formalističke definicije i uska tumačenja zakona u ovoj oblasti (vidi gore stavove 88–108 i 126–147).
Prvo, čini se da zahtev da žrtva mora da pruži fizički otpor više nije prisutan u zakonodavstvima evropskih zemalja.
U državama precedentnog prava, u Evropi i drugde, pozivanje na pru žanje fizičkog otpora je izbrisano iz zakona i/ili sudske prakse (vidi stavove 98, 100 i 138–147– i to u Irskoj, Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu, Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama i drugim zemljama). Irsko pravo izričito kaže da se ne može zaključiti da je postojao pristanak samo zato što nije pružen otpor (vidi gore stav 98).
U većini evropskih država s kontinentalnom pravnom tradicijom, de finicija silovanja sadrži reference na primenu nasilja i pretnji nasiljem od strane počinioca. Međutim, značajno je da se u sudskoj praksi i pravnoj teoriji odsustvo pristanka, a ne primena sile, smatraju konsitutivnim elementom krivičnog dela silovanja (vidi gore stavove 90–97, 99 i 130–137).
Belgijski zakon je izmenjen 1989. godine, tako da sada predviđa da svaki čin seksualne penetracije čini silovanje ako je izvršen nad osobom koja nija dala pristanak. Znači, iako „nasilje, prinuda ili lukavstvo“ i dalje stoje u zakonu kao radnje koje su kažnjive ukoliko se njima nameće radnja bez pristanka, nasi lje i/ili fizički otpor ne predstavljaju elemente silovanja u belgijskom pravu (vidi gore stavove 90 i 130–134)
Bez obzira na specifične formulacije u zakonima, u mnogim zemlja ma krivično gonjenje seksualnih radnji bez pristanka se u praksi sprovodi na osnovu tumačenja relevantnih zakonskih pojmova („prinuda“, „nasilje“, „pret nja“, „lukavstvoprevara“, „prepad“ i drugi) i kroz procenu dokaza s većim razu mevanjem konteksta događaja (vidi gore stavove 95 i 130–147).
Sud takođe konstatuje da su se države članice Saveta Evrope, preko Komiteta ministara saglasile da je kažnjavanje seksualnih radnji bez pristanka, „[uključujući] i slučaje kada žrtva ne pokazuje znake otpora“, neophodno radi delotvorne zaštite žena od nasilja (vidi gore stav 101), i tražile da se hitno spro vedu dalje reforme u ovoj oblasti.
U međunarodnom krivičnom pravu je nedavno priznato da sila nije element silovanja, kao i da je iskorišćavanje prinudnih okolnosti za vršenje sek sualnih radnji kažnjivo. Međunarodni krivični sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju je stao na stanovište da u međunarodnom krivičnom pravu svaka seksualna penetracija bez pristanka žrtve čini silovanje, da se pristanak mora dati dobrovoljno, slobod nom voljom i prema proceni datih okolnosti (vidi gore stavove 102–107). Iako je gornja definicija formulisana za poseban kontekst silovanja koja su počinjena protiv stanovništva u uslovima oružanih sukoba, ona takođe odražava univerzal ni trend u vezi s pitanjem da li je bilo pristanka kao suštinskog elementa silova nja i seksualnog zlostavljanja.
Prema mišljenju zainteresovane strane, došlo je do promene u shva tanju načina na koji žrtva doživljava silovanje, što pokazuje da žrtve silovanja i seksualnog zlostavljanja – posebno maloletne devojke – često ne pružaju nikakav fizički otpor zbog raznih psiholoških faktora, ili zato što se boje da će počinilac upotrebiti silu.
Štaviše, razvoj prava i prakse u ovoj oblasti ukazuju na evoluciju društva ka delotvornoj pravičnosti i poštovanju seksualne autonomije svakog pojedinca.
U svetlu gore navedenog, Sud je uveren da svaki rigidan pristup u krivičnom gonjenju seksualnih krivičnih dela, kao što je traženje dokaza o pru žanju fizičkog otpora u svim okolnostima, dovodi do opasnosti da određene vr ste silovanja ostanu nekažnjene, čime se ugrožava delotvorna zaštita seksualne autonomije pojedinca. U skladu sa savremenim standardima i trendovima u ovoj oblasti, pozitivne obaveze država članica prema članovima 3 i 8 Konvencije se moraju posmatrati kao zahtev za kažnjavanjem i delotvornim gonjenjem svakog seksualnog čina izvršenog bez saglasnosti žrtve, uključujući i slučajeve kada žr tva nije pružala fizički otpor.

(c) Zadatak Suda po ovom predmetu

U svetlu gore navedenog, zadatak Suda je da ispita da li su, ili ne zakonodavstvo i praksa koji se osporavaju, i njihova primena u ovom predmetu, u kombinaciji s navodnim propustima u istrazi, imali značajne propuste koji su doveli do kršenja pozitivne obaveze tužene države prema članovima 3 i 8 Konvencije.
Predmet koji je podnesen Sudu se svodi na gore navedena pitanja. Za datak suda nije da razmatra navode o greškama i izolovanim propustima istrage; on ne može da zameni domaće nadležne organe u oceni činjenica ovog slučaja; niti može da odlučuje o krivičnoj odgovornosti navodnih počinilaca.

2. Primena pristupa Suda

Podnositeljka predstavke je navela da je pristup nadležnih organa, u njenom slučaju, bio zasnovan na manjkavom zakonodavstvu i da odslikava pre dominantnu praksu da se krivično gone samo počinioci silovanja u slučajevima kada postoji dokaz o pružanju fizičkog otpora.
Sud zapaža da član 152 stav 1 bugarskog krivičnog zakonika ne sadr ži nikakav zahtev za postojanjem fizičkog otpora žrtve, i definiše delo silovanja na način koji se ne razlikuje znatno od formulacija koji se nalaze u zakonima drugih država članica. Kako je gore rečeno, mnogi pravni sistemi i dalje definišu silovanje ukazivanjem na sredstva kojima počinilac pribegava da pokori žrtvu (vidi gore stavove 77 i 88–100).
Međutim, ono što je odlučujuće jeste značenje koje se daje pojmo vima kao što su „sila“ ili „pretnje“ i drugim izrazima koje se koriste u pravnim definicijama. Na primer, u nekim pravnim sistemima, u slučajevima silovanja, smatra se da je primena „sile“ utvrđena već samom činjenicom da je počinilac izvršio seksualnu radnju bez pristanka žrtve, ili zato što je bez njenog pristanka držao žrtvu i manipulisao njenim telom kako bi izvršio seksualni čin. Kao što je gore rečeno, uprkos razlikama u zakonskim rešenjima sudovi više zemalja su proširili tumačenje s ciljem da se obuhvate sve seksualne radnje do kojih je došlo bez pristanka žrtve (vidi stavove 95 i 130–147).
U ovom predmetu, u odsustvu sudske prakse koja se eksplicitno bavi pitanjem da li je prema bugaraskom pravu svaki seksualni čin koji je izvršen bez pristanka žrtve kažnjiv, teško je doneti opšte zaključke po ovom pitanju samo na osnovu presuda Vrhovnog suda i objavljenih pravnih naučnih radova (vidi gore stavove 75–85). Utvrđivanje postojanja prinude u svakom konkretnom slučaju zavisi od sudske procene činjenica. Dodatna teškoća je nepostojanje pouzdanog proučavanja prakse organa gonjena u slučajevima koji nikad nisu stigli u sud.
Pored svega navedenog, treba reći da Država nije mogla da obezbedi kopije presuda ili pravnih komentara koji sadrže jasno neslaganje s restriktivnim pristupom u postupku krivičnog gonjenja krivičnih dela silovanja. Takođe, prethodne napomene Države koje se odnose na elemente krivičnog dela silovanja u bugarskom pravu nisu bile dosledne i jasne (vidi gore stavove 122–123). Konačno, činjenica da velika većina presuda Vrhovnog suda o kojima je Sud izvešten, a koje su se odnosile na silovanja koja su izvršena uz primenu nasilja (osim onih u kojima je žrtva bila fizički ili psihički nesposobna), iako nisu odlučujuće, može se shvatiti kao pokazatelj da je u većini slučajeva u kojima je ustanovljenja mala ili nikakva primena fizičke sile i pružanje otpora nije pokrenut krivični postupak (vidi gore stavove 74–85, 113, 122 i 123).
Sud nema obavezu da pronađe uverljive odgovore o praksi bugarskih nadležnih organa u slučajevima silovanja. Za svrhu razmatranja ovog predmeta dovoljno je to što se izjava podnositeljke predstavke o restriktivnoj praksi zasniva na razumnim argumentima, kao i da nije osporena od strane Države.
U pogledu konkretnih činjenica slučaja podnositeljke predstavke, Sud konstatuje da je u toku istrage saslušano više svedoka, kao i da je tražen izveštaj veštaka, psihologa i psihijatra. Slučaj je istražen, tužioci su obrazložili svoje odluke i objasnili u određenoj meri svoje stavove (vidi gore stavove 44–65).
Sud priznaje da su bugarski organi imali težak zadatak s obzirom da su se suočili s dve suprotne verzije događaja i s malo „direktnih“ dokaza. Sud ne potcenjuje napor koji su uložili istražni organi i tužilaštvo radeći na ovom predmetu.
Ipak, Sud konstatuje da je postojanje dve nepomirljive verzije o činje nicama zahtevalo da se, imajući u vidu kontekst, proceni verodostojnosti datih izajava, kao i potvrde datih okolnosti. Međutim, malo je učinjeno na proveri kre dibiliteta verzija o događajima koji su dali P. i A. i svedoci koje su oni predložili. Ovo se posebno odnosi na svedoke čiji su iskazi bili protivrečni, kao na primer gđe. T. i g. M, koji nisu bili suočeni. Ništa nije učinjeno da se preciznije ustanovi hronološki tok događaja. Podnosiocu predstavke i njenom advokatu nije data mogućnost da ispitaju svedoke koje je ona optužila za lažno svedočenje. Tužioci se nisu uopšte osvrnuli na pitanje da li je verzija koju su dali P. i A. verodostoj na, iako su neke od njihovih izjava zahtevale pozornost, kao što je tvrdnja da je podnositeljka predstavke, u to vreme stara 14 godine, počela da miluje A. samo nekoliko minuta pošto je imala seksualni odnos s drugim muškarcem (vidi gore stavove 16–65).
Stoga, Sud je mišljenja da su nadležni organi propustili da istraže mo gućnosti koje su im bile na raspolaganju za utvrđivanje datih okolonosti, kao i da nisu dovoljno procenili verodostojnost datih protivrečnih izjava.
Od velikog je značaja je to da je razlog za ovakav propust očigledno mišljenje istražnog organa i tužilaštva da ono što se desilo predstavlja „silovanje na sastanku“, jer u odsustvu „direktnih“ dokaza silovanja kao što su tragovi nasi lja, pružanja otpora ili zvanja u pomoć, na osnovu procene datih okolnosti nisu mogli zaključiti da nije postojao pristanak žrtve, pa shodno tome, ni krivično delo silovanja. Ovakav stav je očigledno posledica mišljenja istražitelja, a poseb no odluke regionalnog tužioca od 13. maja 1997. godine i odluke glavnog javnog tužioca od 24. juna 1997. godine (vidi gore stavove 55, 60, 61 i 65).
Pored toga, čini se da tužioci nisu isključili mogućnost da podnositeljka predstavke možda nije dala pristanak, ali da su zauzeli stav da se, u svakom slučaju, u odsustvu dokaza o pružanju otpora, ne može dokazati da su počinioci shvatili da podnositeljka predstavke nije pristala (vidi, tekst odluke tužioca, gore stavovi 64 i 65). Tužioci nisu iskoristili mogućnost da dokažu mens rea počinilaca procenom svih datih okolnosti, kao što je dokaz da su namerno prevarili podnositeljku pred stavke kako bi je odveli u napuštenu oblast i time stvorili okolnost prinude, kao i procenjivenjem verodostojnosti izjava o činjenicima koje su dali tri muškarca i svedoci koje su oni predložili (vidi gore stavove 21, 63 i 66–68).
Sud je mišljenja da su, iako je ponekad u praksi teško dokazati nepostojanje pristanka u odsustvu „direktnih“ dokaza o silovanju kao što su tragovi primene sile ili očevici, vlasti dužne da istraže sve činjenice i odlučuju na osnovu procene svih datih okolnosti. Istraga i zaključci se moraju usredsrediti na pitanje da li je žrtva pristala.
U slučaju podnositeljke predstavke ovo nije učinjeno. Sud smatra da je propust organa, da u ovom slučaju dovoljno istraže date okolnosti, posledica toga što su davali prevelik značaj „direktnim“ dokazima silovanja. Njihov pristup, u ovom konkretnom predmetu, bio je restriktivan i takav da su praktično izjednačavali „otpor“ sa statusom najvažnijeg elementa krivičnog dela.
Uz to, vlastima se može uputiti kritika zato što su dali premali značaj konkretnoj bespomoćnosti mladih osoba, kao i posebnim psihološkim faktorima koji postoje u slučajevima silovanja maloletnika (vidi gore stavove 58–60).
Pored toga, istraga se sprovela sa značajnim zakašnjenjem (vidi gore stavove 44–46).
Sve u svemu, bez davanja mišljenja o krivici P. i A, Sud smatra da istraga koja je sprovedena u slučaju podnositeljke predstavke, a posebno pristup istražnih organa i tužilaštva u ovom slučaju, nije ispunila zahteve iz pozitivnih obaveza države – posmatrano u svetlu relevantnih savremenih standarda u upo rednom i međunarodnom pravu – da se ustanovi i delotvorno primeni sistem krivičnog sankcionisanja svih oblika silovanja i seksualnog zlostavljanja.
Što se tiče argumenta Države da nacionalni pravni sistem pruža mo gućnost pokretanja građanske tužbe za naknadu štete protiv počinilaca, Sud kon statuje da ta tvrdnja nije potkrepljena dokazima. U svakom slučaju, kako je gore rečeno, delotvorna zaštita od silovanja i seksualnog zlostavljanja zahteva postoja nje mera koje su po prirodi krivičnopravne (vidi gore stavove 124 i 148–53).
Stoga, Sud konstatuje da je u ovom predmetu došlo do kršenja pozi tivne obaveze tužene Države kako po osnovu člana 3, tako i po osnovu člana 13 Konvencije.

II NAVODNO KRŠENJE ČLANA 14 KONVENCIJE

Upoređivanjem članova 157 stav 2 i 152 bugarskog Krivičnog zako nika, koji se odnose na starosnu granicu za davanje pristanka na seksualni čin, podnositeljka predstavke se žalila da zakon pruža bolju zaštitu od silovanja „ho moseksualnoj deci“ nego „heteroseksualnoj“.

Član 14 Konvencije glasi:

„Uživanje prava i sloboda predviđenih ovom Konvencijom obezbeđuje se bez diskriminacije po bilo kom osnovu, kao što su pol, rasa, boja kože, jezik, ve roispovest, političko ili drugo mišljenje, nacionalno ili socijalno poreklo, veza s nekom nacionalnom manjinom, imovno stanje, rođenje ili drugi status“.

U svetlu gore navedenih nalaza, Sud je mišljenja da nije neophodno da razmatra žalbu po osnovu člana 14 Konvencije.

III. PRIMENA ČLANA 41 KONVENCIJE

Član 41 Konvencije predviđa:

„Kada sud utvrdi prekršaj Konvencije ili protokola uz nju, a unutrašnje pra vo Visoke strane ugovornice u pitanju omogućava samo delimičnu odštetu, Sud će, ako je to potrebno, pružiti pravično zadovoljenje oštećenoj stranci“.

A. Šteta

Podnositeljka predstavke je izjavila da ona i dalje, posle toliko godina od silovanja, trpi psihološku traumu. U velikoj meri to je posledica činjenice da joj relevantno pravo i praksa nisu pružili delotvorno zaštitu. Pored toga, istraga u ovom slučaju je bila manjkava, čime je ona postala žrtva istrage.
Po tom osnovu, pozivajući se na nekoliko presuda Suda u slučajevima seksualnog zlostavljanja, podnositeljka predstavke je tražila 20.000 evra (EUR) na ime nematerijalne štete.
Država je izjavila da je traženi iznos preteran.
Sud je mišljenja da je podnositeljka predstavke sigurno pretrpela bol i psihičku traumu što je bar donekle posledica propusta u pristupu nadležnih organa u ovom slučaju. Nakon procene na osnovu pravičnosti, Sud određuje na knadu od EUR 8.000 u njenu korist.

B. Sudski i drugi troškovi

Podnositeljka predstavke je tražila EUR 4.740 za ukupno 118.5 sati angažovanja advokata na ovom slučaju, po tarifi od EUR 40 po satu. Ona je pod nela Sudu ugovor koji je njena majka sklopila s njenim advokatom 2003. godine, kao i specifikaciju utrošenog vremena. Advokat podnositeljke predstavke je obja snio da je ugovor o honoraru potpisala njena majka zato što ga je prvobitno ona angažovala, s obzirom da je podnositeljka predstavke u to vreme bila maloletna.
Država je izjavila da ugovor o naknadi nije validan jer je podnositelj ka predstavke napunila 18 godina u septembru 1998. godine i da od tada njena majka nije imala pravo da postupa u njeno ime. Čak i u vreme kada je postignut prvi usmeni dogovor između majke i advokata, podnositeljka predstavke je ima le više od 14 godina, pa je prema bugarskom zakonu, imala pravo da obavlja pravne radnje uz odobrenje majke.
Država je takođe izjavila da su se strane dogovorile o tarifi od EUR 40 po satu, u završnoj fazi postupka, a to znači da je dogovorena visoka artbitrer na naknada. U „drugim okolnostima“ podnositeljka predstavke ne bi prihvatila da plaća ovakav iznos.
Prema ustanovljenoj praksi Suda, troškovi se neće određivati u skladu sa članom 41 Konvencije, osim ako se ne utvrdi da su oni stvarno nastali i bili neophodni, kao i da su razumni u pogledu iznosa. Dalje, troškovi se mogu nado knaditi samo u meri u kojoj se odnose na utvrđene povrede (vidi Beyele v. Italy (pravično zadovoljenje) [GC], br. 33202/96, st. 27, 28. maj 2002).
Država nije osporila činjenicu da je advokat podnositeljke predstavke obavljao pravni posao u ovom slučaju, pošto je dobio punomoćje 27. novembra 1997. godine, koje su potpisale podnositeljka predstavke i njena majka, a u vre me kada je podnositeljka predstavke još uvek bila maloletna (vidi gore stavove 2 i 9). Nije se tvrdilo da je podnositeljka predstavke osporavala troškove njenog advokata, odnosno iznose koje mu je plaćala, niti da se traženi trošak ne odnosi na kršenje koje je utvrđeno u ovom predmetu. U takvim okolnostima, ne postoji sumnja da su traženi pravni troškovi stvarno nastali.
Država nije stavila prigovor na predočeni broj sati rada advokata. Da lje, Sud smatra da tarifa po satu od EUR 40 nije preterano visoka. Shodno tome, pošto je umanjio traženi iznos za EUR 630 koliko je primljeno na ime pravne pomoći, Sud presuđuje iznos od EUR 4,110 na ime troškova.

C. Zatezna kamata

Sud smatra da je prihvatljivo da se zatezna kamata obračuna po marginalnoj stopi za pozajmice Evropske centralne banke, na koju se dodaju tri procentna poena.

IZ NAVEDENIH RAZLOGA, SUD JEDNOGLASNO

Odlučuje da je tužena Država prekršila svoje pozitivne obaveze prema članovima 3 i 8 Konvencije;
Odlučuje da nije nastalo posebno pitanje prema članu 13 Konvencije;
Odlučuje da nije potrebno ispitati žalbe podnositeljke predstavke u odnosu na član 14 Konvencije;
Odlučuje

(a) da tužena Država plati podnosiocu predstavke, u roku od tri meseca od dana kada presuda postane konačna, u skladu sa članom 44 stav 2 Konvencije, sledeće iznose, koji će se promeniti u nacionalnu valutu tužene Države po važećem kursu na dan izmirenja:

(i) EUR 8.000 (osam hiljada evra) na ime nematerijalne štete;

(ii) EUR 4.110 (četiri hiljade stodeset evra) na ime sudskih i drugih troškova;

(iii) sve poreze koji se plaćaju na gore navedene iznose;

(b) da se po isteku gore navedenog roka od tri meseca do momenta izmirenja obračunava i naplaćuje kamata po stopi koja je jednaka marginalnoj stopi za zajmove Evropske centralne banke tokom perioda kašnjenja, uvećana za tri procentna poena.

Odbacuje ostatak zahteva podnositeljke predstavke za pravično zado voljenje.

Sačinjeno na engleskom jeziku i pismeno potvrđeno 4. decembra 2003. godine u skladu s pravilom 77, stavovi 2 i 3 Poslovnika Suda.

Soren Nielsen Kristos Rozakis

Zamenik sekretara Predsednik

U skladu sa članom 45 stav 2 Konvencije i pravilom 74 Poslovnika Suda, uz ovu presudu priloženo je i saglasno mišljenje gđe Tulkens.

R. S. N.

SAGLASNO MIŠLJENJE SUDIJE TULKENS (prevod)

U ovom izuzetno osetljivom i delikatnom slučaju, želim samo da dodam nekoliko svojih zapažanja.

Verujem da je bilo značajno da Sud razmotri predmet kako na osnovu člana 3, tako i na osnovu člana 8 Konvencije. Silovanje narušava ne samo lični integritet (kako fizički, tako i psihički) koji se garantuje članom 3 Konvencije, već i pravo na autonomiju kao sastavnog dela prava na poštovanje privatnog ži vota koje se garantuje članom 8 Konvencije.

U potpunosti se slažem s generalnim pristupom Suda (vidi stavove 148 et. seq. presude), kao i s načinom na koji je primenjen u ovom predmetu (vidi stavove 169 et seq.). Jedino pitanje koje želim da pojasnim odnosi se na prime nu krivičnopravnih lekova. Oslanjajući se posebno na predmet X. and Y. v. the Netherlands (presuda od 26. marta 1985. godine, Series A No. 91), Sud smatra da države „imaju pozitivnu obavezu sadržanu u članovima 3 i 8 Konvencije da usvoje krivičnopravne odredbe za delotvorno kažnjavanje silovanja“ (vidi stav 153). Pribegavanje krivičnopravnim odredbama je prihvatljivo kada se radi o prestupima ove vrste. Međutim, važno je naglasiti na još opštijem nivou, kao što je sam Sud učinio u predmetu X. and Y. v. the Netherlands, da „pribegavanje kri vičnom pravu nije nužno jedino rešenje“ (str. 12, st. 24 in fine). Moje mišljenje je da krivični postupci treba da ostanu, kako u teoriji tako i u praksi, kao poslednje rešenje ili supsidijarni pravni lek, i da njihovo koriščenje, čak i u kontekstu po zitivnih obaveza, traži određeni stepen „uzdržanosti“. Što se tiče pretpostavke da su krivičnopravni lekovi, u svakom slučaju, najefikasniji za prevenciju, mišljenje iz Izveštaja o dekriminalizaciji Evropskog komiteta za probleme kriminala uka zuje na to da delotvornost opšte prevencije koja se zasniva na krivičnom pravu zavisi od više faktora i da takav pristup „nije jedini način za sprečavanje neželje nog ponašanja“.1)

Rekavši to, u ovom predmetu, kao i u slučaju X. and Y. v. the Nether lands (str. 13, st. 27), kada država jednom izabere sistem zaštite koji je zasnovan na krivičnom zakonu, svakako je od osnovnog značaja da se relevantne krivične odredbe u potpunosti i rigorozno primenjuju kako bi se omogućilo da podnosi teljka predstavke ima praktičnu i delotvorno zaštitu. S tim u vezi, zapažanje Suda da se u ovom predmetu „istraga i zaključci istrage moraju usredsrediti na pitanje da li je žrtva pristala ili ne“ (vidi stav 181 ove presude), je po mom mišljenju od fundamentalnog značaja.

1) European Committe for Crime Problems, Report on Decriminalisation, Strazbur, Savet Ev rope, 1980, str. 75–78.

_________________________________________________

Presuda je preuzeta iz zbirke presuda "Evropski sud za ljudska prava – Odabrane presude IV"

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF M.C. v. BULGARIA

Application no. 39272/98

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

4 December 2003

FINAL

04/03/2004

In the case of M.C. v. Bulgaria, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrsF. Tulkens,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrE. Levits
MrsS. Botoucharova,
MrA. Kovler
MrV. Zagrebelsky, judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Deputy Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 13 November 2003,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 39272/98) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Bulgarian national, M.C. (“the applicant”), on 23 December 1997. In the proceedings before the Court, the President of the Chamber acceded to the applicant's request not to have her name disclosed (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court).

2. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr Y. Grozev, a lawyer practising in Sofia. Mr Grozev submitted a power of attorney dated 27 November 1997, signed by the applicant and her mother. The Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Ms V. Djidjeva, Ms M. Dimova and Ms M. Kotzeva, of the Ministry of Justice.

3. The applicant alleged violations of her rights under Articles 3, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention in that domestic law and practice in rape cases and the investigation into the rape of which she had been a victim did not secure the observance by the respondent State of its positive obligation to provide effective legal protection against rape and sexual abuse.

4. The application was transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998, when Protocol No. 11 to the Convention came into force (Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11).

5. The application was initially allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1).

6. On 1 November 2001 the Court changed the composition of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was assigned to the newly composed First Section (Rule 52 § 1). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.

7. By a decision of 5 December 2002, the Chamber declared the application admissible.

8. The applicant and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber decided, after consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required (Rule 59 § 3 in fine). In addition, thirdparty comments were received from Interights, a nongovernmental organisation based in London, which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and former Rule 61 § 3).

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

9. The applicant is a Bulgarian national who was born in 1980.

10. She alleged that she had been raped by two men on 31 July and 1 August 1995, when she was 14 years and 10 months old. The ensuing investigation came to the conclusion that there was insufficient proof of the applicant having been compelled to have sex.

A. The events of the night of 31 July to 1 August 1995

1. The evening of 31 July

11. On 31 July 1995 the applicant and a friend of hers had been waiting to enter a disco bar in the town of K., when three men, P. (21 years old at the time), A. (20 years old at the time) and V.A. (age not specified), arrived in a car owned by P. The applicant knew P. and A. She had met P. in the same disco bar and had danced with him once. A. was the older brother of a classmate of hers.

12. A. invited the applicant to go with him and his friends to a disco bar in a small town 17 km away. According to the applicant, she agreed on condition that she would be back home before 11 p.m.

13. In the bar, one or two of the group had drinks. The applicant saw some friends, with whom she had a short chat. According to the applicant, she repeatedly told the others it was time to leave, as it was getting late.

14. At some time late in the evening, the group left and headed back to K. On the way, they were briefly stopped and checked by traffic police.

15. A. then suggested stopping for a swim at a nearby reservoir. According to the applicant, they went there despite her objections. She submitted that she had not suspected the men's intentions.

2. Events at the reservoir

16. At the reservoir, the applicant remained in the car, in the front passenger seat, saying that she was not interested in swimming. The three men headed towards the water. Soon afterwards, P. came back and sat in the front seat next to the applicant.

17. In her statements to the investigating authorities, the applicant submitted that P. had then pressed his body against hers, proposed that they “become friends” and started kissing her. The applicant had refused his advances and had asked him to leave. P. had persisted in kissing her while she had tried to push him back. He had then moved the car seat back to a horizontal position, grabbed her hands and pressed them against her back. The applicant had been scared and at the same time embarrassed by the fact that she had put herself in such a situation. She had not had the strength to resist violently or scream. Her efforts to push P. back had been unsuccessful, as he had been far stronger. P. had undressed her partially and had forced her to have sexual intercourse with him.

18. In her testimony, the applicant stated: “It was my first time and it hurt a lot. I felt sick and I wanted to throw up. I started crying.”

19. According to P.'s statements, he had had sex with the applicant in the car with her full consent. He had started kissing her, she had responded, and he had tried unsuccessfully to unbutton her jeans or loosen her belt, whereupon she had done so herself and had taken off her pants.

20. After P. had finished, he left the car and walked towards A. and V.A. In his submissions to the police, A. said that P. had told them that he had “shagged” the applicant. Shortly afterwards, the three men returned to the car and the group drove off.

21. In her submissions to the investigator, the applicant stated that she had later come to suspect that the three men had planned to have sex with her and had invented the pretext of swimming to drive to a deserted area. In particular, she did not remember A. and V.A. being wet when they had come back to the car, although they had insisted on going to the reservoir for a swim.

3. The alleged second rape

22. The applicant later testified that after the first rape she had been very disturbed and had cried most of the time. According to the version of events given by P. and A. when later questioned, the applicant had been in an excellent mood, had started caressing A., which had irritated P., and had asked to go to a bar or a restaurant. The group had gone to a restaurant, where the applicant had briefly talked with a Ms T., the singer performing there. Ms T. had been sitting at a table there with one Mr M.

23. Ms T., the singer, stated that on 1 August 1995 she had been in the restaurant with Mr M. Shortly after midnight the applicant, whom she knew vaguely, had approached her and asked whether her group would be performing in the next few days. Ms T. recalled having seen at that moment a man waiting at the door. Having heard the answer to her question, the applicant had left. Ms T. stated that the applicant had appeared cheerful and that there had been nothing unusual in her behaviour.

24. Mr M. was also questioned by the police. He stated that he knew the applicant very well and that he did not remember having seen her that night.

25. The applicant disputed the statements of P., A., V.A. and Ms T., maintaining that there had been no visit to a restaurant and that she did not know Ms T. The applicant and her mother later accused Ms T. of perjury (see paragraphs 6668 below).

26. Instead of returning to K., at around 3 a.m. the group went to a neighbouring town, where V.A.'s relatives had a house. A., V.A. and the applicant got out of the car. P., who was the owner of the car, drove off.

27. The three men and a baker, Mr S., called by them as a witness, later maintained that in the meantime there had been a short stop at Mr S.'s bakery. Mr S. allegedly had the key to the house. Mr S., when interrogated, stated that at about 2 a.m. he had given the key to V.A. and had seen the applicant waiting in the car, apparently in a good mood. Loud music had been coming from the car. The applicant disputed that there had been any visit to a baker's shop and accused the baker of perjury. P., A. and V.A. submitted in their statements that they had decided to go to the house as the applicant had told them that she had quarrelled with her mother and did not want to go back home.

28. The applicant stated to the police that she had felt helpless and in need of protection. As A. was the brother of a classmate of hers, she had expected such protection from him and had followed him and V.A. into a room on the ground floor of the house.

29. There was one bed in the room and the applicant sat on it. The two men smoked and talked for a while. V.A. then left the room.

30. The applicant maintained that at that point A. had sat next to her, pushed her down onto the bed, undressed her and forced her to have sex with him. The applicant had not had the strength to resist violently. She had only begged the man to stop. She later related in her statement:

“I started crying and asked him to stop ... He started caressing my breasts and sucking my neck ... At some point he took my jeans and my pants off with his feet. Then he spread my legs apart with his legs and forced his way into me ... [After he finished] I started crying and I continued crying until some time in the morning, when I fell asleep ... [V.A.] woke me up telling me that [A.] had gone to find a car to drive me back to K. I sat on the bed and started crying.”

31. A.'s position before the police was that he had had sex with the applicant with her full consent.

4. The morning of 1 August 1995

32. On the following morning at around 7 a.m., the applicant's mother found her daughter in the house of V.A.'s relatives. The applicant's mother stated that, having learned from neighbours that her daughter had been seen the previous evening with A., she had been on her way to A.'s house when she had met V.A. in the street. V.A. had allegedly tried to mislead the applicant's mother in an effort to gain time and warn A. However, she had insisted.

33. The applicant and her mother maintained in their submissions during the investigation that the applicant had told her mother right away that she had been raped. A. had also been there. He had told the applicant's mother that “a truck driver” had had sex with her daughter the previous night.

34. According to A.'s version of events, the applicant and her mother had quarrelled, the applicant allegedly refusing to go with her and telling her to go away. A neighbour, apparently named as a witness by A. or V.A., stated that he had heard the quarrel and, in particular, the refusal of the applicant to leave with her mother and her saying that nothing had happened to her. The applicant accused the witness of perjury.

35. The applicant and her mother went directly to the local hospital, where they were directed to see a forensic medical examiner. The applicant was examined at about 4 p.m.

36. The medical examiner found that the hymen had been freshly torn. He also noted grazing on the applicant's neck, measuring 35 mm by 4 mm, and four small ovalshaped bruises. As noted in the medical certificate, the applicant had reported only one rape, stating that it had occurred between 10.30 and 11 p.m. the previous day at the reservoir.

B. Events between 1 and 11 August 1995

37. The applicant submitted that during the next few days she had refused to talk to her mother about the incident. She had given no details and had not mentioned the second rape at all. She explained that she lived in a conservative smalltown environment where virginity was considered to be an asset for marriage. She felt ashamed of the fact that she had “failed to protect her virginity” and of “what people would say about it”.

38. On the first evening after the events, on 1 August 1995, P. visited the applicant's family. The applicant and her mother stated that that evening P. had begged for forgiveness and had claimed that he would marry the applicant when she came of age. The applicant's mother had considered that accepting the offer would be reasonable in the circumstances. This had influenced the initial behaviour of the applicant, who had accepted her mother's idea of minimising the damage.

39. On one of the following evenings, the applicant went out with P. and some of his friends.

40. P. and V.A., the latter claiming that he had been with P. during the visit to the applicant's house on the evening of 1 August 1995, stated that the applicant's mother had told them that “all pleasure must be paid for” and had tried to extort money from them.

41. P.'s grandmother also made a statement to the police. She asserted that on an unspecified date the applicant's mother had visited her, trying to extort money.

42. With regard to that visit and other relevant events, Mrs D., a neighbour and friend of the applicant's mother, stated that the applicant's mother had been very upset about the events and had agreed to her daughter going out with P. as he had maintained that he loved the applicant. The applicant's mother had nevertheless decided to talk to P.'s parents. On an unspecified date Mrs D. and another neighbour had approached the house of P.'s family, but his grandmother had told them to go away, stating that the applicant had slept not only with P. but also with A. At that moment A. had arrived. Mrs D. had asked him whether it was true that he had slept with the applicant. He had confirmed that it was true, adding that he had the money and power to do as he pleased. Until then, the applicant's mother had not known about the second rape.

43. The applicant submitted that a visit by A.'s father on 8 August 1995 had caused her to break down. She had then confided to her mother about the second rape. On 10 August 1995 the applicant's father returned home, after being absent for several days. The family discussed the matter and decided to file a complaint. The applicant's mother did so on 11 August 1995.

C. The investigation

1. The initial police inquiry

44. On 11 August 1995 the applicant made a written statement about the events of 31 July and 1 August. On the same day P. and A. were arrested and made written statements. They claimed that the applicant had had sexual intercourse with them of her own free will. The two men were released. Written statements were also made by V.A. and a person who lived next to the house where the second alleged rape had taken place. On 25 August 1995 a police officer drew up a report and forwarded the file to the competent prosecutor.

45. On 14 November 1995 the district prosecutor opened a criminal investigation into the alleged rape and referred the case to an investigator. No charges were brought.

46. No action was taken on the case between November 1995 and November 1996.

2. The proceedings in relation to the complaints by P. and A. alleging perjury

47. On 24 August 1995 P. and A. filed complaints with the district prosecutor's office, stating that the applicant and her mother had been harassing them by making false public accusations.

48. On the basis of these complaints, on 28 August 1995, the district prosecutor ordered a police inquiry. In September and October 1995 several persons were heard and made written statements.

49. On 25 October 1995 a police officer drew up a report apparently accrediting the allegations of P. and A. and disbelieving the version of the facts as submitted by the applicant and her mother.

50. On 27 October 1995 the file was transmitted to the district prosecutor's office with jurisdiction to decide whether or not to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant and her mother. It appears that the matter was left hanging and no decision was taken.

3. The resumed investigation into the rape case

51. Between 2 November and 9 December 1996 the investigator questioned the applicant, her mother and other witnesses. P. and A. were heard as witnesses.

52. The applicant gave a detailed account of the facts, repeating that P. had overcome her resistance by pressing her against the car seat and twisting her hands, and that thereafter she had been in a state of shock and unable to resist A.

53. In his evidence, P. claimed that the applicant had actively responded to his advances. He also asserted that the applicant had spoken with Mr M. at the restaurant they had allegedly gone to after having sex.

54. Both A. and P. stated, inter alia, that shortly after having sex with P. at the reservoir, the applicant had started caressing A. in the car.

55. On 18 December 1996 the investigator completed his work on the case. He drew up a report stating that there was no evidence that P. and A. had used threats or violence, and proposed that the prosecutor close the case.

56. On 7 January 1997 the district prosecutor ordered an additional investigation. The order stated that the initial investigation had not been objective, thorough or complete.

57. On 16 January 1997 the investigator to whom the case had been referred appointed a psychiatrist and a psychologist to answer several questions. The experts were asked, inter alia, whether it was likely that the applicant would have spoken calmly with Ms T., the singer at the restaurant, and then listened to music in the car, if she had just been raped and whether it was likely that several days after the alleged rape the applicant would have gone out with the person who had raped her.

58. The experts considered that, owing to her naivety and inexperience, the applicant had apparently not considered the possibility that she might be sexually assaulted. There was no indication that she had been threatened or hurt, or that she had been in a state of shock during the events, as she had demonstrated a clear recollection of them. The experts considered that during the events she must have been suddenly overwhelmed by an internal conflict between a natural sexual interest and a sense that the act was reprehensible, which had “reduced her ability to resist and defend herself”. They further found that the applicant was psychologically sound and that she had understood the meaning of the events. In view of her age at the time, however, she “could not assert a stable set of convictions”.

59. The experts also found that, if there had indeed been a meeting between Ms T. and the applicant after the events at the reservoir – and this was disputed – it was still possible that the applicant could have had a short exchange with Ms T. after being raped. As to the applicant going out with P. several days after the events, this could be easily explained by her family's desire to lend a socially acceptable meaning to the incident.

60. On 28 February 1997 the investigator concluded his work on the case and drew up a report, again proposing that the case should be closed. He considered that the experts' opinion did not affect his earlier finding that there was no evidence demonstrating the use of force or threats.

61. On 17 March 1997 the district prosecutor ordered the closure of the criminal investigation. He found, inter alia, that the use of force or threats had not been established beyond reasonable doubt. In particular, no resistance on the applicant's part or attempts to seek help from others had been established.

62. The applicant lodged consecutive appeals with the regional prosecutor's office and the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office. The appeals were dismissed in decisions of 13 May and 24 June 1997 respectively.

63. The prosecutors relied, inter alia, on the statements of the alleged perpetrators and V.A. that the applicant had not shown any signs of distress after having sex with P. at the reservoir, and the evidence of the three men and Ms T. that the latter had met the applicant and had spoken with her that night. As regards the applicant's objections that those statements should be rejected as being untrue, the decision of 13 May 1997 stated that “prosecutors' decisions cannot be based on suppositions, and witnesses' statements cannot be rejected only on the basis of doubts, without other evidence ...”.

64. The decision of 13 May 1997 also stated:

“It is true that, as can be seen from the report of the forensic psychiatric experts, the young age of the applicant and her lack of experience in life meant that she was unable to assert a stable set of convictions, namely to demonstrate firmly her unwillingness to engage in sexual contact. There can be no criminal act under Article 152 §§ 1 (2) and 3 of the Criminal Code, however, unless the applicant was coerced into having sexual intercourse by means of physical force or threats. This presupposes resistance, but there is no evidence of resistance in this particular case. P. and A. could be held criminally responsible only if they understood that they were having sexual intercourse without the applicant's consent and if they used force or made threats precisely with the aim of having sexual intercourse against the applicant's will. There is insufficient evidence to establish that the applicant demonstrated unwillingness to have sexual intercourse and that P. and A. used threats or force.”

It was further noted that the applicant had explained that the bruises on her neck had been caused by sucking.

65. The decision of 24 June 1997 reiterated those findings, while noting that the statements of Ms T., the singer at the restaurant, were not decisive. It also stated:

“What is decisive in the present case is that it has not been established beyond reasonable doubt that physical or psychological force was used against the applicant and that sexual intercourse took place against her will and despite her resistance. There are no traces of physical force such as bruises, torn clothing, etc. ...

It is true that it is unusual for a girl who is under age and a virgin to have sexual intercourse twice within a short space of time with two different people, but this fact alone is not sufficient to establish that a criminal act took place, in the absence of other evidence and in view of the impossibility of collecting further evidence.”

4. Other proceedings

66. In June or July 1997 the applicant and her mother requested the institution of criminal proceedings against Ms T. and other witnesses, including V.A., alleging that they had committed perjury in that their statements in connection with the investigation into the rape of the applicant had been false.

67. On 14 July 1997 the same prosecutor from the district prosecutor's office who had ordered the closure of the rape investigation refused the request, stating that it was unfounded and even abusive, as all the facts had been clarified in previous proceedings.

68. An ensuing appeal by the applicant was dismissed on 6 February 1998 by the regional prosecutor's office.

D. The expert opinion submitted by the applicant

69. In June 2001 the applicant submitted a written opinion by two Bulgarian experts, Dr Svetlozar Vasilev, a psychiatrist, and Mr Valeri Ivanov, a psychologist, who had been asked by the applicant's lawyer to comment on the case.

70. The experts stated, with reference to scientific publications in several countries, that two patterns of response by rape victims to their attacker were known: violent physical resistance and “frozen fright” (also known as “traumatic psychological infantilism syndrome”). The latter was explained by the fact that any experiencebased model of behaviour was inadequate when the victim was faced with the inevitability of rape. As a result the victim, terrorised, often adopted a passiveresponse model of submission, characteristic of childhood, or sought a psychological dissociation from the event, as if it were not happening to her.

71. The experts stated that all the scientific publications they had studied indicated that the “frozenfright pattern” prevailed. Further, they had conducted their own research for the purposes of their written opinion in the present case. They had analysed all the cases of young women aged 14 to 20 who had contacted two specialised treatment programmes for victims of violence in Bulgaria during the period from 1996 to 2001, declaring that they had been raped. Cases that were too different from that of the applicant had been excluded. As a result, twentyfive cases had been identified, in twentyfour of which the victim had not resisted violently, but had reacted with passive submission.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

72. By Article 151 § 1 of the Criminal Code, sexual intercourse with a person under 14 years of age is a punishable offence (statutory rape). Consent is not a valid defence in such cases.

73. Consent is likewise irrelevant where the victim is more than 14 years old, but did not “understand the essence and meaning of the occurrence” (Article 151 § 2 of the Code). That provision has been applied in cases where the victim did not grasp the meaning of the events owing to a mental disorder (see judgment no. 568 of 18 August 1973, case no. 540/73, Supreme CourtI).

74. Article 152 § 1 of the Criminal Code defines rape as:

“sexual intercourse with a woman

(1) incapable of defending herself, where she did not consent;

(2) who was compelled by the use of force or threats;

(3) who was brought to a state of helplessness by the perpetrator.”

75. Although lack of consent is mentioned explicitly only in the first subparagraph, the Supreme Court has held that it is an element inherent in the whole provision (see judgment no. 568, cited above).

76. According to judicial practice, the three subparagraphs of Article 152 § 1 can only be applied alternatively, each of them referring to a separate factual situation. The Supreme Court has held that general references to two or all of the subparagraphs are not acceptable (see judgment no. 247 of 24 April 1974, case no. 201/74, Supreme CourtI; judgment no. 59 of 19 May 1992, case no. 288/90, Supreme CourtI; and many others).

77. Therefore, an accused person may be found guilty of rape only if it has been established that he had sexual intercourse with a woman in circumstances covered by one of the three subparagraphs.

78. The first and third subparagraphs concern particular factual situations where the victim was in a state of helplessness at the time of sexual intercourse. The third subparagraph refers to cases where the perpetrator put the victim in a state of helplessness before raping her, whereas the first subparagraph refers to cases where he took advantage of the victim's existing state of helplessness.

79. The courts have stated that a victim is in a state of helplessness (“incapable of defending herself” or “brought to a state of helplessness”) only in circumstances where she has no capacity to resist physically owing to disability, old age or illness (see judgment no. 484 of 29 July 1983, case no. 490/83, and judgment no. 568, cited above) or because of the use of alcohol, medicines or drugs (see judgment no. 126 of 11 April 1977, case no. 69/77, Supreme CourtII).

80. The second subparagraph is the provision applicable in all other cases of alleged rape. Thus, where no special circumstances such as the state of helplessness of the victim are reported, an investigation into an alleged rape will concentrate on establishing whether or not the victim was coerced into having sexual intercourse by the use of force or threats.

81. It is an established view in the caselaw and legal theory that rape under the second subparagraph of Article 152 § 1 of the Criminal Code is a “two‑step” offence – that is to say, the perpetrator first starts employing force or threats and then penetrates the victim.

82. The parties in the present case offered their views on the meaning of the words “use of force and threats” and their interpretation in practice (see paragraphs 113, 122 and 123 below).

83. The Supreme Court has stated that lack of consent is to be deduced from the fact that a situation covered by one of the three subparagraphs of Article 152 § 1 has been established, either from the victim's state of helplessness or from the fact that physical or psychological force has been used (see judgment no. 568, cited above).

84. In one case, the Supreme Court stated that “force” was not only to be understood as direct violence, but could also consist of placing the victim in a situation such that she could see no other solution than to submit against her will (see judgment no. 520 of 19 July 1973, case no. 414/73). In that particular case, the perpetrator, after demonstrating his desire for close relations with the victim by his behaviour over a period of two or three days (following her and trying to hold her and kiss her), entered her room, locked the door and asked her to undress. She refused, whereupon he tried to spread her legs apart. Realising that she had no other choice, the victim opened the window and jumped, sustaining serious injury. The perpetrator was convicted of attempted rape resulting in serious injury.

85. Legal commentators have not commented in detail on situations where coercion through force or threats may be considered to have been established, apparently taking the view that this was a matter for judicial interpretation (Al. Stoynov, Наказателно право, Особена част, 1997; A. Girginov, Наказателно право, Особена част, 2002). One commentator has stated that the essential characteristic of rape is the victim's lack of consent and that the three subparagraphs of Article 152 § 1 of the Criminal Code embody different situations of lack of consent. He further notes that in previous centuries the utmost resistance by the victim was required and that that view is now outdated. Without reference to case‑law, he considers that what is now required is nothing more than the resistance necessary to eliminate any doubt as to the victim's lack of consent (N. Antov, Проблеми на изнасилването, 2003).

86. Under Article 152 § 1 of the Criminal Code, rape committed by a man against a woman is punishable by two to eight years' imprisonment. At the material time, Article 157 § 1 of the Code provided for one to five years' imprisonment in cases of forced sexual intercourse with a person of the same sex. In 2002 the punishment prescribed under the latter provision was brought into line with that applicable in cases of rape under Article 152 § 1, and is now two to eight years' imprisonment.

87. At the material time, the age of consent in respect of sexual intercourse with a person of the same sex was 16 years (Article 157 § 2 of the Code). In 2002 it was lowered to 14 years.

III. RELEVANT COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE

A. Provisions on rape in the domestic law of some European countries

88. In the legal systems of a number of European States, rape and sexual assault are “genderneutral” offences, whereas in other countries rape may only be committed by a man against a woman.

89. The minimum age of consent for sexual activity in most States is 14, 15 or 16 years. In some countries, there is a different age of consent for sexual acts without penetration and for sexual acts with penetration, or different penalties depending on the age of the victim. The approaches vary significantly from one country to another.

90. Article 375 §§ 1 and 2 of the Belgian Criminal Code (referred to by Interights), as amended in 1989, read:

“Any act of sexual penetration, of whatever nature and by whatever means, committed on a person who does not consent to it shall constitute the crime of rape.

In particular, there is no consent where the act is forced by means of violence, coercion or ruse or was made possible by the victim's disability or physical or mental deficiency.”

91. Article 241 § 1 of the Czech Criminal Code (Law no. 140/1961, as amended) provides:

“A person who coerces another into an act of sexual penetration or a similar sexual act through violence or the threat of imminent violence or by taking advantage of the person's helplessness shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of two to eight years.”

92. Sections 216(1) and 217 of the Danish Penal Code (referred to by the intervener) provide:

“Any person who coerces [another into having] sexual intercourse by violence or under threat of violence shall be guilty of rape and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding eight years. The placing of a person in such a position that the person is unable to resist shall be equivalent to violence ...”

“Any person who by means of unlawful coercion (according to section 260 of this Act) other than violence or the threat of violence procures sexual intercourse for himself, shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding four years.”

93. Chapter 20, sections 1 and 3, of the Finnish Penal Code (as amended in 1998) provides:

“Section 1: Rape

(1) A person who coerces another into having sexual intercourse by the use or threat of violence shall be sentenced for rape to imprisonment for at least one year and at most six years.

(2) A person shall also be guilty of rape if he/she takes advantage of the incapacity of another to defend himself/herself and has sexual intercourse with him/her, after rendering him/her unconscious or causing him/her to be in a state of incapacity owing to fear or another similar reason ...

Section 3: Coercion into having sexual intercourse

(1) If the rape, in view of the low level of violence or threat and the other particulars of the offence, is deemed to have been committed under mitigating circumstances, the offender shall be sentenced for coercion into having sexual intercourse to imprisonment for at most three years.

(2) A person who coerces another into having sexual intercourse by a threat other than that referred to in section 1(1) shall be guilty of coercion into having sexual intercourse.”

94. Articles 22222, 22223 and 22725 of the French Criminal Code provide:

“Sexual aggression is any sexual assault committed by violence, coercion, threats or surprise.”

“Any act of sexual penetration, whatever its nature, committed against another person by violence, coercion, threats or surprise, shall be considered rape. Rape shall be punishable by fifteen years' imprisonment.”

“A sexual offence committed without violence, coercion, threats or surprise by an adult on the person of a minor under 15 years of age shall be punished by five years' imprisonment and a fine of 75,000 euros.”

95. The following information about French caselaw on rape may be gathered from the authoritative publication JurisClasseur (2002):

(i) The words “violence, coercion, threats or surprise” are given a broad meaning in practice. For example, in one case it was stated that the fact that the victim was begging the perpetrator to stop, without further resistance, where she had previously agreed to enter his car and to be kissed by him, was sufficient to establish that there was rape (judgment of the Court of Cassation, Criminal Division (“Cass. crim.”), 10 July 1973, Bulletin Criminel (“Bull. crim.”) no. 322; Revue de Science Criminelle, 1974, p. 594, observations of Levasseur; see also, for an opposing view, Crim., 11 October 1978, Dalloz 1979. IR, 120). The victim's refusal may be inferred from the circumstances, such as paralysing shock, as a result of which the victim could not protest or escape (Cass. crim., 13 March 1984, Bull. crim. no. 107).

(ii) There is “surprise” where the victim cannot freely consent because, for example, she is physically or mentally disabled (Cass. crim., 8 June 1984, Bull. crim. no. 226), in a particular psychological state, involving depression, fragility, or simply distress (Cass. crim., 12 November 1997, JurisData no. 2000005087; Paris Court of Appeal, 30 March 2000, JurisData no. 2000117239), or where the perpetrator used trickery to deceive the victim as to the real situation (Cass. crim., 14 April 1995, JurisData no. 1995002034).

(iii) The courts have considered that there is always “surprise”, and therefore rape, where the victim is of such a low age as not to understand the concept of sexuality and the nature of the acts being imposed (Cass. crim., 11 June 1992, Bull. crim. no. 228; Limoges Court of Appeal, 5 April 1995, JurisData no. 1995042693; Paris Court of Appeal, 14 November 2000, JurisData no. 2000134658). In some other cases, however, it has been stated that in principle the age of the victim cannot as such, without additional elements, establish the existence of “surprise” (Cass. crim., 1 March 1995, Bull. crim. no. 92).

96. The relevant part of Article 177 (Sexual coercion; Rape) of the German Criminal Code reads:

“1. Anyone who coerces another person

(1) by force,

(2) by the threat of immediate danger to life or limb, or

(3) by exploiting a situation in which the victim is defenceless and at the mercy of the actions of the perpetrator

into submitting to sexual acts performed by the perpetrator or by a third person or into performing such acts on the perpetrator or on the third person, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year.”

97. Article 197 § 1 of the Hungarian Criminal Code (Law no. 4 of 1978) provides:

“A person who by violent action or a direct threat to life or limb forces a person to have sexual intercourse, or uses a person's incapacity to defend himself/herself or to express his/her will to have sexual intercourse shall be guilty of a serious offence punishable by imprisonment for two to eight years.”

98. In Ireland, section 2(1) of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981 and section 9 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 (referred to by the intervener) provide:

“A man commits rape if (a) he has sexual intercourse with a woman who at the time of intercourse does not consent and (b) at the time he knows she does not consent or is reckless as to whether or not she is consenting.”

“It is hereby declared that in relation to an offence that consists of or includes the doing of an act to a person without the consent of the person, any failure or omission by that person to offer resistance to the act does not of itself constitute consent to that act.”

99. Article 180 § 1 of the Slovenian Criminal Code reads:

“Anyone who compels a person of the same or the opposite sex to submit to sexual intercourse by force or the threat of imminent attack on life and limb shall be sentenced to imprisonment from one to ten years.”

100. In the United Kingdom, section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 (referred to by the intervener) provides:

“[A] man commits rape if (a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who at the time of intercourse does not consent to it; and (b) at that time he knows that she does not consent to the intercourse or is reckless as to whether she consents to it.”

B. Recommendation Rec(2002)5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the protection of women against violence

101. The Committee of Ministers recommends that member States adopt and implement, in the manner most appropriate to each country's national circumstances, a series of measures to combat violence against women. Paragraph 35 of the appendix to the recommendation states that, in the field of criminal law, member States should, inter alia:

“– penalise any sexual act committed against nonconsenting persons, even if they do not show signs of resistance;

...

– penalise any abuse of the position of a perpetrator, and in particular of an adult vis‑àvis a child.”

C. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

102. In Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija (case no. IT9517/1T, judgment of 10 December 1998), in the context of the question whether or not forced oral sexual penetration may be characterised as rape under international law, the Trial Chamber made the following relevant remarks about rape under international criminal law:

“The Trial Chamber notes the unchallenged submission ... that rape is a forcible act: this means that the act is 'accomplished by force or threats of force against the victim or a third person, such threats being express or implied and must place the victim in reasonable fear that he, she or a third person will be subjected to violence, detention, duress or psychological oppression'. ...

... all jurisdictions surveyed by the Trial Chamber require an element of force, coercion, threat, or acting without the consent of the victim: force is given a broad interpretation and includes rendering the victim helpless.”

103. The Trial Chamber defined rape as:

“sexual penetration ... by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.”

104. Noting that the terms “coercion”, “force”, or “threat of force” from the Furundžija definition were not intended to be interpreted narrowly, the Trial Chamber in another case (Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković, case no. IT9623, judgment of 22 February 2001) observed:

“In stating that the relevant act of sexual penetration will constitute rape only if accompanied by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person, the Furundžija definition does not refer to other factors which would render an act of sexual penetration nonconsensual or nonvoluntary on the part of the victim, which ... as discussed below, is in the opinion of this Trial Chamber the accurate scope of this aspect of the definition in international law.

... the basic underlying principle common to [the national legal systems surveyed is] that sexual penetration will constitute rape if it is not truly voluntary or consensual on the part of the victim ... [F]orce, threat of force or coercion ... are certainly the relevant considerations in many legal systems but the full range of [the relevant] provisions ... suggest that the true common denominator which unifies the various systems may be a wider or more basic principle of penalising violations of sexual autonomy. ”

105. In Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković, a Muslim girl in an occupied area was taken by armed soldiers to a building which served as military headquarters. After being raped by two soldiers there, she was brought to a room where she herself initiated sexual contact with the accused Mr Kunarac, the commanding officer. The Trial Chamber noted that the victim had been told by soldiers that she should satisfy their commander sexually or risk her life. The victim therefore “did not freely consent to any sexual intercourse with Kunarac [as she] was in captivity and in fear for her life”. The Trial Chamber also rejected Kunarac's defence that he was not aware of the fact that the victim had only initiated sexual intercourse with him because she feared for her life. The Chamber found that, even if Kunarac had not heard the threats made by other soldiers, he could not have been “confused” by the behaviour of the victim, given the general context of the existing wartime situation and the specifically delicate situation of the Muslim girls in the region.

106. In the context of the above facts, the Trial Chamber made the following observations on the elements of rape under international law:

“The basic principle which is truly common to [the reviewed] legal systems is that serious violations of sexual autonomy are to be penalised. Sexual autonomy is violated wherever the person subjected to the act has not freely agreed to it or is otherwise not a voluntary participant.

In practice, the absence of genuine and freely given consent or voluntary participation may be evidenced by the presence of the various factors specified in other jurisdictions – such as force, threats of force, or taking advantage of a person who is unable to resist. A clear demonstration that such factors negate true consent is found in those jurisdictions where absence of consent is an element of rape and consent is explicitly defined not to exist where factors such as use of force, the unconsciousness or inability to resist of the victim, or misrepresentation by the perpetrator [are present].

... coercion, force, or threat of force [are] not to be interpreted narrowly ... coercion in particular would encompass most conduct which negates consent ...

In light of the above considerations, the Trial Chamber understands that the actus reus of the crime of rape in international law is constituted by ... sexual penetration ... where [it] occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim's free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. The mens rea is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.”

107. In the same case, on an appeal by the perpetrators based on the argument, inter alia, that there was no rape without force or threat of force and the victim's “continuous” or “genuine” resistance, the Appeals Chamber, in its judgment of 12 June 2002, stated:

“The Appellants' bald assertion that nothing short of continuous resistance provides adequate notice to the perpetrator that his attentions are unwanted is wrong on the law and absurd on the facts.

Secondly, with regard to the role of force in the definition of rape, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber appeared to depart from the Tribunal's prior definitions of rape. However, in explaining its focus on the absence of consent as the conditio sine qua non of rape, the Trial Chamber did not disavow the Tribunal's earlier jurisprudence, but instead sought to explain the relationship between force and consent. Force or threat of force provides clear evidence of nonconsent, but force is not an element per se of rape. In particular, the Trial Chamber wished to explain that there are “factors [other than force] which would render an act of sexual penetration nonconsensual or nonvoluntary on the part of the victim”. A narrow focus on force or threat of force could permit perpetrators to evade liability for sexual activity to which the other party had not consented by taking advantage of coercive circumstances without relying on physical force ...

For the most part, the Appellants in this case were convicted of raping women held in de facto military headquarters, detention centres and apartments maintained as soldiers' residences. As the most egregious aspect of the conditions, the victims were considered the legitimate sexual prey of their captors. Typically, the women were raped by more than one perpetrator and with a regularity that is nearly inconceivable. (Those who initially sought help or resisted were treated to an extra level of brutality). Such detentions amount to circumstances that were so coercive as to negate any possibility of consent.”

D. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women

108. In its General Recommendation 19 of 29 January 1992 on violence against women, the Committee made the following recommendation in paragraph 24:

“(a) States parties should take appropriate and effective measures to overcome all forms of genderbased violence, whether by public or private act;

(b) States parties should ensure that laws against ... abuse, rape, sexual assault and other genderbased violence give adequate protection to all women, and respect their integrity and dignity. ...”

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 3, 8 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION

109. The applicant complained that Bulgarian law and practice did not provide effective protection against rape and sexual abuse, as only cases where the victim had resisted actively were prosecuted, and that the authorities had not investigated the events of 31 July and 1 August 1995 effectively. In her view, the above amounted to a violation of the State's positive obligations to protect the individual's physical integrity and private life and to provide effective remedies in this respect.

110. The relevant Convention provisions read:

Article 3

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

Article 8 § 1

“Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life ...”

Article 13

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

A. The parties' submissions

1. The applicant

111. The applicant considered that domestic law and practice in rape cases should determine the existence, or lack, of consent to sexual intercourse on the basis of all relevant factors. In her view, a legal framework and practice that required proof of physical resistance by the victim, and thus left unpunished certain acts of rape, were inadequate.

112. The applicant relied on the written expert opinion she submitted (emphasising that the majority of children or other young rape victims displayed passive psychological reactions of panic – see paragraphs 6971 above) and also on developments in international and comparative law as to the elements of the crime of rape.

113. The applicant then offered her analysis of Bulgarian law and practice concerning rape and sexual abuse. She made the following submissions:

(i) According to the practice of the Bulgarian investigating and prosecuting authorities, the prosecution of rape was only possible if there was evidence of the use of physical force and evidence of physical resistance. Lack of such evidence would lead to the conclusion that sexual intercourse had been consensual.

(ii) It was not possible to support the above assertion directly with a case study since investigators' and prosecutors' decisions were not publicly available; they could only be found in the relevant case files and there was no system of sorting, reporting or analysis that could serve as the basis of a study. Also, the impugned practice was not based on written instructions but on institutional tradition and culture.

(iii) Because of the existing policy of the prosecuting authorities not to bring charges unless there was evidence of physical force and resistance, the issue had not been addressed directly by the courts.

(iv) Nevertheless, an overview of the reported judgments of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Cassation (judgments of lower courts were not reported) provided indirect evidence about the type of cases that were likely to be brought to court by the prosecuting authorities. The applicant had searched all reported judgments in rape cases and produced copies of twentyone judgments considered relevant by her counsel.

(v) Almost all reported cases concerned rape accompanied by substantial use of physical force and/or threats. Those cases typically involved the following acts of violence: dragging the victim from a car to a house and locking her up; tearing clothes and hitting the victim; punching the victim on the head and kicking her; suffocating the victim; causing concussion and fracture of the nose; or beating causing substantial bleeding. In several cases the victim had been threatened with violence or other consequences. In three cases the victim had committed or attempted to commit suicide as a result.

(vi) The research had produced only two cases in which a more context‑sensitive approach could be noted. In one case a teacher, having attempted flirting, forced his student to have sex with him repeatedly over a certain period of time by threatening her with negative consequences at school and with violence. The Supreme Court found that there had been repeated acts of rape committed through the use of threats and acknowledged that the victim had gradually been put into a state of a psychological dependence. In another case, a 14yearold girl who suffered from epilepsy and was mentally retarded had been raped by an acquaintance of the family; the courts noted that the girl had offered weak resistance (she had tried to get up after being pushed down on the floor by the perpetrator) but concluded that that “level of resistance”, seen in the context of the girl's age and health, had been “sufficient to demonstrate her unwillingness to have sex”.

114. The applicant submitted a copy of a letter by a Bulgarian psychotherapist working with victims of sexual violence, who stated that in her experience the prosecuting authorities brought charges only in cases where the attacker was a stranger to the victim, where there were serious injuries or where there were witnesses. In the applicant's view, that confirmed her allegation that the predominant tendency in practice was to infer consent from insufficient proof of physical resistance.

115. She further stated that, by setting at 14 the age of consent for sexual intercourse and at the same time limiting the prosecution of rape to cases of violent resistance by the victim, the authorities had left children insufficiently protected against rape.

116. The applicant submitted that, in her case, the prosecutors had put undue emphasis on the absence of physical violence and had not taken into account the fact that, at the age of 14, she had never taken important decisions herself, particularly under the pressure of time. The prosecutors had failed to have regard to the unlikelihood of a 14yearold girl who had never had sexual intercourse consenting to sex with two men in a row.

117. Furthermore, the investigation had not been thorough and complete. The crucial issue of the timing of all the moves of the three men and the applicant during the night in question – which could have shown that there had been no visit to a restaurant after the rape at the reservoir – had not been investigated. Contradictions in the evidence had been disregarded. The police patrol who had stopped the group on their way to the reservoir had not been identified. The investigator had accredited the testimony of the alleged perpetrators and of witnesses called by them and had at the same time disbelieved or ignored the testimony of other witnesses and the applicant's account of the events.

118. In the applicant's view, seen in the context of all the relevant facts, her clear and consistent testimony that she had begged P. to stop and had pushed him away until he had twisted her arms, and her account of the distress she had felt and of her resistance – reasonable in the circumstances – should have led to the conviction of the perpetrators if a correct interpretation of “rape”, consonant with the State's positive obligations under Articles 3, 8 and 13 of the Convention, had been applied.

2. The Government

119. The Government submitted that the investigation had been thorough and effective. All possible steps had been taken: seventeen persons had been questioned, some of them repeatedly, experts in psychiatry and psychology had been appointed and all aspects of the case had been explored. The Government therefore considered that the conclusion of the national authorities that P. and A. must have acted on the assumption of the applicant's consent had been wellfounded. In particular, the authorities had relied on all evidence about the events of 31 July to 1 August 1995, including information about the behaviour of the applicant. Furthermore, the applicant had gone out with P. after the events and there had been allegations by witnesses that her mother had attempted to extort money from P. and A. in return for dropping the rape allegations.

120. In the Government's submission, the facts of the case did not, therefore, concern the issue of protecting a person's integrity or ill‑treatment. As a result, no positive obligations arose under Articles 3 or 8 of the Convention.

121. The Government maintained that, in any event, Bulgarian law and practice in rape cases and their application in the present case did not violate any positive obligation that could arise under the Convention.

122. Describing the domestic law and practice in their initial submissions at the admissibility stage, the Government stated that proof of physical resistance was required in cases of rape and that, moreover, in accordance with “international practice, including in France” rape was only possible between strangers, whereas the applicant knew the alleged perpetrators.

123. In their submissions on the merits, the Government corrected their earlier statements and submitted that lack of consent was an essential element of rape under Bulgarian law. Proof of lack of consent was derived from evidence demonstrating that the victim was in a state of helplessness or had been put in such a state by the perpetrator, or from evidence of physical or psychological violence by the perpetrator. The Government submitted copies of several relevant judgments of the Supreme Court. They did not dispute the reliability of the analysis of Bulgarian caselaw offered by the applicant.

124. In the applicant's case – the Government argued – after a careful and impartial investigation, the authorities had not found it established, to the level of proof necessary to secure a criminal conviction, that rape had been committed. On the other hand, it was open to the applicant to submit a civil action for damages against the alleged perpetrators. She would be required to prove the unlawfulness of the perpetrators' acts, but no proof of mens rea would be necessary.

125. Finally, the Government submitted that the applicant had had effective criminal and civil remedies at her disposal, as required by Article 13 of the Convention.

3. Submissions by Interights

(a) General submissions

126. The intervener stated that over the past two decades the traditional definition of rape had undergone reform in civil and common law jurisdictions and in international law. This was the result of the evolving understanding of the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was experienced by the victim. Research had demonstrated that women, and more particularly minors, often did not physically resist rape either because they were physically unable to do so through paralysing fear, or because they were seeking to protect themselves against the increasing level of force being used against them.

127. Interights submitted that the reform of rape law reflected a shift from a “historical approach” to the “equality approach” to the question of consent. Rape was an offence against women's autonomy and its essential element was lack of consent. A central concern underlying reforms in rape law had been to clarify that it was not necessary to establish that the accused had overcome the victim's physical resistance in order to prove lack of consent.

128. That tendency had been reflected in developments in international criminal law. In particular, the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia had characterised as rape sexual penetration “in circumstances which are coercive” or committed through “coercion or force or threat of force”. That approach had also been taken in the Statute of the International Criminal Court and its draft Rules.

(b) Submissions on the law of several countries

129. Interights submitted copies of reports on the relevant law of several European and nonEuropean countries, prepared by legal scholars or professionals, or by research assistants. The information and assessments contained therein may be summarised as follows.

(i) Belgium

130. The list in Article 375 of the Belgian Criminal Code, amended in 1989, of situations where there is no consent was meant to preserve the caselaw dating from before 1989. The list of situations is not considered to be exhaustive, although one commentator is of the opposite opinion.

131. Historically, what was required to prove rape was proof of sufficiently serious and physically violent acts to break, paralyse or destroy the resistance of the victim. The 1989 amendments replaced the notion of “serious threats” (present in the Criminal Code since 1867) with the broader notion of “coercion” which includes not only fear for one's physical integrity but also any other general fear.

132. Nowadays, the prosecution is required to prove sexual penetration and lack of consent. Any elements that might show lack of consent will be taken into account, but the prosecution will mostly try to prove the existence of at least one of the factors “nullifying consent”, set out in the second paragraph of Article 375, namely violence, coercion, ruse or disability.

133. Lack of consent is proved where there is proof of physical resistance. However, even if there is no proof of physical violence or physical resistance, proof of coercion is sufficient. Whether or not there was coercion is a question to be assessed with reference to the capacities of the victim (age, actual state at the time of the facts).

134. There is a different age of consent for sexual acts of any kind (statutory indecent assault) on the one hand, and for acts involving sexual penetration (statutory rape) on the other. The age of consent for sexual penetration is 14 years and the age of consent for sexual acts of any kind is 16 years. As a result, sexual intercourse with a person aged 14 to 16, in the absence of proof of lack of consent, would be punished as statutory indecent assault. In practice, where the victim is between 14 and 16 years, charges of statutory indecent assault are more frequent than charges of rape.

(ii) Denmark

135. Coercion is nowadays understood broadly and is not limited to threats of serious violence.

136. Evidence of lack of consent is particularly important in cases where the accused and the victim knew each other. While the act of saying “no” would be a sufficient expression of lack of consent, proving that it was said and understood as being meant seriously could be difficult.

137. In a case from 1982, a man accused of raping a 16yearold girl was acquitted on the ground that he had not understood that the intercourse had been involuntary. The accused had taken the girl for a ride in his van. According to him, the girl had wished to be taken to her home. According to the girl, she had felt compelled to accept the offer to be taken home because of the situation, particularly once the accused had put his bicycle in his car. On the way, the accused had talked about his sexual problems and needs. The accused had regarded the fact that the girl had let him discuss these subjects as an acceptance that the situation was developing towards intimate contact. The victim had been afraid that the accused would turn violent if she did not let him talk. At one point, the accused had stopped the car and asked the victim to get into the luggage compartment, where sexual intercourse had taken place. The accused had asked the girl several times whether she agreed or not. The victim stated that she had had a mental block and had been afraid. The city court had convicted the accused, finding that the girl had not consented and that the accused had acted with intent, as he would only have had reason to put questions to the victim if he had doubted that she agreed to sexual intercourse. The court of appeal, however, found that the statement of the accused that he had perceived the victim's passivity as acceptance could not be disregarded and acquitted him.

(iii) Ireland

138. The principle that the prosecution must prove lack of consent, and not the presence of force, is well established. Absence of consent is a matter of fact for the jury to decide, having regard to all relevant circumstances and following the judge's directions. As regards the mens rea of rape, a defence of “genuine belief” is open to the accused, so that he is entitled to acquittal if it genuinely did not occur to him that the victim might not be consenting.

(iv) The United Kingdom

139. Before 1976 the commonlaw definition of rape was unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent, by force, fear or fraud. Historically, injury to the body was required as proof of force and as proof of resistance.

140. Under current law, after 1976, the prosecution must prove that the victim did not consent. Absence of consent is the key element of the actus reus. The burden is on the prosecution. There is no statutory definition of consent or lack of it. “Does not consent” is a question of fact for the jury, which it decides after hearing the judge's directions. In the leading case of Olugboja [1982] Queen's Bench 320, [1981] 3 All England Law Reports 443, two teenage girls had been given a lift home by the accused and his friend. Instead of taking the girls home, the two men took them to another house where the accused person's friend raped one of the girls, who was 16 years old. The accused then also had intercourse with her. He told her to take off her trousers. She did so because she was frightened and the room was dark. She told him “why can't you leave me alone”. He pushed her onto a sofa and had intercourse with her. She did not cry out or struggle. He was convicted of rape. Lord Justice Dunn said:

“[The jury] should be directed that consent, or the absence of it, is to be given its ordinary meaning and if need be, by way of example, that there is a difference between consent and submission; every consent involves a submission, but it by no means follows that a mere submission involves consent ... [The jury] should be directed to concentrate on the state of mind of the victim immediately before the act of sexual intercourse, having regard to all relevant circumstances, and in particular the events leading up to the act, and her reaction to them showing their impact on her mind.”

141. According to some legal commentators, despite Olugboja, the reality is that prosecution is unlikely to proceed where women have submitted in circumstances of similar psychological duress and entrapment to those in Olugboja, but in the absence of threats.

142. The prosecution must also prove the mens rea of rape, which is either knowledge that the victim does not consent or recklessness as to whether she consents or not. The perpetrator is reckless where he “never gave it a thought”, or was aware that the other person “might not be consenting but goes on just the same” (R. v. Gardiner [1994] Criminal Law Reports 455).

(v) The United States of America

143. The fifty States define what is commonly referred to as “rape” in a number of different ways but, despite significant variations in wording, the States converge on the question of nonconsent. In particular, it is an established principle that a victim is not required physically to resist her attacker to prove that she did not consent to the act. Verbal expressions of dissent suffice. In Commonwealth v. Berkowitz (641 A.2d 1161 (Pennsylvania, 1994)), the defendant had sexual intercourse with an acquaintance in his college dormitory room although she said “no” throughout the experience. The Pennsylvania courts held that the victim's repeated expressions of “no” were sufficient to prove her nonconsent.

144. In thirtyseven States, nonconsensual intercourse without extrinsic force (force extrinsic to that required to effect penetration) is expressly criminalised by statute as a felony, a sexual crime of the highest order, or a misdemeanour. Although it appears from the language of the remaining thirteen State codes that extrinsic force may be required, courts in twelve states have accepted, for example, that the statutory force requirement was met when the defendant only pushed or pinned his victim down or otherwise physically manipulated her; the test for “force” was found to be “whether the act was against the will of [the victim]” (Freeman v. State, 959 S.W.2d 401 (Arkansas 1998)). Thus, “force” was established where the perpetrator “pushed his body weight against [the victim]” and he was “large” or “husky” and the victim “petite” or “small” (State v. Coleman, 727 A.2d 246 (Connecticut, 1999) and State v. Plunkett, 934 P.2d 113 (Kansas, 1997)). The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated:

“[A]ny act of sexual penetration ... without the affirmative and freely given permission of the victim ... constitutes the offence of sexual assault. Therefore, physical force in excess of that inherent in the act of sexual penetration is not required for such penetration to be unlawful (In the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992)).”

145. Historically, a number of States required a rape victim to display the “utmost resistance”. Today, that requirement has been rejected. Only two States continue to require a sexual assault victim to display “earnest” resistance (Alabama and West Virginia); however, they do not require her to resist if she reasonably believes that resistance would be futile or would result in serious bodily injury (Richards v. State, 457 So.2d 893 (Alabama, 1985) – earnest resistance proved by victim's pleas to put her down and stop).

146. Increasingly, courts in the United States are taking into account relevant social science data indicating that sexual assault victims react in unpredictable ways under conditions of psychological and physical abuse. In 1992, for example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, when rejecting the resistance requirement for a sexual assault conviction, referred to “empirical research” to discredit “the assumption that resistance to the utmost or to the best of the woman's ability was the most reasonable or rational response to rape”. Indeed, rapists often employ subtle coercion or bullying when this is sufficient to overcome their victims. In most cases of rape against children, violence is not necessary to obtain submission. Courts are also recognising that some women become frozen with fear at the onset of a sexual attack and thus cannot resist (People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183, 1189 (California, 1994)).

(vi) Other legal systems

147. Interights also submitted analyses of the relevant law in Australia, Canada and South Africa, concluding that lack of consent was the defining element of rape and sexual abuse in those countries and that proof of use of physical force by the perpetrator or of physical resistance by the victim was not required.

B. The Court's assessment

1. General approach

(a) The existence of a positive obligation to punish rape and to investigate rape cases

148. Having regard to the nature and the substance of the applicant's complaints in this particular case, the Court finds that they fall to be examined primarily under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.

149. The Court reiterates that the obligation of the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to illtreatment, including illtreatment administered by private individuals (see A. v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998VI, p. 2699, § 22; Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392/95, §§ 7375, ECHR 2001V; and E. and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 33218/96, 26 November 2002).

150. Positive obligations on the State are inherent in the right to effective respect for private life under Article 8; these obligations may involve the adoption of measures even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves. While the choice of the means to secure compliance with Article 8 in the sphere of protection against acts of individuals is in principle within the State's margin of appreciation, effective deterrence against grave acts such as rape, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, requires efficient criminallaw provisions. Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to effective protection (see X and Y v. the Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A no. 91, pp. 1113, §§ 2324 and 27, and August v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 36505/02, 21 January 2003).

151. In a number of cases, Article 3 of the Convention gives rise to a positive obligation to conduct an official investigation (see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998VIII, p. 3290, § 102). Such a positive obligation cannot be considered in principle to be limited solely to cases of illtreatment by State agents (see, mutatis mutandis, Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], no. 32967/96, ECHR 2002I).

152. Further, the Court has not excluded the possibility that the State's positive obligation under Article 8 to safeguard the individual's physical integrity may extend to questions relating to the effectiveness of a criminal investigation (see Osman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998VIII, p. 3164, § 128,).

153. On that basis, the Court considers that States have a positive obligation inherent in Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention to enact criminal‑law provisions effectively punishing rape and to apply them in practice through effective investigation and prosecution.

(b) The modern conception of the elements of rape and its impact on the substance of member States' positive obligation to provide adequate protection

154. In respect of the means to ensure adequate protection against rape, States undoubtedly enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. In particular, perceptions of a cultural nature, local circumstances and traditional approaches are to be taken into account.

155. The limits of the national authorities' margin of appreciation are nonetheless circumscribed by the Convention provisions. In interpreting them, since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the Court must have regard to the changing conditions within Contracting States and respond, for example, to any evolving convergence as to the standards to be achieved (see Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, § 74, ECHR 2002VI).

156. The Court observes that, historically, proof of physical force and physical resistance was required under domestic law and practice in rape cases in a number of countries. The last decades, however, have seen a clear and steady trend in Europe and some other parts of the world towards abandoning formalistic definitions and narrow interpretations of the law in this area (see paragraphs 88108 and 12647 above).

157. Firstly, it appears that a requirement that the victim must resist physically is no longer present in the statutes of European countries.

158. In commonlaw countries, in Europe and elsewhere, reference to physical force has been removed from the legislation and/or caselaw (see paragraphs 98, 100 and 13847 above, in relation to Ireland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and other countries). Irish law explicitly states that consent cannot be inferred from lack of resistance (see paragraph 98 above).

159. In most European countries influenced by the continental legal tradition, the definition of rape contains references to the use of violence or threats of violence by the perpetrator. It is significant, however, that in case‑law and legal theory lack of consent, not force, is seen as the constituent element of the offence of rape (see paragraphs 9097, 99 and 13037 above).

160. Belgian law was amended in 1989 to state that any act of sexual penetration would constitute rape when committed in respect of a person who had not given consent. Thus, while the reference to “violence, duress or ruse” as punishable means of imposing a nonconsensual act remains in the statute, violence and/or physical resistance are not elements of rape in Belgian law (see paragraphs 90 and 13034 above).

161. Regardless of the specific wording chosen by the legislature, in a number of countries the prosecution of nonconsensual sexual acts in all circumstances is sought in practice by means of interpretation of the relevant statutory terms (“coercion”, “violence”, “duress”, “threat”, “ruse”, “surprise” or others) and through a contextsensitive assessment of the evidence (see paragraphs 95 and 13047 above).

162. The Court also notes that the member States of the Council of Europe, through the Committee of Ministers, have agreed that penalising nonconsensual sexual acts, “[including] in cases where the victim does not show signs of resistance”, is necessary for the effective protection of women against violence (see paragraph 101 above) and have urged the implementation of further reforms in this area.

163. In international criminal law, it has recently been recognised that force is not an element of rape and that taking advantage of coercive circumstances to proceed with sexual acts is also punishable. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has found that, in international criminal law, any sexual penetration without the victim's consent constitutes rape and that consent must be given voluntarily, as a result of the person's free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances (see paragraphs 10207 above). While the above definition was formulated in the particular context of rapes committed against the population in the conditions of an armed conflict, it also reflects a universal trend towards regarding lack of consent as the essential element of rape and sexual abuse.

164. As submitted by the intervener, the evolving understanding of the manner in which rape is experienced by the victim has shown that victims of sexual abuse – in particular, girls below the age of majority – often provide no physical resistance because of a variety of psychological factors or because they fear violence on the part of the perpetrator.

165. Moreover, the development of law and practice in that area reflects the evolution of societies towards effective equality and respect for each individual's sexual autonomy.

166. In the light of the above, the Court is persuaded that any rigid approach to the prosecution of sexual offences, such as requiring proof of physical resistance in all circumstances, risks leaving certain types of rape unpunished and thus jeopardising the effective protection of the individual's sexual autonomy. In accordance with contemporary standards and trends in that area, the member States' positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention must be seen as requiring the penalisation and effective prosecution of any nonconsensual sexual act, including in the absence of physical resistance by the victim.

167. In the light of the above, the Court's task is to examine whether or not the impugned legislation and practice and their application in the case at hand, combined with the alleged shortcomings in the investigation, had such significant flaws as to amount to a breach of the respondent State's positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.

168. The issue before the Court is limited to the above. The Court is not concerned with allegations of errors or isolated omissions in the investigation; it cannot replace the domestic authorities in the assessment of the facts of the case; nor can it decide on the alleged perpetrators' criminal responsibility.

2. Application of the Court's approach

169. The applicant alleged that the authorities' attitude in her case was rooted in defective legislation and reflected a predominant practice of prosecuting rape perpetrators only in the presence of evidence of significant physical resistance.

170. The Court observes that Article 152 § 1 of the Bulgarian Criminal Code does not mention any requirement of physical resistance by the victim and defines rape in a manner which does not differ significantly from the wording found in statutes of other member States. As seen above, many legal systems continue to define rape by reference to the means used by the perpetrator to obtain the victim's submission (see paragraphs 74 and 88‑100).

171. What is decisive, however, is the meaning given to words such as “force” or “threats” or other terms used in legal definitions. For example, in some legal systems “force” is considered to be established in rape cases by the very fact that the perpetrator proceeded with a sexual act without the victim's consent or because he held her body and manipulated it in order to perform a sexual act without consent. As noted above, despite differences in statutory definitions, the courts in a number of countries have developed their interpretation so as to try to encompass any nonconsensual sexual act (see paragraphs 95 and 13047).

172. In the present case, in the absence of caselaw explicitly dealing with the question whether every sexual act carried out without the victim's consent is punishable under Bulgarian law, it is difficult to arrive at safe general conclusions on this issue on the basis of the Supreme Court's judgments and legal publications (see paragraphs 7585 above). Whether or not a sexual act in a particular case is found to have involved coercion always depends on a judicial assessment of the facts. A further difficulty is the absence of a reliable study of prosecutorial practice in cases which never reached the courts.

173. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the Government were unable to provide copies of judgments or legal commentaries clearly disproving the allegations of a restrictive approach in the prosecution of rape. The Government's own submissions on the elements of rape in Bulgarian law were inconsistent and unclear (see paragraphs 12223 above). Finally, the fact that the vast majority of the Supreme Court's reported judgments concerned rapes committed with the use of significant violence (except those where the victim was physically or mentally disabled), although not decisive, may be seen as an indication that most of the cases where little or no physical force and resistance were established were not prosecuted (see paragraphs 7485, 113, 122 and 123 above).

174. The Court is not required to seek conclusive answers about the practice of the Bulgarian authorities in rape cases in general. It is sufficient for the purposes of the present case to observe that the applicant's allegation of a restrictive practice is based on reasonable arguments and has not been disproved by the Government.

175. Turning to the particular facts of the applicant's case, the Court notes that, in the course of the investigation, many witnesses were heard and an expert report by a psychologist and a psychiatrist was ordered. The case was investigated and the prosecutors gave reasoned decisions, explaining their position in some detail (see paragraphs 4465 above).

176. The Court recognises that the Bulgarian authorities faced a difficult task, as they were confronted with two conflicting versions of the events and little “direct” evidence. The Court does not underestimate the efforts made by the investigator and the prosecutors in their work on the case.

177. It notes, nonetheless, that the presence of two irreconcilable versions of the facts obviously called for a contextsensitive assessment of the credibility of the statements made and for verification of all the surrounding circumstances. Little was done, however, to test the credibility of the version of the events proposed by P. and A. and the witnesses called by them. In particular, the witnesses whose statements contradicted each other, such as Ms T. and Mr M., were not confronted. No attempt was made to establish with more precision the timing of the events. The applicant and her representative were not given the opportunity to put questions to the witnesses whom she accused of perjury. In their decisions, the prosecutors did not devote any attention to the question whether the story proposed by P. and A. was credible, although some of their statements called for caution, such as the assertion that the applicant, 14 years old at the time, had started caressing A. minutes after having sex for the first time in her life with another man (see paragraphs 1665 above).

178. The Court thus considers that the authorities failed to explore the available possibilities for establishing all the surrounding circumstances and did not assess sufficiently the credibility of the conflicting statements made.

179. It is highly significant that the reason for that failure was, apparently, the investigator's and the prosecutors' opinion that, since what was alleged to have occurred was a “date rape”, in the absence of “direct” proof of rape such as traces of violence and resistance or calls for help, they could not infer proof of lack of consent and, therefore, of rape from an assessment of all the surrounding circumstances. That approach transpires clearly from the position of the investigator and, in particular, from the regional prosecutor's decision of 13 May 1997 and the Chief Public Prosecutor's decision of 24 June 1997 (see paragraphs 55, 60, 61, 64 and 65 above).

180. Furthermore, it appears that the prosecutors did not exclude the possibility that the applicant might not have consented, but adopted the view that in any event, in the absence of proof of resistance, it could not be concluded that the perpetrators had understood that the applicant had not consented (see the text of the prosecutors' decisions in paragraphs 64 and 65 above). The prosecutors forwent the possibility of proving the perpetrators' mens rea by assessing all the surrounding circumstances, such as evidence that they had deliberately misled the applicant in order to take her to a deserted area, thus creating an environment of coercion, and also by judging the credibility of the versions of the facts proposed by the three men and witnesses called by them (see paragraphs 21, 63 and 6668 above).

181. The Court considers that, while in practice it may sometimes be difficult to prove lack of consent in the absence of “direct” proof of rape, such as traces of violence or direct witnesses, the authorities must nevertheless explore all the facts and decide on the basis of an assessment of all the surrounding circumstances. The investigation and its conclusions must be centred on the issue of nonconsent.

182. That was not done in the applicant's case. The Court finds that the failure of the authorities in the applicant's case to investigate sufficiently the surrounding circumstances was the result of their putting undue emphasis on “direct” proof of rape. Their approach in the particular case was restrictive, practically elevating “resistance” to the status of defining element of the offence.

183. The authorities may also be criticised for having attached little weight to the particular vulnerability of young persons and the special psychological factors involved in cases concerning the rape of minors (see paragraphs 5860 above).

184. Furthermore, they handled the investigation with significant delays (see paragraphs 4446 above).

185. In sum, the Court, without expressing an opinion on the guilt of P. and A., finds that the investigation of the applicant's case and, in particular, the approach taken by the investigator and the prosecutors in the case fell short of the requirements inherent in the States' positive obligations – viewed in the light of the relevant modern standards in comparative and international law – to establish and apply effectively a criminallaw system punishing all forms of rape and sexual abuse.

186. As regards the Government's argument that the national legal system provided for the possibility of a civil action for damages against the perpetrators, the Court notes that this assertion has not been substantiated. In any event, as stated above, effective protection against rape and sexual abuse requires measures of a criminallaw nature (see paragraphs 124 and 14853 above).

187. The Court thus finds that in the present case there has been a violation of the respondent State's positive obligations under both Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. It also holds that no separate issue arises under Article 13 of the Convention.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION

188. Comparing the texts of Articles 157 § 2 and 152 of the Bulgarian Criminal Code, which concern the age of consent for sexual activity, the applicant complained that the law afforded better protection against rape to “homosexual children” than to “heterosexual children”.

Article 14 of the Convention provides:

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”

189. In the light of its findings above, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine the complaint under Article 14 of the Convention.

III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

190. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

191. The applicant stated that she was continuing to suffer psychological trauma years after she had been raped. That was to a large extent due to the fact that the relevant law and practice had not ensured effective protection. Furthermore, the investigation in her case had been flawed and had victimised her.

192. On that basis, referring to several of the Court's judgments in cases of sexual abuse, the applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of nonpecuniary damage.

193. The Government submitted that the amount claimed was excessive.

194. The Court considers that the applicant must have suffered distress and psychological trauma resulting at least partly from the shortcomings in the authorities' approach found in the present case. Making an assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards her EUR 8,000.

B. Costs and expenses

195. The applicant claimed EUR 4,740 for a total of 118.5 hours of legal work on her case, at the rate of EUR 40 per hour. She submitted a fee agreement with her lawyer, signed in 2003 by her mother, and a time sheet. The applicant's lawyer explained that the fee agreement had been signed by the applicant's mother because he had been initially hired by her, the applicant having been under age at the time.

196. The Government stated that the fee agreement was not valid because the applicant had turned 18 in September 1998 and since then her mother had no longer been entitled to act on her behalf. Even at the time of the initial, apparently oral, agreement between the mother and the lawyer, the applicant had been over 14 years of age and had thus been entitled under Bulgarian law to perform legal acts with her mother's approval.

197. The Government also stated that the parties had agreed on the hourly rate of EUR 40 in 2003, at the final stage of the proceedings, which meant that a high and arbitrary fee had been fixed. In “other circumstances”, the applicant would not have agreed to pay such amounts.

198. According to the Court's established caselaw, costs and expenses will not be awarded under Article 41 unless it is established that they were actually and necessarily incurred and are also reasonable as to quantum. Furthermore, legal costs are only recoverable in so far as they relate to the violation found (see Beyeler v. Italy (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 33202/96, § 27, 28 May 2002).

199. The Government have not disputed the fact that the applicant's lawyer had carried out legal work in her case, after being given a power of attorney dated 27 November 1997 signed by the applicant and her mother, at a time when the applicant had not yet reached the age of majority (see paragraphs 2 and 9 above). It has not been alleged that the applicant disputes the costs her lawyer has charged her or that the amounts claimed are unrelated to the violation found in the present case. In these circumstances, there is no doubt that the legal costs claimed were actually and necessarily incurred.

200. The Government have not objected to the number of hours of legal work claimed. The Court further considers that the hourly rate of EUR 40 is not excessive. Accordingly, deducting EUR 630 received in legal aid from the Council of Europe, it awards EUR 4,110 in respect of costs.

C. Default interest

201. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Holds that there has been a violation of the respondent State's positive obligations under both Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention;

2. Holds that no separate issue arises under Article 13 of the Convention;

3. Holds that it is not necessary to examine the applicant's complaints under Article 14 of the Convention;

4. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i) EUR 8,000 (eight thousand euros) in respect of nonpecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 4,110 (four thousand one hundred and ten euros) in respect of costs and expenses;

(iii) any tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;

(b) that from the expiry of the abovementioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 4 December 2003, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Deputy Registrar President

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the concurring opinion of Mrs Tulkens is annexed to this judgment.

C.L.R.
S.N.

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE TULKENS

(Translation)

In this particularly sensitive and delicate case, I should simply like to make a few additional observations.

1. I consider that it was important and significant that the Court should examine the case under both Article 3 and Article 8 of the Convention. Rape infringes not only the right to personal integrity (both physical and psychological) as guaranteed by Article 3, but also the right to autonomy as a component of the right to respect for private life as guaranteed by Article 8.

2. I agree entirely with the Court's general approach (see paragraphs 148 et seq. of the judgment) and the manner in which it was applied in the present case (see paragraphs 169 et seq.). The only point I wish to clarify concerns the use of criminal remedies. Relying, in particular, on X and Y v. the Netherlands (judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A no. 91), the Court considers that “States have a positive obligation inherent in Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention to enact criminallaw provisions effectively punishing rape” (see paragraph 153). Admittedly, recourse to the criminal law may be understandable where offences of this kind are concerned. However, it is also important to emphasise on a more general level, as, indeed, the Court did in X and Y v. the Netherlands itself, that “[r]ecourse to the criminal law is not necessarily the only answer” (p. 12, § 24 in fine). I consider that criminal proceedings should remain, both in theory and in practice, a last resort or subsidiary remedy and that their use, even in the context of positive obligations, calls for a certain degree of “restraint”. As to the assumption that criminal remedies are, in any event, the most effective in terms of deterrence, the observations set out in the Report on Decriminalisation by the European Committee on Crime Problems clearly show that the effectiveness of general deterrence based on the criminal law depends on various factors and that such an approach “is not the only way of preventing undesirable behaviour”[1].

3. That said, in the present case, as in X and Y v. the Netherlands (p. 13, § 27), once the State has opted for a system of protection based on the criminal law, it is of course essential that the relevant criminallaw provisions are fully and rigorously applied in order to provide the applicant with practical and effective protection. In that connection, the Court's observation that “[t]he investigation and its conclusion must be centred on the issue of nonconsent” (see paragraph 181 of the present judgment) is, in my opinion, of fundamental importance.

[1]1. European Committee on Crime Problems, Report on Decriminalisation, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1980, pp. 7578.