Pranjić-M-Lukić protiv Bosne i Hercegovine

Država na koju se presuda odnosi
Bosna i Hercegovina
Institucija
Evropski sud za ljudska prava
Stepen važnosti
3
Jezik
Bosanski
Datum
02.06.2020
Članovi
3
8
8-1
8-2
Kršenje
3
8
8-1
8-2
Nekršenje
nije relevantno
Ključne reči
(Čl. 3) Zabrana torture
(Čl. 3 / CAT-16) Ponižavajuće postupanje
(Čl. 8) Pravo na poštovanje privatnog i porodičnog života
(Čl. 8-1) Poštovanje privatnog života
(Čl. 8-2) U skladu sa zakonom
Broj predstavke
4938/16
Zbirke
Sudska praksa
Presuda
Veće
Sažetak
Podnosilac prijave, Goran Pranjić-M-Lukić, državljanin je Bosne i Hercegovine rođen 1962. godine i živi u Karlsruheu (Njemačka). Aplikacija se odnosi na navodno podvrgavanje aplikanta postupanju suprotnom članovima 3. i 8. Konvencije zbog njegovog ponovljenog prinudnog privođenja prema nezakonitim sudskim naredbama (uključujući i stavljanje lisica na ruke jednom prilikom) i nedobrovoljnom psihijatrijskom i psihološkom veštačenju izvršenom tokom krivičnog postupka protiv njega.

Godine 2004. podnosilac predstavke je optužen da je oštetio fasadu kuće svog komšije i da je pljunuo policajca i verbalno zlostavljao drugog nakon što su pozvali na lice mesta. Opštinski sud je 2011. godine obustavio postupak vezan za krivično delo oštećenja imovine usled zastarelosti, dok je odlučivanje o krivičnom delu napada na službeno lice odloženo, nakon što je psihijatar zaključio da je podnosilac predstavke nesposoban za suđenje zbog problema sa mentalnim zdravljem. Krivični postupak je nastavljen u decembru 2012. godine, dok je vanparnični postupak za podnosiočevo obavezno psihijatrijsko lečenje još uvek u toku. Opštinski sud naredio je da podnosilac predstavke prođe psihijatrijske i psihološke preglede (u četiri navrata podnosilac je bio prisilno sproveden na pregled). U julu 2013. sud je odlučio da obustavi postupak, a zatim u oktobru 2016. godine da ga prekine na osnovu lekarskih izveštaja u kojima je zaključeno da podnosilac ima trajnu psihološku bolest. Tokom čitavog krivičnog postupka, podnosilac prijave se neuspešno žalio na postupanje sudske policije.

Aplikant se žalio, prema članu 8. Konvencije, zbog njegovog ponovljenog prinudnog odvođenja na nedobrovoljno psihijatrijsko i psihološko veštačenje za vreme krivičnog postupka koji se vodio protiv njega 2013. godine, što mu je nanelo duševnu patnju.

Sud primjećuje da postoji spor između stranaka o tome je li mešanje u prava aplikanta iz člana 8. bilo „u skladu sa zakonom“. Sud ponavlja da izrazi „propisano zakonom“ i „u skladu sa zakonom“ u članovima 8. do 11. Konvencije ne samo da zahtevaju da sporna mera mora imati pravni osnov u domaćem zakonu, već se takođe odnose i na kvalitet dotičnog zakona koji mora biti dostupan osobi o kojoj je reč i predvidiv u pogledu njegovih učinaka citirane. U tom pogledu Sud napominje da je 6.11.2012. godine općinski sud okončao vanparnični postupak, smatrajući da će se po pravnosnažnosti te odluke postupak nastaviti prema pravilima krivičnog postupka. Aplikant se žalio na tu odluku dana 21.02.2013. godine (dakle, u zakonskom roku). On dalje primjećuje da, prema članu 19. Zakona o vanparničnom postupku iz 1998. godine, žalba ima suspenzivan učinak. Pa ipak, krivični postupak je nastavljen dana 21.12.2012. godine (dakle, dok je vanparnični postupak i dalje bio u toku), a općinski sud je iznova naređivao psihijatrijsko i psihološko veštačenje aplikanta i njegovo prinudno odvođenje na ta veštačenja. Naredbe jesu stoga imale osnov u domaćem zakonu, međutim, u konkretnim okolnostima predmetnog slučaja, ne može se reći da su domaće vlasti postupale u skladu sa zakonom budući da je nastavak krivičnog postupka bio nezakonit.
Sud napominje da je kantonalni sud odlučio da općinski sud nije mogao na vlastitu inicijativu zakonito nastaviti krivični postupak koji je bio prekinut, te da, shodno tome, on nije mogao zakonito doneti bilo kakve naredbe za prinudno veštačenje aplikanta u kontekstu tog nastavljenog postupka, jer bi to bilo suprotno važećim pravilima krivičnog postupka. Mešanje u pravo aplikanta na poštovanje njegovog privatnog života stoga nije bilo „u skladu sa zakonom“, u smislu člana 8. stav 2. Konvencije.

Aplikant se žalio prema članu 3. Konvencije na tretman kojem je bio izložen dana 06.06.2013. godine kada mu je sudska policija stavila lisice prilikom njegovog prinudnog odvođenja na nedobrovoljno psihijatrijsko veštačenje. Kako je Sud ranije istaknuo, kada je osoba lišena slobode ili, uopšte, kada je suočena sa službenicima za provedbu zakona, svaka primena fizičke sile koju ponašanje te osobe nije učinilo izrazito nužnom, narušava ljudsko dostojanstvo i u načelu predstavlja povredu prava utvrđenog članom 3. Konvencije. Sud napominje da činjenica da su aplikantu stavljene lisice pred njegovim roditeljem, zbog čega se on mogao u vlastitim očima osećati poniženim, predstavlja samo otežavajući faktor u tom smislu.

Iz navedenih razloga, sud jednoglasno uvtrđuje da je došlo do povrede člana 3. i člana 8. Konvencije.

 preuzmite presudu u pdf formatu

 

ČETVRTI ODJEL

PREDMET PRANJIĆ-M-LUKIĆ protiv BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE

(Aplikacija br. 4938/16)

PRESUDA

STRASBOURG

02.06.2020. godine

Ova presuda će postati konačna u skladu s uvjetima iz člana 44. stav 2. Konvencije. U presudi su moguće uredničke izmjene.

U predmetu Pranjić-M-Lukić protiv Bosne i Hercegovine, Evropski sud za ljudska prava (Četvrti odjel), zasjedajući u vijeću u sljedećem sastavu:

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, predsjednik,
Faris Vehabović,
Iulia Antoanella Motoc,
Carlo Ranzoni,
Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström,
Georges Ravarani,
Péter Paczolay, sudije,
i Ilse Freiwirth, zamjenik registrara Odjela,

imajući u vidu: aplikaciju protiv Bosne i Hercegovine koju je prema članu 34. Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda („Konvencija“) Sudu podnio državljanin Bosne i Hercegovine, g. Goran Pranjić-M-Lukić („aplikant“), dana 29.12.2015. godine; odluku da se vlada Bosne i Hercegovine („vlada“) obavijesti o pritužbama prema članu 3. i članu 8. Konvencije, te da se preostali dio aplikacije proglasi nedopštenim; izjašnjenja stranaka; nakon vijećanja na sjednici zatvorenoj za javnost dana 12.05.2020. godine, donio je sljedeću presudu koja je usvojena navedenoga datuma:

UVOD

Aplikacija se odnosi na navodno podvrgavanje aplikanta postupanju suprotnom članovima 3. i 8. Konvencije zbog njegovog ponovljenog prinudnog privođenja prema nezakonitim sudskim naredbama (uključujući i stavljanje lisica na ruke jednom prilikom),  nedobrovoljnom psihijatrijskom i psihološkom vještačenju izvršenom tijekom krivičnog postupka protiv njega.

ČINJENICE

  1. Aplikant je rođen 1962. godine i živi u Karlsruheu. Dozvoljeno mu je da se sam zastupa.
  2. Vladu je u početku zastupala zamjenik agenta vlade, gđa S. Malešić, a potom vršiteljica dužnosti agenta, gđa V. Bjelica-Prutina.
  3. Činjenice ovog predmeta kako su ih navele stranke, mogu se sažeti na sljedeći način.

I KRIVIČNI POSTUPAK

  1. Dana 5.04.2004. godine aplikant je navodno oštetio fasadu kuće njegovog susjeda. Nakon što je pozvana policija, aplikant je navodno pljunuo i napao jednog policajca i verbalno vrijeđao drugog, te je potom uhapšen. Pušten je na slobodu dana 6.04.2004. godine, nakon što ga je ispitao tužitelj Kantonalnog tužiteljstva u Mostaru („tužitelj“).
  2. Dana 4.05.2004. godine tužitelj je izdao naredbu da se aplikant javi psihijatru kako bi se izvršilo njegovo vještačenje. Kako izgleda, aplikant nije postupio prema toj naredbi i vještačenje nije izvršeno.
  3. Dana 16.07.2004. godine tužitelj je podnio optužnicu protiv aplikanta za krivično djelo oštećenja tuđe stvari i za krivično djelo napad na službenu osobu u vršenju poslova sigurnosti.
  4. Dana 9.03.2006. godine aplikantu je dodijeljena besplatna pravna pomoć na način da mu je sud postavio branitelja. Aplikant je odmah prigovorio imenovanju tog branitelja i zatražio da se imenuje N.D.; N.D. je postavljen 15.02.2010. godine.
  5. Dana 22.02.2007. godine aplikant se nije pojavio na suđenju, pravdavajući svoj izostanak navođenjem potrebe da ode u Centar za mentalno zdravlje u Mostaru (centar za mentalno zdravlje) zbog duševne bolesti od koje pati; tužitelj je potom predložio da aplikanta pregleda psihijatar, navodeći da su zdravstveni problemi aplikanta primijećeni i tijekom istrage. Istoga dana, Općinski sud u Mostaru („općinski sud“) izdao je naredbu da se izvrši psihijatrijsko vještačenje aplikanta. Kako izgleda, takvo vještačenje nije izvršeno.
  6. Dana 21.10.2008. godine općinski sud je donio novu naredbu da se izvrši psihijatrijsko vještačenje aplikanta nakon što je uvid u drugi spis koji se odnosi na aplikanta pokazao da on ima duševnu bolest.
  7. Dana 3.11.2010. godine izvršeno je psihijatrijsko vještačenje. Aplikant je prinudno doveden kod psihijatra, budući da se nije pojavio dobrovoljno.
  8. Dana 31.12.2010. godine psihijatrica je izdala svoje stručno mišljenje. Ona je zaključila da je aplikant asocijalna osoba koja je zbog trajnog toka psihičkih poteškoća razvila veći dijapazon i intenzitet simptoma koji se približavaju psihotičnom stanju, a što u situacijama koje su izuzetno napete, potencijalno konfliktne, iste doživljava kao prijeteće po vlastiti opstanak i dobrobit, a što sve zajedno može dovesti do pretjeranih i imupulzivnih reakcija. Stoga je vještak zaključila da aplikant nije u stanju sudjelovati u krivičnom postupku, te je predložila općinskom sudu da optuženom izrekne mjeru sigurnosti obaveznog psihijatrijskog liječenja u psihijatrijskoj ustanovi.
  9. Dana 4.03.2011. godine općinski sud je obustavio postupak protiv aplikanta u vezi sa krivičnim djelom oštećenja tuđe stvari (vidi tačku 6. ove presude) jer je nastupila zastara za to krivično djelo.
  10. Dana 8.04.2011. godine općinski sud je donio odluku kojom je (i) prihvaćen nalaz i mišljenje vještaka (vidi tačku 11. ove presude) i odlučeno da se prekine krivični postupak protiv aplikanta za krivično djelo napad na službenu osobu u vršenju poslova sigurnosti (vidi tačku 6. ove presude) dok se zdravlje aplikanta ne popravi u dovoljnoj mjeri da može sudjelovati u postupku. Sud je aplikanta uputio u Centar za socijalni rad Grada Mostara („centar za socijalni rad“) na dalji postupak. Aplikant se žalio na tu odluku.
  11. Dana 21.06.2011. godine Kantonalni sud u Mostaru, („kantonalni sud“) odbio je žalbu aplikanta.

II VANPARNIČNI POSTUPAK

  1. Dana 25.10.2011. godine, centar za socijalni rad podnio je prijedlog u vanparničnom postupku pred općinskim sudom za izricanje mjere sigurnosti obaveznog psihijatrijskog liječenja aplikanta (vidi tačku 11. ove presude).
  2. Dana 18.04.2012. godine općinski sud je zatražio da se centar za socijalni rad izjasni da li i dalje ostaje kod mjere koju je predložio ranije, ili sada preporučuje da aplikant (u smislu članova 45. do 59. Zakona o vanparničnom postupku – vidi tačku 49. ove presude) bude zadržan u zdravstvenoj ustanovi. Centar za socijalni rad je odgovorio da ostaje kod svog ranijeg prijedloga.
  3. Dana 6.11.2012. godine općinski sud je odbio prijedlog centra za socijalni rad (vidi tačku 15. ove presude) i obustavio postupak. Smatrao je da nije ovlašten da odredi predloženu mjeru s obzirom na to da je prema članu 43. Zakona o zaštiti osoba sa duševnim smetnjama iz 2001. godine (vidi tačku 48. ove presude) krivični sud jedino tijelo koje ima nadležnost da odredi takvu mjeru u krivičnom postupku. Obrazložio je da, s obzirom na podnesene dokaze, krivično djelo nije počinjeno u stanju neuračunljivosti, te da aplikant nije osoba sa teškom psihičkom bolešću, niti je „osoba sa duševnim smetnjama“ u smislu člana 45. Zakona o vanparničnom postupku i člana 22. Zakona o zaštiti osoba sa duševnim smetnjama iz 2001. godine (vidi tačke 48. i 49. ove presude). Utvrdio je da će po pravomoćnosti te odluke postupak biti nastavljen prema pravilima krivičnog postupka, te da aplikant ima pravo žalbe protiv te odluke u roku od petnaest dana od dana dostavljanja.
  4. Dana 6.02.2013. godine aplikantu je dostavljena ta odluka, a on se žalio na nju 21.02.2013. godine (što znači u zakonskom roku od petnaest dana– vidi tačku 49. ove presude), pozivajući se na članove 3. i 6. Konvencije.
  5. Dana 22.12.2015. godine Kantonalni sud je odbacio žalbu aplikanta. On je utvrdio da (i) aplikant nema pravni interes za podnošenje žalbe protiv rješenja donesenog u vanparničnom postupku budući da je taj postupak obustavljen, i (ii) da će se, u skladu s pravilima krivičnog postupka, postupak koji se odnosi na izricanje mjere sigurnosti obaveznog psihijatrijskog liječenja aplikanta u zdravstvenoj ustanovi nastaviti po pravomoćnosti rješenja donesenog u vanparničnom postupku.

III. NASTAVAK KRIVIČNOG POSTUPKA

  1. Dana 21.12.2012. godine općinski sud je donio novu naredbu da aplikanta pregleda vještak neuropsihijatar. Općinski sud je naložio neuropsihijatru da pregleda spis predmeta, kao i medicinsku dokumentaciju koja se nalazi u Centru za mentalno zdravlje u Bolnici Južni logor u Mostaru, u kojoj je - prema informacijama kojima je raspolagao općinski sud - aplikant bio na liječenju. Pregled aplikanta trebao je biti obavljen s posebnim naglaskom na utvrđivanje (i) da li je on sposoban da prati postupak, i (ii) njegove uračunljivosti u vrijeme kada je počinio krivično djelo.
  2. Dana 27.12.2012. godine aplikant je općinskom sudu dostavio podnesak navodeći (i) da je krivični postupak protiv njega prekinut 8.04.2011. godine (vidi tačku 13. ove presude) i (ii) da vanparnični postupak još nije okončan, budući da je njegova žalba još uvijek neriješena (vidi tačku 18. ove presude); prema tome, ustvrdio je, naredba suda za njegovo neuropsihijatrijsko vještačenje je „bespredmetna“.
  3. Dana 17.01.2013. općinski sud je pozvao aplikanta na psihijatrijsko vještačenje u Bolnici Mostar, zakazano za 23.01.2013. godine, prema članu 124. Zakona o krivičnom postupku (vidi tačku 47. ove presude). Općinski sud je također naložio da će u slučaju da se aplikant ne povinuje naredbi, ili u slučaju nemogućnosti da mu se uruči naredba, on biti doveden od strane sudske policije u skladu sa članom 139. Zakona o krivičnom postupku.
  4. Dana 21.01.2013. godine aplikant je dostavio podnesak općinskom sudu u kojem je ponovio svoje ranije tvrdnje (vidi tačku 21. ove presude) dodavši da općinski sud postupa na način suprotan Zakonu o krivičnom postupku jer nije donio novu odluku o nastavku prekinutog postupka. S obzirom na sve okolnosti, odbio je otići na zakazano vještačenje.
  5. Dana 30.01.2013. godine općinski sud je izdao dovedbeni nalog sudskoj policiji u skladu sa članom 139. (vidi tačku 47. ove presude) da aplikanta dovede u Bolnicu Mostar prinudnim putem na pregled psihijatra i psihologa. Općinski sud je također naredio sudskoj policiji da prisustvuje pregledu aplikanta.
  6. Dana 5.02.2013. godine sudska policija je aplikanta dovela na vještačenje; međutim, vještačenje nije obavljeno jer je aplikant podnio zahtjev za izuzeće vještaka. Taj zahtjev je općinski sud odbio 13.03. 2013. godine.
  7. Dana 29.03.2013. godine općinski sud je opet pozvao aplikanta da dođe u Bolnicu Mostar na neuropsihijatrijsko vještačenje kako bi se utvrdilo je li u stanju pratiti krivični postupak (vidi tačku 20. ove presude).
  8. Dana 12.04.2013. godine aplikant je uputio drugi podnesak općinskom sudu navodeći da je naredbom o njegovom vještačenju bio izložen raznim „metodama mučenja“, čime je narušen njegov mentalni integritet, te da se neće povinovati naredbi. Ponovno se pozvao na odluku donesenu u vanparničnom postupku (vidi tačku 17. ove presude).
  9. Dana 7.05.2013. godine općinski sud je izdao novu naredbu sudskoj policiji u skladu sa članom 139. (vidi tačku 47. ove presude), da aplikanta prinudno dovede u Bolnicu Mostar na pregled od strane vještaka psihijatra i psihologa.
  10. Dana 8.05.2013. godine aplikanta je sudska policija prinudno odvela na pregled. Aplikant je opet podnio zahtjev za izuzeće navedenih vještaka. Kako izgleda, općinski sud nije odlučio o zahtjevu za izuzeće; u svakom slučaju, vještačenje nije obavljeno.
  11. Dana 24.05.2013. godine općinski sud je pozvao aplikanta na ročište zakazano za 7.06.2013. godine. Aplikant je također poučen da može uzeti branitelja.
  12. Dana 3.06.2013. aplikant je općinskom sudu dostavio podnesak u kojem je naveo da nije u mogućnosti sudjelovati u krivičnom postupku, pozivajući se na nalaz vještaka od 31.12.2010. godine (vidi tačku 11. ove presude). Aplikant je dodao da rješenje doneseno u vanparničnom postupku (vidi tačku 17. ove presude) još nije pravomoćno.
  13. Dana 5.06.2013. godine općinski sud je izdao još jednu naredbu sudskoj policiji prema članu (vidi tačku 47. ove presude) da aplikanta prinudno dovede u Bolnicu Mostar, te da prisustvuje njegovom psihijatrijskom vještačenju zakazanom za 6.06.2013.
  14. Dana 6.06.2013. godine četiri pripadnika sudske policije su prinudno doveli aplikanta na odjel neurologije Bolnice Mostar na psihijatrijsko vještačenje, koje je obavljeno toga dana. Istoga dana sudska policija je izdala i Potvrdu o ulasku i pregledu stana i drugih prostorija „potvrda“, u kojoj se navodi da su tri policajca ušla u stan aplikanta izvršavajući sudsku naredbu za njegovo psihijatrijsko vještačenje. U njoj se također navodi da je otac aplikanta, koji je vlasnik stana, odbio potpisati potvrdu, tako da mu je ona ostavljena u dnevnoj sobi. Izvještaj o ulasku policajaca u stan aplikanta, sa istim datumom i potpisan od strane četvorice policajaca, u relevantnom dijelu glasi:

„...Dolaskom na adresu stanovanja navedenu u naredbi patrola je u 14,30 pronašla optuženog Gorana Pranjića-M-Lukića kod kuće.

Patrola sudske policije je optuženog Gorana Pranjića-M-Lukića upoznala o razlozima dolaska, predala mu primjerak gore navedene naredbe Općinskog suda u Mostaru nakon čega je optuženi pozvan da pođe sa patrolom, što je isti odbio govoreći „da je on bio na vještačenju te da neće s nama krenuti“. Više puta vođa patrole optuženom je saopćio da isti mora poći što je on energično odbijao i uputio se prema stubištu koje vodi na sprat kuće.

Pošto se patrola sudske policije nalazila uz samo lice sudski policajac M.A. je stao na vrata koja vode na sprat čime bih istog zaustavio u njegovoj namjeri, a sudski policajac L. A. je optuženom naredio da stavi ruke na leđa što je i učinio i istom stavio sredstva za vezivanje (lisice) bez upotrebe ostalih sredstava prinude, nakon čega je smješten u službeno vozilo i odveden u KC Mostar.

.....

Patrola sudske policije je izvršila osiguranje vještačenja koje je trajalo od 16.00 do 17.30 sati i kojom prilikom nije bilo negatvnosti.

.....

Tokom postupanja po datoj naredbi korištena su ovlaštenja propisana Zakonom o sudskoj policiji i Pravilima o sudskoj policiji gdje nije bilo negativnosti niti upotrebe nikakvih sredstava prinude.“

  1. Prema medicinskim dokazima koje je podnio aplikant, odnosno prijavi o povredi Hitne službe Doma zdravlja Mostar od 10.06.2013. godine, aplikantu su bile stavljene lisice prilikom njegovog prinudnog odvođenja na psihijatrijsko vještačenje. Ljekar je utvrdio da je aplikant zadobio tri do četiri hematoma na desnoj nadlaktici, svaki veličine 1x1 cm. Ljekar je također zabilježio izjavu aplikanta da je prinudno stavljanje lisica od strane sudske policije kod njega prouzročio psihičke povrede i  
  2. Dana 18.06.2013. godine općinski sud je izdao još jednu naredbu sudskoj policiji, u skladu sa članom 139. (vidi tačku 47. ove presude), da aplikanta prinudno dovede u Bolnicu Mostar i da prisustvuje njegovom psihološkom vještačenju. Vještačenje je obavljeno 19.06.2013. godine.
  3. Dana 8.07.2013. godine općinski sud je odlučio prekinuti krivični postupak protiv aplikanta i uputio ga centru za socijalni rad na dalji vanparnični postupak. U svom obrazloženju općinski sud je, prihvativši u cjelosti izvještaje vještaka, utvrdio da aplikant pati od „trajne (hronične) psihičke bolesti, koja je trenutno u fazi progresije“. U vrijeme vještačenja aplikant je bio mentalno neuračunljiv, dok je u vrijeme počinjenja navodnog krivičnog djela njegova uračunljivost bila bitno smanjena. Sud je zaključio da aplikant nije u stanju učestvovati ili pratiti krivični postupak protiv njega. Istoga dana, općinski sud je aplikantu postavio branitelja, zbog njegovog duševnog stanja, u interesu pravde.
  4. Dana 12.07.2013. godine aplikant se žalio na to rješenje, pozivajući se na član 3. Konvencije. Ponovio je da vanparnični postupak još nije okončan. Nadalje, tvrdio je da su sudske naredbe i provedena vještačenja bili nezakoniti, te je osporio način i svrhu vještačenja (krivično djelo je navodno počinjeno 2004., a on je vještačen tek 2013. godine). Konačno, aplikant je naveo da su ga sudske naredbe da se njegovo vještačenje izvrši prinudno, kao i sama vještačenja izložili „mentalnoj patnji“ koja je dostigla minimalan prag težine u smislu člana 3. Aplikantov branitelj po službenoj dužnosti također je podnio žalbu protiv navedenog rješenja (vidi tačku 36. ove presude).
  5. Dana 30.04.2014. godine Kantonalni sud je utvrdio da je žalba aplikantovog branitelja po službenoj dužnosti proturječna i odbio je razmatrati. Istovremeno, on je prihvatio žalbu aplikanta i poništio rješenje od 8.07.2013. godine (vidi tačku 36. ove presude). On je konstatirao da je sporni krivični postupak konačno prekinut 21.06.2011. godine (vidi tačku 14. ove presude), a da se prema akuzatornom načelu mogao zakonito nastaviti samo na zahtjev tužitelja (a ne na vlastitu inicijativu suda), u skladu sa članovima 17. i 409. stav 2. Zakona o krivičnom postupku (vidi tačku 47. ove presude), kao i da je tužitelj imao obavezu takav zahtjev potkrijepiti odgovarajućim dokazima koji ukazuju da su razlozi za prekid postupka prestali da postoje. Budući da tužitelj nikada nije podnio zahtjev za nastavak krivičnog postupka, uvjeti za nastavak nisu bili ispunjeni. Stoga je bilo bespredmetno slati aplikanta još jednom na vještačenje i donijeti još jednu odluku o prekidu postupka na osnovu takvog vještačenja, s obzirom na to da je konačna odluka o ovom pitanju već bila donesena. Kantonalni sud nije ispitivao pritužbu prema članu 3.

IV OBUSTAVA KRIVIČNOG POSTUPKA

  1. Dana 22.04.2016. godine tužitelj je donio naredbe da se izvrši psihijatrijsko, odnosno psihološko vještačenje aplikanta. Vještaci, koji su svoje mišljenje zasnovali na medicinskoj dokumentaciji aplikanta, zaključili su da se duševno zdravlje aplikanta nije moglo poboljšati od 2013. godine kada je prilikom vještačenja zaključeno da on pati od „trajne (hronične) psihičke bolesti“ i da je u vrijeme tog vještačenja bio mentalno neuračunljiv (vidi tačku 36. ove presude).
  2. Dana 12.10.2016. godine tužitelj je podnio zahtjev sudiji za prethodno saslušanje tražeći saglasnost za povlačenje optužnice; sudija za prethodno saslušanje dao je saglasnost 14.10.2016. godine. Dana 18.10.2016. godine općinski sud je obustavio krivični postupak protiv aplikanta.

V PRIGOVOR APLIKANTA U PISANOJ FORMI ODJELU SUDSKE POLICIJE

  1. Dana 10.06.2013. godine aplikant je podnio prigovor u pisanoj formi odjelu sudske policije Hercegovačko-neretvanskog kantona („Odjel sudske policije“), navodeći da su njegova prava iz člana 3. Konvencije prekršena zbog načina na koji je sudska policija postupala s njim dana 6.06.2013. godine (vidi tačke 33. i 34. ove presude). On je naveo da su mu stavljene lisice u njegovoj kući (pred njegovim bolesnim roditeljima koji su doživjeli stres i počeli da plaču) – iako je to bilo nepotrebno jer je „njegov bijeg bio isključen“ a njegovo „ponašanje besprijekorno“.
  2. Istoga dana šef Odjela sudske policije, zajedno sa dvojicom drugih viših službenika, obavio je s aplikantom razgovor o njegovom prigovoru, nakon čega je aplikant dao izjavu koja je zabilježena u zapisniku toga razgovora, čiji relevantni dijelovi glase:

„‛Dana 06.06.2013.godine negdje oko 15,00 sati meni nepoznati sudski policajci su došli na vrata moje kuće, sa sudskim nalogom da me sprovedu na Kliniku za neurologiju radi vještačenja. Došlo je do razgovora između mene i nepoznatog sudskog plicajca, ja se ne sjećam šta me je pitao i šta sam im odgovorio. Tom prilikom mi je dao samo dovedbeni nalog. Dok smo razgovarali, mislim da me je on nešto pogrešno razumio, u tom je došlo do stavljanja lisica, a ja se nisam opirao. Nakon toga su me izveli iz kuće i fino su me izveli do auta. Na upit zapovjednika  D. da li je njemu poznato da u predmetu ima Potvrda o ulasku u stan, a koju njegov otac kao vlasnik stana nije htio potpisati, isti je izjavio da on nije vidio potvrdu iako je inzistirao da se ista napiše, a što nije učinjeno.

Na prijedlog zapovjednika i zamjenika da se predstava završi neformalnim razrješenjem, Goran Pranjić-M-Lukić je rekao da se slaže sa prijedlogom sa tim da zapovjednik iste ukori i o svemu obavijesti svoju Upravu Goran Pranjić-M-Lukić odustaje od daljnjeg prigovora, jer je zadovoljan sa objašnjenjem zapovjednika vezano za pravilnost postupanja sudskih policajaca u ovom slučaju.“

  1. Dana 10.06.2013. godine šef Odjela sudske policije dostavio je informaciju o prigovoru aplikanta glavnom zapovjedniku sudske policije. Ona je sadržavala (i) informaciju o ulasku sudske policije u kuću aplikanta u svrhu njegovog prinudnog odvođenja na psihijatrijsko vještačenje, i (ii) informaciju o tome da je stavljanje lisica obavljeno u skladu sa članom 17. Pravilnika o upotrebi sredstava prinude (vidi tačku 51. ove presude). U njoj se također, između ostalog, navodi:

„Nakon obavljenog razgovora sa podnositeljem predstavke, očito je da je podnositlj predstavku podnio iz razloga nepoznavanja pozitivnih propisa po kojima postupa

Sudska policija, a radi se o osobi koju smo do sada u više navrata sprovodili na psihijatrijsko vještačenje.

Podnositelj predstavke je prihvatio obrazloženje vezano za postupanje službenika sudske policije, te je predstavka riješena neformalnim razrješenjem.“

VI POSTUPAK PRED USTAVNIM SUDOM

  1. U međuvremenu, dana 22.11.2010. godine aplikant se žalio Ustavnom sudu zbog dužine krivičnog postupka koji se vodio protiv njega. Dana 28.02.2013. godine Ustavni sud je utvrdio da je dužina krivičnog postupka bila prekomjerna i naredio općinskom sudu da hitno okonča taj postupak. Sud je naročito smatrao neprihvatljivim da je općinskom sudu trebalo više od tri godine od saznanja da aplikant ima „određenih psihičkih problema“ da provede neuropsihijatrijsko vještačenje (vidi tačke 8. i 10. ove presude), te da mu je trebalo više od četiri godine da mu postavi pravnog zastupnika po njegovom izboru (vidi tačku 7. ove presude).
  2. Dana 14.06.2013. godine aplikant je podnio još jednu apelaciju Ustavnom sudu žaleći se prema članu 3. Konvencije na maltretiranje u nastavku krivičnog postupka (vidi tačke 20.-38. ove presude). Aplikant je tvrdio da su ponavljanim naredbama općinskog suda sudskoj policiji za njegovo odvođenje na vještačenje protivno njegovoj volji, naročito naredbom od 6.06.2013. godine (vidi tačke 33. i 34. ove presude) – povrijeđena njegova prava iz člana 3. Konvencije.
  3. Dana 21.07.2015. godine Ustavni sud je odbio apelaciju aplikanta kao očigledno neosnovanu. On je zaključio da aplikant nije dokazao da je u ovoj konkretnoj situaciji bio podvrgnut nehumanom i ponižavajućem postupku koji je dosegao minimalnu razinu ozbiljnosti da bi se mogao svrstati pod opseg člana 3.

RELEVANTNI PRAVNI OKVIR

I RELEVANTNO DOMAĆE PRAVO

  1. Relevantne odrebe Zakona o krivičnom postupku iz 2003. godine, objavljenog u Službenim novinama Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine, br. 35/03, 37/03, 56/03, 78/04, 28/05, 55/06, 27/07, 53/07, 9/09, 12/10, 8/13 i 59/14, glase:

Član 17.

Princip akuzatornosti

„Krivični postupak se može pokrenuti i provesti samo po zahtjevu nadležnog tužitelja.“

Član 124.

Psihijatrijsko vještačenje

„(1)  Ako se pojavi sumnja da je isključena ili smanjena uračunljivost osumnjičenog, odnosno optuženog, ili da je osumnjičeni, odnosno optuženi učinio krivično djelo zbog ovisnosti od alkohola ili opojnih droga, ili da zbog duševnih smetnji nije sposoban učestvovati u postupku, odredit će se psihijatrijsko vještačenje.

...“

Član 139.

Naredba za dovođenje

„(1)  Naredbu da se optuženi dovede može izdati sud ako je donijeto rješenje o pritvoru ili ako uredno pozvani optuženi ne dođe, a svoj izostanak ne opravda, ili ako se nije moglo izvršiti uredno dostavljanje poziva, a iz okolnosti očigledno proizlazi da optuženi izbjegava prijem poziva.

...

(3)  Naredbu za dovođenje izvršava sudska policija.

...

(5)  Osoba kojoj je povjereno izvršenje naredbe predaje naredbu optuženom i poziva ga da pođe s njom. Ako optuženi to odbije, dovest će ga prinudno.“

Član 221.

Duševno oboljenje osumnjičenog, odnosno optuženog u toku postupka

„Kad se u toku krivičnog postupka utvrdi da je osumnjičeni, odnosno optuženi po učinjenom krivičnom djelu obolio od kakvog duševnog oboljenja, rješenjem će se prekinuti krivični postupak (član 409.)“

Član 409.

Prekid postupka u slučaju nastupanja duševne bolesti

1. Ako je kod optuženog nakon učinjenja krivičnog djela nastupila takva duševna bolest da nije sposoban učestvovati u postupku, sud će rješenjem, nakon psihijatrijskog vještačenja, prekinuti postupak i optuženog uputiti organu nadležnom za pitanja socijalnog staranja.

2. Kada se zdravstveno stanje optuženog poboljša u mjeri da je sposoban učestvuje u postupku, krivični postupak će se nastaviti.

...“

Član 410.

Postupak u slučaju neuračunljivosti

„1.  Ako je osumnjičeni počinio protivpravno djelo u stanju neuračunljivosti i postoje zakonom određeni uvjeti za određivanje prisilnog smještaja osobe sa težim duševnim smetnjama u zdravstvenu ustanovu, tužitelj će u optužnici postaviti prijedlog da sud utvrdi da je osumnjičeni počinio protivpravno djelo u stanju neuračunljivosti, te i da mu se privremeno odredi prisilni smještaj u zdravstvenoj ustanovi uz izvještavanje zdravstvene ustanove.

2. Protiv osumnjičenog, odnosno optuženog iz stava (1) ovog člana na obrazložen prijedlog tužitelja može se odrediti pritvor iz razloga iz člana 146. ovog Zakona. Ako je pritvor protiv osumnjičenog određen ili produžen, izvršava se u zdravstvenoj ustanovi i može trajati dok postoje razlozi iz člana 146. ovog Zakona, ali ne duže od rokova iz člana 149. i člana 151. st. (2) i (3) ovog Zakona, odnosno pravosnažnog rješenja o privremenom određivanju prisilnog smještaja.

... “

  1. Relevantne odredbe Zakona o zaštiti osoba s duševnim smetnjama iz 2001. godine, objavljenog u Službenim novinama Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine, br. 37/01, 40/02, 52/11, 14/13, i 20/13, koji je bio na snazi u predmetno vrijeme, glase:

Član 22.

„1.  Osoba sa težim duševnim smetnjama koja uslijed svoje duševne smetnje ozbiljno i direktno ugrožava vlastiti život ili zdravlje ili sigurnost, odnosno život ili zdravlje ili sigurnost drugih osoba može se smjestiti u zdravstvenu ustanovu bez pristanka, po postupku za prisilno zadržavanje i prisilni smještaj propisanim ovim zakonom.

... “ 

Član 43.

„Učiniocu koji je krivično djelo učinio u stanju neuračunljivosti ili bitno smanjene uračunljivosti sud će u krivičnom postupku izreći mjeru sigurnosti obaveznog psihijatrijskog liječenja i čuvanja u zdravstvenoj ustanovi, odnosno mjeru obaveznog psihijatrijskog liječenja na slobodi, u skladu sa odredbama čl. 63. i 64. Krivičnog zakona Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine i čl. 475. do 480. Zakona o krivičnom postupku („Službene novine Federacije BiH“, broj 43/98).“

  1. Relevantne odredbe Zakona o vanparničnom postupku, objavljenog u Službenim novinama Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine br. 2/98, 39/04, 73/05 i 80/14, glase:

Član 18.

„Protiv rješenja donesenog u prvom stupnju može se izjaviti žalba u roku od 15 dana od dana dostavljanja rješenja, ako zakonom nije drugačije određeno.“

Član 19.

„Žalba zadržava izvršenje rješenja, ako zakonom nije drugačije određeno.

Sud iz važnih razloga može odlučiti da žalba ne zadržava izvršenje rješenja.

... “

Član 45.

„1.  ... U postupku zadržavanja u zdravstvenoj ustanovi sud odlučuje o zadržavanju duševno bolesne osobe u zdravstvenoj ustanovi kada je zbog prirode bolesti neophodno da ta osoba bude ograničena u slobodi kretanja ili kontaktiranja sa vanjskim svijetom, kao i njenom otpuštanju kad prestanu razlozi zbog kojih je zadržana.

2. Postupak iz stava 1. ovog člana mora se završiti što prije, a najkasnije u roku od sedam dana.“

Član 58.

„Protiv rješenja o zadržavanju u zdravstvenoj ustanovi i puštanju iz ove ustanove žalbu mogu izjaviti: zdravstvena ustanova koja je zadržala duševno bolesnu osobu, zadržana osoba, njen staratelj, odnosno privremeni zastupnik i organ starateljstva i to u roku od osam dana od dana prijema rješenja.

Žalba ne zadržava izvršenje, ako sud iz opravdanih razloga drugačije ne odluči ...“

  1. Relevantne odredbe Zakona o sudskoj policiji Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine iz 1996. godine, objavljenog u Službenim novinama Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine br. 19/96 i 37/04, glase:

Član 7.

„Sudska policija pomaže Ustavnom sudu Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine, Vrhovnom sudu Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine, Sudu za ljudska prava Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine i sudovima u kantonu - županiji u osiguranju informacija, u izvršavanju sudskih naredbi za prinudno dovodjenje svjedoka, izvršavanju sudskih naredbi za dovodjenje optuženih osoba...“

Član 20.

„Sudski policajci u obavljanju poslova mogu uporabiti sredstva prinude i to: tjelesnu snagu, gumenu palicu i druga sredstva prinude, samo onda kad je te neophodno da se spriječi tjelesni napad na suce i druge djelatnike suda, ombudsmane i druge osobe koje štite, bijeg svjedoka, okrivljenoga i osudjenoga ili prouzrokovanje materijalne štete sudu. Tjelesna snaga može se uporabiti naročito onda kada je nužno da se spriječi otpor osobe prema kojoj se izvršava nalog suda.“

  1. Relevantne odredbe Pravilnika o upotrebi sredstava prinude, br. SuSp-55/11 koji je 2.03.2011. godine donio predsjednik Vrhovnog suda  Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine, glase:

Član 2.

„Službenici sudske policije Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine upotrebljavaju sredstva prinude radi ostvarivanja zakonitog cilja, srazmjerno stepenu otpora osobe.

Službenici sudske policije će u konkretnim okolnostima, upotrijebiti ono sredstvo prinude koje garantuje uspješno obavljanje službenog zadatka, uz najblaže posljedice po osobu prema kojoj se upotrebljava.“

Član 3.

„ ...

Prilikom upotrebe sredstava prinude službenici sudske policije vode računa o životu, zdravlju i ljudskom dostojanstvu čovjeka i o imovini fizičkih i pravnih osoba.“

Član 17.

„Službenici sudske policije sredstva za vezivanje upotrebljavaju radi ograničavanja pokretljivosti tijela osobe, naročito ruku i nogu.

Pod sredstvima za vezivanje smatraju se lisice za ruke, lisice za ruke sa pojasom, lisice za noge, lisice za ruke i noge, plastične zatege i trake.

Službenici sudske policije su obavezni izvršiti vezivanje osobe, prilikom poduzimanja radnji dovođenja ili sprovođenja privremeno zadržanih, pritvorenih ili osuđenih osoba..“

II MEĐUNARODNI TEKSTOVI, AKTI I DOKUMENTI

  1. U svojoj Preporuci Rec(2001)10 o Evropskom kodeksu policijske etike, usvojenoj 19.09.2001. godine, Komitet ministara Vijeća Evrope izrazio je svoje uvjerenje da je

„... javno povjerenje u policiju usko povezano s njenim odnosom i ponašanjem prema javnosti, naročito njenim poštovanjem ljudskog dostojanstva i osnovih prava i sloboda osobe koja su sadržana naročito u Evropskoj konvenciji o ljudskom pravima.“

On preporučuje vladama država članica da se u svome unutarnjem zakonodavstvu, praksi i kodeksima ponašanja koji se tiču policije, rukovode načelima utvrđenim u Evropskom kodeksu policijske etike priloženim uz Preporuku, u cilju njihove progresivne primjene i najšire moguće cirkulacije teksta koji ih utvrđuje.

  1. Kodeks naročito ističe da je jedna od glavnih svrha policije zaštita i poštovanje osnovnih prava i sloboda osobe, sadržanih naročito u Konvenciji (stav 1.). U dijelu „Smjernice za djelovanje/intervenciju policije“ on propisuje da  „policija neće počiniti, poticati ili tolerirati bilo kakav čin mučenja ili nehumanog ili ponižavajućeg postupanja ili kažnjavanja pod bilo kakvim okolnostima“ (stav 36.), te da ona „može koristiti silu samo kada je to striktno neophodno i samo u mjeri potrebnoj kako bi se postigao legitiman cilj“ (stav 37.). Nadalje, „u obavljanju svojih  aktivnosti, [ona] će uvijek imati na umu osnovna prava svih osoba“ (stav 43.) a „pripadnici policije će postupati s integritetom i poštovanjem prema javnosti, te s posebnom pažnjom u odnosu na situaciju osoba koje pripadaju posebno ugroženim grupama“ (stav 44.).
  2. Dana 22.09.2004. godine Komitet ministara je usvojio Preporuku Rec(2004)10 koja se tiče zaštite ljudskih prava i dostojanstva osoba sa duševim smetnjama. U relevantnom dijelu ta Preporuka glasi:

Član 32.

Uključivanje policije

„1.  U ispunjavanju svojih zakonskih dužnosti policija mora uskladiti svoje aktivnosti s aktivnostima zdravstvenih i socijalnih službi, ako je moguće uz pristanak  osobe o kojoj je riječ, ako ponašanje te osobe izrazito ukazuje na postojanje duševnih smetnji i predstavlja ozbiljnu opasnost od povrjeđivanja sebe ili drugih.

2. Kada ne postoje druge mogućnosti, u izvršavanju njihovih dužnosti može biti potrebna pomoć policije u odvođenju ili vraćanju osoba koje su predmet nedobrovoljnog smještanja u odgovarajuću ustanovu.

3. Pripadnici policije moraju poštovati dostojanstvo i ljudska prava osoba s duševnim smetnjama. Važnost ove obaveze trebala bi se naglasiti tijekom obuke“

PRAVO

I OPSEG SLUČAJA

  1. U odgovoru na izjašnjenje vlade, aplikant je ponovio svoje pritužbe prema članovima 5. i 6. Konvencije, koje je naveo u svojoj aplikaciji.
  2. Sud napominje da su ove pritižbe već proglašene nedopuštenima, te su stoga izvan opsega ovog slučaja.

II NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 8. KONVENCIJE

  1. Aplikant se žalio, prema članu 8. Konvencije, zbog njegovog ponovljenog prinudnog odvođenja na nedobrovoljno psihijatrijsko i psihološko vještačenje za vrijeme krivičnog postupka koji se vodio protiv njega 2013. godine, što mu je nanijelo duševnu patnju.
  2. Kao gospodar pravne kvalifikacije činjenica predmeta (vidi Bouyid protiv Belgije [VV], br. 23380/09, tačka 55., ESLJP 2015), Sud nalazi da je primjereno ispitati navode aplikanata prema članu 8. Konvencije koji glasi:

„1.  Svako ima pravo na poštovanje privatnog i porodičnog života, doma i prepiske.

2.  Javna vlast se neće miješati u ostvarivanje ovoga prava, osim u skladu sa  zakonom ako je to nužno u demokratskom društvu u interesu državne sigurnosti, javne sigurnosti ili privredne dobrobiti zemlje, radi sprječavanja nereda ili zločina, radi zaštite zdravlja ili morala, ili radi zaštite prava i sloboda drugih.“

A. Dopuštenost

  1. Sud primjećuje da ova pritužba nije očigledno neosnovana niti nedopuštena po bilo kojem drugom osnovu navedenom u članu 35. Konvencije. Stoga se ona mora proglasiti dopuštenom.

B. Meritum

1. Argumenti stranaka

  1. Aplikant se žalio prema članu 8. da su naredbe suda za njegovo nedobrovoljno psihijatrijsko i psihološko vještačenje, te njegovo prinudno odvođenje od strane sudske policije na osnovu takvih naredbi i podvrgavanje vještačenjima bili nezakoniti i da su ga izložili „duševnoj patnji“. Naredbe su bile nezakonite s obzirom na činjenicu da odluka o obustavi vanparničnog postupka još nije postala pravomoćna u vrijeme donošenja tih naredbi (vidi tačke 17.-19. ove presude); štoviše, krivični postupak protiv njega bio je „bespredmetan“, budući da je on u konačnici prekinut.
  2. Vlada je svoj odgovor ograničila na ovu pritužbu, pozivajući se samo na incident od 6.06.2013. godine (vidi tačku 33. ove presude). Ona je navela da je sila morala biti primijenjena u prebacivanju aplikanta na psihijatrijsko vještačenje jer aplikant nije postupio prema uredno dostavljenoj naredbi suda koja je izdata tijekom relevantnog krivičnog postupka, te da s obzirom na okolnosti, nije bilo miješanja u njegova prava iz člana 8. Ona je nadalje tvrdila da čak i da je došlo do miješanja, ono je imalo temelj u domaćem pravu, tako da je ono bilo u skladu sa zahtijevanim kvalitetom domaćeg zakona, te štoviše, da njime nisu bila povrijeđena njegova prava iz člana 8. budući da je do tog miješanja došlo u cilju utvrđivanja opravdanosti vođenja sudskog postupka protiv aplikanta.

2. Ocjena Suda

  1. Sud napominje da je aplikant prinudno odvođen na nedobrovoljna psihijatrijska i psihološka vještačenja dana 5.02., 8.05., 6.06. i 19.06.2013. godine (vidi tačke 25., 29., 33. i 35. ove presude) temeljem sudskih naredbi izdatih 30.01., 7.05., 5.06., odnosno 18.06.2013. godine (vidi tačke 24., 28., 32. i 35. ove presude).
  2. Sud je ranije utvrdio, u različitim kontekstima, da koncept privatnog života uključuje fizičku i psihičku cjelovitost osobe (vidi, na primjer, protiv Hrvatske, br. 55164/08, tačka 60., 14.10.2010.) i da duševno zdravlje predstavlja ključni dio privatnog života (vidi, na primjer, Bensaid protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, br. 44599/98, tačka 47., ESLJP 2001-I, i Dolenec protiv Hrvatske, br. 25282/06, tačka 165., 26.11.2009). Nadalje, on je utvrdio da nedobrovoljni pregled osobe od strane psihijatra državne klinike ili bolnice predstavlja miješanje u pravo na poštovanje privatnog života te osobe (vidi Matter protiv Slovačke, br. 31534/96, tačka 64., 5.07. 1999., i Fyodorov i Fyodorova protiv Ukrajine, br. 39229/03, tačka 82., 7.07.2011.). U skladu s tim načelima, on nalazi da je prinudno odvođenje aplikanta i njegovo podvrgavanje, protivno njegovoj volji, psihijatrijskom i psihološkom vještačenju u državnoj instituciji – u četiri navrata (vidi tačku 62. ove presude) – predstavljalo miješanje u njegov privatni život.
  3. Sud dalje ponavlja da će miješanje biti suprotno članu 8. osim ako je „u skladu sa zakonom“, slijedi jedan ili više legitimnih ciljeva iz stava 2., te ako je također i „neophodno u demokratskom društvu“ kako bi se postigao cilj o kojemu je riječ.
  4. Sud primjećuje da postoji spor između stranaka o tome je li miješanje u prava aplikanta iz člana 8. bilo „u skladu sa zakonom“. Sud ponavlja da izrazi „propisano zakonom“ i „u skladu sa zakonom“ u članovima 8. do 11. Konvencije ne samo da zahtijevaju da sporna mjera mora imati pravni osnov u domaćem zakonu, već se također odnose i na kvalitet dotičnog zakona koji mora biti dostupan osobi o kojoj je riječ i predvidiv u pogledu njegovih učinaka (vidi Kudrevičius i drugi protiv Litvanije [VV], br. 37553/05, tačka 108., ESLJP 2015., i tamo citirane predmete). U tom pogledu Sud napominje da je 6.11.2012. godine općinski sud okončao vanparnični postupak, smatrajući da će se po pravomoćnosti te odluke postupak nastaviti prema pravilima krivičnog postupka. Aplikant se žalio na tu odluku dana 21.02.2013. godine (dakle, u zakonskom roku). On dalje primjećuje da, prema članu 19. Zakona o vanparničnom postupku iz 1998. godine, žalba ima suspenzivan učinak (vidi tačku 49. ove presude). Pa ipak, krivični postupak je nastavljen dana 21.12.2012. godine (dakle, dok je vanparnični postupak i dalje bio u tijeku), a općinski sud je opetovano naređivao psihijatrijsko i psihološko vještačenje aplikanta i njegovo prinudno odvođenje na ta vještačenja, u skladu sa članovima 124. i 139. Zakona o krivičnom postupku. Naredbe su stoga imale osnov u domaćem zakonu. Međutim, u konkretnim okolnostima predmetnog slučaja, ne može se reći da su domaće vlasti postupale u skladu sa zakonom budući da je nastavak krivičnog postupka bio nezakonit. Sud napominje da je kantonalni sud odlučio da općinski sud nije mogao na vlastitu inicijativu zakonito nastaviti krivični postupak koji je bio prekinut, te da, shodno tome, on nije mogao zakonito donijeti bilo kakve naredbe za prinudno vještačenje aplikanta u kontekstu tog nastavljenog postupka, jer bi to bilo suprotno važećim pravilima krivičnog postupka (vidi tačku 38. ove presude). Miješanje u pravo aplikanta na poštovanje njegovog privatnog života stoga nije bilo „u skladu sa zakonom“, u smislu člana 8. stav 2. Konvencije.
  5. S obzirom na to, Sud nije obavezan utvrđivati je li se miješanjem nastojao postići legitiman cilj te, ukoliko jeste, je li ono bilo srazmjerno cilju kojem se težilo (vidi Mockutė protiv Litvanije, br. 66490/09, tačka 105., 27.02.2018.).
  6. Stoga je došlo do povrede člana 8. Konvencije.

III. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 3. KONVENCIJE

  1. Aplikant se žalio prema članu 3. Konvencije na tretman kojem je bio izložen dana 6.06.2013. godine kada mu je sudska policija stavila lisice prilikom njegovog prinudnog odvođenja na nedobrovoljno psihijatrijsko vještačenje. Odredba o kojoj je riječ glasi:

„Niko ne smije biti podvrgnut mučenju, kao ni nehumanom ili ponižavajućem postupanju ili kažnjavanju.“

A. Dopuštenost

  1. Sud primjećuje da ova pritužba nije očigledno neosnovana, niti je nedopuštena po bilo kojem drugom osnovu iz člana 35. Konvencije. Stoga se ona mora proglasiti dopuštenom.

B. Meritum

1. Argumenti stranaka

  1. Aplikant je ponovio svoje pritužbe. Naveo je da mu je, bez upozorenja, jedan od gore navedenih pripadnika sudske policije zavrnuo ruku kako bi mu stavio lisice, što potvrđuje prijava o povredi (vidi tačku 34. ove presude). On je odbacio bilo kakvu tvrdnju da je pružao otpor ili da je pokušao pobjeći, jer bi to samo dodatno uznemirilo njegove bolesne roditelje. On je dalje naveo da je povlačenje njegovog prigovora u pogledu spornog incidenta bilo uvjetovano time da se službenici sudske policije ukore i da se o tome obavijeste njihovi nadređeni (vidi tačku 42. ove presude), što nije učinjeno. Konačno, citirajući predmet Shchiborshch i Kuzmina protiv Rusije (br. 5269/08, 16.01.2014.), aplikant je naveo da radnje policajaca nisu dosegnule zahtijevani nivo pažnje koji se od njih očekuje kada postupaju prema osobama koje pate od duševne bolesti, te je izrazio uvjerenje da oni nisu prošli bilo kakvu obuku u tom smislu.
  2. Vlada je tvrdila da je stavljanje lisica na ruke aplikantu bilo neophodno jer je on odbio postupiti prema zakonitoj naredbi suda koja mu je propisno uručena prije njenog provođenja. Ona je dalje navela da prema aplikantu nije primijenjena fizička sila, te da on, prema tome, nije pretrpio fizičke povrede prilikom njegovog prinudnog dovođenja na psihijatrijsko vještačenje. Vlada također smatra da je izvještaj o povredi podnesen sa zakašnjenjem, tako da nema uvjerljivih dokaza da su sporne povrede nanesene od strane pripadnika sudske policije. Konačno, ona je navela da je aplikant odustao od prigovora u pogledu spornog incidenta, te da je uprava sudske policije bila obaviještena o incidentu (vidi tačku 43. ove presude).

2. Ocjena Suda

(a) Opća načela

  1. Sud je u ranijim prilikama utvrdio da mjere vezivanja poput stavljanja lisica obično ne pokreću pitanje iz člana 3. Konvencije ako su primijenjene u vezi sa zakonitim hapšenjem ili pritvorom, i ako nisu izvršene uz upotrebu sile ili javno prikazivanje u mjeri koja prevazilazi ono što se razumno smatra nužnim u datim okolnostima. U tom smislu, od značaja je, na primjer, postoji li razlog za vjerovanje da će se osoba o kojoj je riječ odupirati hapšenju ili pokušati pobjeći ili nanijeti povrede ili štetu ili ukloniti dokaze (vidi Svinarenko i Slyadnev protiv Rusije [VV], br. 32541/08 i 43441/08, tačka 117., ESLJP 2014 (izvaci), i tamo citirane predmete). U svakom slučaju, Sud pridaje posebnu važnost okolnostima svakog predmeta i ispituje da li je upotreba sredstava vezivanja bila neophodna (vidi Gorodnichev protiv Rusije, br. 52058/99, tačka 102., 24.05.2007., i Stoleriu protiv Rumunije, br. 5002/05, tačka 74., 16.07.2013.).
  2. Nadalje, kako je Sud ranije istaknuo, kada je osoba lišena slobode ili, općenito, kada je suočena sa službenicima za provedbu zakona, svaka primjena fizičke sile koju ponašanje te osobe nije učinilo izrazito nužnom, narušava ljudsko dostojanstvo i u načelu predstavlja povredu prava utvrđenog članom 3. Konvencije (Bouyid protiv Belgije ([VV], br. 23380/09, tačka 100., ESLJP 2015). Sud je naglasio da se riječi „u načelu“ ne mogu tumačiti tako da znače da mogu postojati situacije u kojma nije potrebno utvrditi povredu zbog toga što nije dosegnut odgovarajući prag težine. Svako zadiranje u ljudsko dostojanstvo pogađa samu suštinu Konvencije. Iz tog razloga, svako postupanje službenika za provedbu zakona prema pojedincu koje narušava ljudsko dostojanstvo, predstavlja povredu člana 3. Konvencije. To se posebno odnosi na primjenu fizičke sile protiv pojedinca u situaciji kada njegovo ponašanje to nije učinilo izrazito nužnim, bez obzira na učinak koji je to imalo na osobu o kojoj je riječ (ibid., tačka 101.).
  3. Konačno, Sud je u svojoj praksi prepoznao posebnu ugroženost duševno bolesnih osoba (vidi Fernandes de Oliveira protiv Portugala [VV], br. 78103/14, tačka 113., 31.01.2019.) te je utvrdio da se prilikom ocjene o tome je li postupanje ili kažnjavanje o kojemu je riječ nespojivo sa standardima člana 3., ova ugroženost mora naročito uzeti u obzir (vidi Bureš protiv Češke Republike, br. 37679/08, tačka 85., 18.10.2012., i tamo citirane predmete).

(b) Ocjena u predmetnom slučaju

  1. Vraćajući se okolnostima predmetnog slučaja, Sud primjećuje da nema spora među strankama o tome da li su aplikantu stavljene lisice u njegovoj kući kada ga je sudska policija prinudno odvela na nedobrovoljno psihijatrijsko vještačenje dana 6.06.2013. godine. Vlada nije komentirala navode aplikanta da su mu stavljene lisice u prisustvu njegovih roditelja. Bez obzira na to, iz Potvrde proizlazi da je barem otac aplikanta bio prisutan za vrijeme tog incidenta (vidi tačku 33. ove presude).
  2. Sud će ispitati da li stavljanje lisica aplikantu spada u opseg člana 3. Konvencije. Vlada je pravdala stavljanje lisica aplikantu tvrdeći da je ono bilo neophodno jer je on odbio postupiti prema zakonitoj sudskoj naredbi koja mu je propisno uručena prije nego što je izvršena. Po mišljenju Suda, iz gore navedenih razloga ne može se reći da je stavljanje lisica na ruke aplikantu bilo „primijenjeno u vezi sa zakonitim hapšenjem ili pritvorom“ (vidi tačku 65. ove presude).
  3. U odnosu na argument vlade da je aplikantov izvještaj o povredi podnesen sa zakašnjenjem, Sud napominje da je ranije prihvaćao određeno kašnjenje u traženju medicinske pomoći (vidi Balogh protiv Mađarske, br. 47940/99, tačka 49., 20.07.2004.), ali da je navedeno kašnjenje od četiri dana prekomjerno i dovodi u sumnju tvrdnju aplikanta u pogledu povreda koje je mogao zadobiti za vrijeme vezivanja. Bez obzira na to, Sud ponavlja da u kontekstu stavljanja lisica na ruke, relativna kratkoća mjere – kao i odsustvo bilo kakvog oštećenja zdravlja aplikanta, te nepostojanje naročite težine – nije od odlučujućeg značaja (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Radkov i Sabev protiv Bugarske, br. 18938/07 i 36069/09, tačka 32., 27.05.2014.). Zapravo, Sud također mora ispitati može li se mjera koja je predmet pritužbe razumno smatrati neophodnom s obzirom na okolnosti slučaja (vidi tačku 73. ove presude).
  4. Vlada je svoje zaključke zasnovala na izvještaju koji su podnijela četiri policajca koja su izvršila naredbu općinskog suda za prinudno odvođenje aplikanta na navedeno nedobrovljno psihijatrijsko vještačenje (vidi tačku 35. ove presude). Sud napominje da je tu verziju događaja osporio aplikant koji je tvrdio da se nije opirao (vidi tačke 41.-42. ove presude). Kada je riječ o ponašanju aplikanta za vrijeme incidenta, Sud štoviše primjećuje da se čak i u spornom izvještaju dva puta ističe kako nije bilo nikakvih problema (nije bilo negativnosti) za vrijeme prinudnog odvođenja aplikanta na vještačenje, te da se aplikant odmah povinovao naredbi da stavi ruke iza leđa kako bi mu se stavile lisice (vidi tačku 35. ove presude).
  5. U pogledu navodne neophodnosti stavljanja lisica, Sud primjećuje da je, unatoč opetovanom odbijanju aplikanta da se podvrgne psihijatrijskom i psihološkom vještačenju, ipak bilo moguće da ga se prinudno odvede na ta vještačenja u tri prilike – uključujući i onu nakon incidenta o kojemu je riječ – bez upotrebe lisica. Štoviše, Sud ne može zanemariti činjenicu da su prilikom stavljanja lisica aplikantu, četiri policijska službenika koji su se nalazili u bitno povoljnijoj poziciji u smislu kontroliranja situacije, bili očito brojčano nadmoćni (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Fyodorov i Fyodorova, citirana gore, tačka 65., 7.07.2011.); u svakom slučaju, takva situacija, naravno, nije bila nepoznata policajcima i oni su trebali biti u stanju predvidjeti da bi se mogli suočiti s određenim otporom aplikanta, te su trebali biti pripravni na to (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Shchiborshch i Kuzmina, citirana gore, tačka 239.).
  6. Konačno, Sud zapaža da u spisu nema nikakvih indikacija da je uzeta u obzir posebna ugroženost aplikanta kao duševno bolesne osobe kada je odlučeno da mu se stave lisice na ruke (vidi tačku 74. ove presude). Kako je Sud ranije istaknuo, policija, naročito, ne smije „počiniti, poticati ili tolerirati bilo kakav čin mučenja ili nehumanog ili ponižavajućeg postupanja ili kažnjavanja pod bilo kakvim okolnostima“ (Evropski kodeks policijske etike, stav 36.; vidi tačke 52.-53. ove presude). Nadalje, član 3. Konvencije utvrđuje pozitivnu obavezu države da svoje službenike za provedbu zakona obuči na način koji će osigurati visok nivo kompetencije u njihovom profesionalnom ponašanju, tako da niko ne bude izložen mučenju ili postupanju koje je protivno toj odredbi (vidi Bouyid, citirana gore, tačka 108.).
  7. U odnosu na argument vlade da je aplikant odustao od svog prigovora u pogledu ove pritužbe dana 10.06.2013. godine (vidi tačke 42. i 71. ove presude), Sud zapaža da vlada nije ponudila dokaz da su policajci koji su bili uključeni u taj incident bili na bilo koji način ukoreni kako je aplikant zatražio u svojoj izjavi. Što je još važnije, Sud smatra da se, s obzirom na fundamentalni značaj zabrane mučenja i nehumanog ili ponižavajućeg postupanja ili kažnjavanja, ne može prihvatiti bilo kakvo odricanje od prava osobe da ne bude povrgnuta takvom postupanju, jer bi to bilo protivno važnom pitanju od javnog interesa (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Konstantin Markin protiv Rusije [VV], br. 30078/06, tačka 150., ESLJP 2012 (izvaci)).
  8. U predmetnom slučaju, imajući u vidu duševno zdravlje aplikanta, činjenica da stavljanje lisica nije primijenjeno u vezi sa zakonitim hapšenjem ili pritvorom, te nepostojanje bilo kakvog prethodnog ponašanja koje bi predstavljalo ozbiljan razlog za strah da bi on mogao pobjeći ili primijeniti  nasilje, Sud smatra da aplikantovo ponašanje nije upotrebu lisica učinilo izrazito neophodnom. Prema tome, stavljanje lisica aplikantu narušilo je njegovo ljudsko dostojanstvo i samo po sebi  bilo ponižavajuće (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Radkov i Sabev, citirana gore, tačka 34., i Ilievska protiv Bivše Jugoslavenske Republike Makedonije, br. 20136/11, tačka 63., 7.05.2015.). Sud napominje da činjenica da su aplikantu stavljene lisice pred njegovim roditeljem, zbog čega se on mogao u vlastitim očima osjećati poniženim, predstavlja samo otežavajući faktor u tom smislu.
  9. Stoga je došlo do povrede člana 3. Konvencije.

IV PRIMJENA ČLANA 41. KONVENCIJE

  1. Član 41. Konvencije propisuje:

„Ukoliko Sud utvrdi da je došlo do povrede Konvencije ili njenih Protokola, te ukoliko zakonodavstvo visoke strane ugovornice o kojoj je riječ omogućuje samo djelomično obeštećenje, Sud će, po potrebi, odrediti pravičnu naknadu oštećenoj strani.“

A. Odšteta

  1. Aplikant je podnio zahtjev na ime nematerijalne štete u iznosu od 220.310,03 eura (EUR).
  2. Vlada je osporila zahtjev aplikanta kao nepotkrijepljen i postavljen u previsokom iznosu.
  3. Sud je mišljenja da je aplikant morao pretrpjeti nematerijalnu štetu usljed povrede njegovih prava iz članova 3. i 8. Konvencije. U pogledu iznosa, odlučujući na pravičnoj osnovi, on mu dosuđuje 3.900 eura.

B. Troškovi i izdaci

  1. Aplikant je također podnio zahtjev u iznosu od 213,13 eura na ime troškova i izdataka koje je imao pred domaćim sudovima i pred Sudom.
  2. Vlada je smatrala da je taj zahtjev nepotkrijepljen i postavljen u previsokom iznosu. Ona je posebno tvrdila da većina troškova i izdataka ustvari nije nastala, budući da aplikant, koji se sam zastupao u domaćim postupcima i pred Sudom, nije platio iznose koje potražuje. Također, njegovi troškovi i izdaci nisu se odnosili isključivo na postupak pred Sudom.
  3. Prema praksi Suda, aplikant ima pravo na naknadu troškova i izdataka samo u mjeri u kojoj je pokazano da su oni zaista nastali, da su bili neophodni, te da je njihov iznos razuman. U predmetnom slučaju, imajući u vidu činjenicu da se aplikant sam zastupao, te dokumente kojima raspolaže i navedene kriterije, Sud smatra opravdanim dosuditi iznos od 70 eura za troškove i izdatke po svim stavkama, kao i svaki porez koji se aplikantu može zaračunati.

C. Zatezna kamata

  1. Sud smatra primjerenim da se zatezna kamata zasniva na najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Evropske centralne banke u periodu neplaćanja, uvećanoj za tri postotna boda.

 

IZ NAVEDENIH RAZLOGA, SUD, JEDNOGLASNO,

  1. Proglašava aplikaciju dopuštenom;

  2. Utvrđuje da je došlo do povrede člana 8. Konvencije;

  3. Utvrđuje da je došlo do povrede člana 3. Konvencije;

  4. Utvrđuje

a) da tužena država ima isplatiti aplikantu, u roku od tri mjeseca od dana kada presuda postane konačna, u skladu sa članom 44. stav 2. Konvencije, sljedeće iznose koji će biti pretvoreni u valutu tužene države po tečaju važećem na dan isplate:

  1. EUR 3.900 (tri hiljade i devet stotina eura), kao i svaki porez koji se može zaračunati, na ime nematerijalne štete;

  2. EUR 70 (sedamdeset eura), i svaki porez koji se aplikantu može zaračunati, na ime troškova i izdataka;

b) da će se od isteka navedenog roka od tri mjeseca do izmirenja, na navedene iznose plaćati obična kamata po stopi jednakoj najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Evropske centralne banke u periodu neplaćanja, uvećanoj za tri postotna boda;

  1. Odbija preostali dio zahtjeva aplikanta za pravičnu naknadu.

 

Sačinjeno na engleskom jeziku i dostavljeno u pisanom obliku dana 02.06.2020. godine, u skladu s pravilom 77. stavovi 2. i 3. Pravila Suda.

Ilse Freiwirth                                                          Jon Fridrik Kjølbro

zamjenik registrar                                                   predsjednik

 

 

FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF PRANJIĆ-M-LUKIĆ v. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

(Application no. 4938/16)

JUDGMENT

Art 8 • Respect for private life • Applicant repeatedly and forcibly taken for involuntary psychiatric and psychological examinations during criminal proceedings • Court orders not in accordance with the law, given unlawfulness of the continuation of criminal proceedings

Art 3 (substantive) • Degrading treatment • Applicant handcuffed in front of his family and forcibly escorted by police to an involuntary psychiatric examination • Handcuffing not imposed in connection with lawful arrest or detention • No serious cause to fear that applicant might abscond or resort to violence • Applicant outnumbered by four police officers, able to address any resistance by other means • Applicants vulnerability as a mentally-ill person not taken into consideration • No waiver of the right not to be subjected to such treatment can be accepted • Handcuffing not made strictly necessary by applicants conduct • Handcuffing diminished applicants human dignity and was in itself degrading

STRASBOURG

2 June 2020

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revisions

In the case of Pranjić-M-Lukić v. Bosnia and HerzegovinaThe European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, President,
Faris Vehabović,
Iulia Antoanella Motoc,
Carlo Ranzoni,
Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström,
Georges Ravarani,
Péter Paczolay, judges,
and Ilse FreiwirthDeputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application against Bosnia and Herzegovina lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a national of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr Goran Pranjić-M-Lukić (“the applicant”), on 29 December 2015;

the decision to give notice to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning Article 3 and Article 8 of the Convention and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;

the parties observations;

Having deliberated in private on 12 May 2020,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION

The application concerns the applicants alleged subjection to treatment contrary to Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention owing to his repeated forcible escort, under unlawful court orders (including handcuffing on one occasion), to involuntary psychiatric and psychological examinations conducted during the course of criminal proceedings against him.

THE FACTS

1.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Karlsruhe. He was granted leave to represent himself.

2.  The Government were initially represented by their Deputy Agent, Ms. S. Malešić, and then by their Acting Agent, Ms V. Bjelica-Prutina.

3.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

  1. THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

4.  On 5 April 2004 the applicant allegedly damaged the façade of his neighbours house. After the police were summoned, the applicant allegedly spat on and assaulted one police officer and verbally abused another, and was then arrested. He was released on 6 April 2004, after he was questioned by a prosecutor from the Mostar Cantonal Prosecutors Office (“the Prosecutor”).

5.  On 4 May 2004 the Prosecutor issued an order by which the applicant was to present himself to a psychiatrist so that he could be examined. It appears that the applicant did not comply with that order and that the examination was not conducted.

6.  On 16 July 2004 the Prosecutor indicted the applicant for the criminal offence of damaging property belonging to another person and for the criminal offence of assaulting an official person in the performance of his or her security duties (napad na službenu osobu u vršenju poslova sigurnosti).

7.  On 9 March 2006 the applicant was granted free legal assistance in the form of a court-appointed lawyer. The applicant immediately objected to the appointment of that lawyer and requested the appointment of N.D.; N.D. was appointed on 15 February 2010.

8.  On 22 February 2007 the applicant failed to appear at his trial, justifying his absence by citing a need to attend a mental health centre in Mostar (the Mental Health Centre) owing to the mental illness from which he suffered; the Prosecutor then proposed that the applicant be examined by a psychiatrist, observing that the applicants health problems had also been noted during the investigation. On the same day the Mostar Municipal Court (“the Municipal Court”) issued an order that the applicant undergo a psychiatric examination. It appears that no such examination was conducted.

9.  On 21 October 2008 the Municipal Court issued a fresh order that the applicant undergo a psychiatric examination, after the perusal of another criminal file relating to the applicant had indicated that he suffered from mental illness.

10.  On 3 November 2010 a psychiatric examination was carried out. The applicant was taken to the psychiatrist by force (prinudno dovođenje), as he had failed to appear voluntarily.

11.  On 31 December 2010 the psychiatrist issued her expert opinion. She concluded that the applicant was an asocial person who, because of chronic psychological distress, had developed an increasingly wide-ranging and intense series of symptoms, which were developing towards a psychotic state. That caused the applicant to perceive situations that were very tense and containing potential for conflict as threatening to his own survival and well-being – all of which could lead to excessive and impulsive reactions. Therefore, the expert concluded, the applicant was unable to participate in criminal proceedings and proposed to the Municipal Court, as a security measure, the “compulsory psychiatric treatment of the accused” in a psychiatric institution.

12.  On 4 March 2011 the Municipal Court terminated the proceedings against the applicant in so far as they concerned the criminal offence of damaging property belonging to another person (see paragraph 6 above) because that offence had become statute-barred.

13.  On 8 April 2011 the Municipal Court issued a decision (i) accepting the findings of the expert (see paragraph 11 above) and (ii) adjourning (prekida) the criminal proceedings against the applicant in respect of the criminal offence of assaulting an official person in the performance of his or her security duties (see paragraph 6 above), until such time as his health improved to the extent that he was capable of standing trial. The Court referred the applicant to the Mostar Social Work Centre (“the Social Work Centre”) for further proceedings. The applicant appealed against that decision.

14.  On 21 June 2011 the Mostar Cantonal Court (“the Cantonal Court”) dismissed the applicants appeal.

  1. THE NON-CONTENTIOUS PROCEEDINGS

15.  On 25 October 2011 the Social Work Centre lodged an application, in non-contentious proceedings, with the Municipal Court, seeking, as a security measure, that the applicant be obliged to undergo mandatory psychiatric treatment in a health institution (see paragraph 11 above).

16.  On 18 April 2012 the Municipal Court asked the Social Work Centre to indicate whether it continued to seek the measure that it had sought initially, or if it now recommended that the applicant be (within the meaning of sections 45 to 59 of the Non-contentious Proceedings Act – see paragraphs 49 below) detained (zadržan) in a health institution. The Social Work Centre replied that it maintained its initial application.

17.  On 6 November 2012 the Municipal Court dismissed the application lodged by the Social Work Centre (see paragraph 15 above) and terminated the proceedings (obustavlja se). It held that it did not have the authority to order the measure sought, given that, pursuant to section 43 of the Mental Health Act 2001 (see paragraph 48 below), the only body with authority to order such a measure was a criminal court within the course of criminal proceedings. It reasoned, on the basis of the evidence presented, that the offence in question had not been committed while the applicant had been in a state of insanity, and that the applicant was not a “person with a mental disorder” within the meaning of section 45 of the Non-contentious Proceedings Act and section 22 of the Mental Health Act 2001 (see paragraphs 48 and 49 below). It held that upon that decision becoming final the procedure would be continued under the rules of criminal proceedings, and that the applicant had the right to appeal against its decision within fifteen days of being served with it.

18.  On 6 February 2013 the applicant was served with that decision, and he appealed against it on 21 February 2013 (that is to say within the statutory fifteen-day deadline – see paragraph 49 below), citing Articles and 6 of the Convention.

19.  On 22 December 2015 the Cantonal Court rejected the applicants appeal as inadmissible. It held that (i) the applicant had no legal interest in appealing against the decision delivered during the non-contentious proceedings, as those proceedings had been terminated, and (ii) in accordance with the rules of criminal proceedings, the proceedings regarding the imposition of a security measure requiring that the applicant undergo psychiatric treatment in a health institution were to be continued, once the decision delivered during the non-contentious proceedings had become final.

  1. THE CONTINUATION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

20.  On 21 December 2012 the Municipal Court issued a new order for the applicant to undergo an expert examination by a psychiatrist. It instructed the psychiatrist to examine the case file, as well as the medical documentation held by the Mental Health Centre in Južni Logor Hospital in Mostar (“Mostar Hospital”), where – according to the information that it had – the applicant was being treated. The applicants examination was to be conducted with special emphasis on determining (i) whether he was capable of following the proceedings and (ii) the extent of his sanity at the time of his committing the offence.

21.  On 27 December 2012 the applicant lodged a submission with the Municipal Court in which he noted that (i) the criminal proceedings against him had been adjourned on 8 April 2011 (see paragraph 13 above) and (ii) the non-contentious proceedings had still not been concluded, as his appeal remained pending (see paragraph 18 above); accordingly, he argued, the courts order that he undergo a psychiatric examination was “pointless”.

22.  On 17 January 2013 the Municipal Court summoned the applicant for a psychiatric examination at Mostar Hospital scheduled for 23 January 2013, pursuant to Article 124 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 47 below). It also stated that if the applicant did not comply with the order, or if the order could not be served, he would be transported by the judicial police to the examination, in accordance with Article 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

23.  On 21 January 2013 the applicant lodged a submission with the Municipal Court in which he repeated his previous arguments (see paragraph 21 above) and added that the Municipal Court was acting in a manner that was contrary to the Code of Criminal Procedure in so far as it had not delivered a fresh decision on the continuation of the adjourned proceedings. Given all the circumstances, he refused to attend the scheduled examination.

24.  On 30 January 2013 the Municipal Court issued an order (dovedbeni nalog), in accordance with Article 139 (see paragraph 47 below), to the judicial police to take the applicant to Mostar Hospital by force (prinudnim putem) for psychiatric and psychological examination. It also ordered the judicial police to be present at the applicants examination.

25.  On 5 February 2013 the applicant was taken by the judicial police for examination; however, no examination was actually conducted, since the applicant lodged a request that he not be examined by those particular experts. That request was refused by the Municipal Court on 13 March 2013.

26.  On 29 March 2013 the Municipal Court again summoned the applicant to Mostar Hospital for a psychiatric examination aimed at determining whether he was capable of following the criminal proceedings against him (see paragraph 20 above).

27.  On 12 April 2013 the applicant lodged a submission with the Municipal Court in which he stated that his being ordered to attend the examination had exposed him to various “methods of torture”, which had affected his mental integrity, and that he would not comply with the order. He again referred to the decision delivered during the non-contentious proceedings (see paragraph 17 above).

28.  On 7 May 2013 the Municipal Court issued another order, in accordance with Article 139 (see paragraph 47 below), to the judicial police to take the applicant by force to Mostar Hospital and to be present at his psychiatric and psychological examination.

29.  On 8 May 2013 the applicant was taken by force for examination by the judicial police. The applicant again lodged a request that he not be examined by the above-mentioned experts. It appears that the Municipal Court did not decide on the exemption request; in any event, no examination took place.

30.  On 24 May 2013 the Municipal Court summoned the applicant to attend the court hearing scheduled for 7 June 2013. The applicant was also advised that he could engage a defence lawyer.

31.  On 3 June 2013 the applicant lodged a submission with the Municipal Court in which he stated that he was not capable of participating in the criminal proceedings, referring to the expert opinion dated 31 December 2010 (see paragraph 11 above). The applicant added that the decision delivered during the non-contentious proceedings (see paragraph 17 above) was still not final.

32.  On 5 June 2013 the Municipal Court issued another order, in accordance with Article 139 (see paragraph 47 below), to the judicial police to take the applicant by force to Mostar Hospital, and to be present at his psychiatric examination, scheduled to be held on 6 June 2013.

33.  On 6 June 2013 the applicant was taken by force by four judicial police officers to the neurology department of Mostar Hospital for a psychiatric examination, which was held on that day. On the same day, the judicial police also issued a “Confirmation regarding the entering and examination of [the applicants] flat and other spaces” (Potvrda o ulasku i pregledu stana i drugih prostorija – “the Confirmation”), which indicated that three police officers had entered the applicants home while enforcing the court order for his psychiatric examination. It furthermore stated that the applicants father, who was the owner of the flat, had refused to sign the Confirmation, so it had been left with him in the living room. The report on the officers visit to the applicants home, dated the same day and signed by the four police officers, reads in the relevant part as follows:

... Upon arriving at the residence indicated in the order, the [Court Police] found the accused, Goran Pranjić-M-Lukić, at home at 14:30.

The Court Police informed the accused, Goran Pranjić-M-Lukić, of the reasons for their arrival [and] gave him a copy of the cited order by the Mostar Municipal Court, after which he was asked to accompany the [judicial police officers], which he refused to do, saying “that he had been examined, and that he would not come with us”. The leader of the [judicial police officers] several times repeated to the accused that he had to come, which he energetically refused to do and turned towards the staircase leading to the other floor of the house.

Since the judicial police officers were situated close to the [accused] judicial police officer M.A. stood at the door leading to the other floor, thus stopping the [accused] from [carrying out] his intention, while judicial police officer L.A. ordered the accused to put his hands behind his back, which he did, and then he applied the binding measures [sredstvo za vezivanje] (handcuffs), without using other means of coercion, after which [the accused] was placed in the official vehicle and taken to the Mostar Centre.

...

The judicial police ensured the security of the examination, which lasted from 16:00 until 17:30, during which there were no problems [nije bilo negativnosti].

...

During the execution of the cited [court] order the powers exercised were provided for by the Judicial Police Act and the Rules on the Judicial Police, and there were no problems [nije bilo negativnosti”] – nor were any types of coercive measure [employed].”

34.  According to the medical evidence submitted by the applicant – namely the injury report (prijava o povredi) dated 10 June 2013 issued by the emergency department of the Mostar Health Centre – the applicant was handcuffed during his forcible escort to the psychiatric examination. The doctor established that the applicant had sustained three to four hematomas on his right upper arm, each measuring 1 cm by 1 cm. The doctor also noted the applicants statement that his forcible handcuffing by the judicial police had caused him mental injuries (psihičke povrede) and anxiety.

35.  On 18 June 2013 the Municipal Court issued another order, in accordance with Article 139 (see paragraph 47 below), to the judicial police to transport the applicant by force to Mostar Hospital, and to be present at his psychological examination. The examination was held on 19 June 2013.

36.  On 8 July 2013 the Municipal Court decided to adjourn the criminal proceedings against the applicant and referred him to the Social Work Centre for further non-contentious proceedings. In its reasoning the Municipal Court, fully accepting the expert reports, established that the applicant suffered from “permanent (chronic) psychological illness, currently at the progression phase”. At the time of the examination the applicant had been mentally incapacitated (neuračunljiv), whereas at the time of the commission of the alleged offence his sanity had been significantly reduced. It concluded that the applicant was not capable of participating or following the criminal proceedings against him. On the same day the Municipal Court appointed the applicant a defence lawyer, owing to his mental state, in the interests of justice.

37.  On 12 July 2013 the applicant appealed against that decision, citing Article 3 of the Convention. He repeated that the non-contentious proceedings were still pending. Furthermore, he contended that the court orders and examinations undertaken had been unlawful, and he challenged the method and purpose of the expert examinations (the criminal offence had allegedly been committed in 2004, but he had only been examined in 2013). Lastly, the applicant submitted that the court orders that he be forcibly examined, and the examinations themselves, had subjected him to “mental anguish” that had reached the minimum threshold of severity, within the meaning of Article 3. The applicants court-appointed lawyer also lodged an appeal against the above-mentioned decision (see paragraph 36 above).

38.  On 30 April 2014 the Cantonal Court found that the appeal lodged by the applicants court-appointed lawyer was incoherent and declined to examine it. At the same time it upheld the applicants appeal and quashed the decision of 8 July 2013 (see paragraph 36 above). It noted that the impugned criminal proceedings had finally been adjourned on 21 June 2011 (see paragraph 14 above), and that under the accusatory principle they could only be continued lawfully upon a prosecutors request (and not at the courts own motion), pursuant to Article 17 and 409 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 47 below), and that the prosecutor had to supplement such a request with appropriate evidence indicating that the underlying reasons for the adjournment of the proceedings had ceased to exist. Since the prosecutor had never lodged a request for the continuation of the criminal proceedings, the conditions for the continuation had not been fulfilled. Thus it was meaningless (bespredmetno) to send the applicant once again for an expert examination and to issue another decision on the adjournment of the proceedings on the basis of such an expert examination, given that a final decision on this matter had already been delivered. The Cantonal Court did not examine the Article 3 complaint.

  1. THE TERMINATION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

39.  On 22 April 2016 the Prosecutor issued orders for expert examinations of the applicant to be undertaken, respectively, by a psychiatrist and a psychologist. The experts, who based their opinions on the applicants medical documentation, concluded that the applicants mental health could not have improved since 2013, when an examination had concluded that he suffered from a “permanent (chronic) psychological illness” and was mentally incapacitated at the time of that examination (see paragraph 36 above).

40.  On 12 October 2016 the Prosecutor lodged a request with the preliminary hearing judge for leave to withdraw the indictment; the preliminary hearing judge gave his consent on 14 October 2016. On 18 October 2016 the Municipal Court terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant.

  1. APPLICANTS WRITTEN OBJECTION TO THE JUDICIAL POLICE DEPARTMENT

41.  On 10 June 2013 the applicant lodged a written objection with the judicial police department of the Herzegovina Neretva Canton (“the Judicial Police Department”), alleging that his rights under Article 3 of the Convention had been violated by the manner in which he had been treated by the judicial police on 6 June 2013 (see paragraphs 33 and 34 above). He alleged that he had been handcuffed in his home (in front of his ailing parents, who had experienced stress and had started to cry) – even though that had been unnecessary as it had been “impossible for him to abscond” and his “conduct [had been] unimpeachable”.

42.  On the same day the head of the Judicial Police Department, with two other senior officers, held a conversation with the applicant about his objection, after which the applicant gave the statement that is noted in the record of that conversation, the relevant parts of which read as follows:

On 6 June 2013, at around 3 p.m., judicial police officers unknown to me came to my home with a court order to take me to [Mostar Hospitals] neurology clinic for examination. A conversation ensued between me and one of the unknown police officers, [but] I do not remember what he asked me, or what I answered. At that moment he only handed to me the order for my forcible escort (dovedbeni nalog). While we were talking I think he misunderstood me, upon which I was handcuffed, even though I was not offering any resistance. After that I was taken from my house and smoothly [lijepo] taken to the car. After I asked commander D. if he knew whether [my case-file] contained the confirmation on the entering and examination of [the applicants] flat and other spaces, which [my] father (as the owner) had refused to sign, he replied that he had not seen it, although he had insisted that it be drafted (which was not done).

After the commander and the deputy recommended that the objection be resolved by means of a non-formal settlement (neformalnim razrješenjem), Goran Pranjić-M-Lukić stated that he agreed with that recommendation, on condition that the commander reprimand [the accused] and inform his superiors (Uprava) about the whole situation. Goran Pranjić-M-Lukić declines to make any further objection, since he is content with the explanation of the commander relating to the regularity of the conduct of the police officers in this case.”

43.  On 10 June 2013 the head of the Judicial Police Department submitted information regarding the applicants objection to the Chief Commander of the judicial police. It comprised (i) information regarding the judicial polices entry into the applicants home for the purpose of his forcible escort to the psychiatric examination, and (ii) information to the effect that his handcuffing had been performed in accordance with section 17 of the Rules on the Use of Means of Coercion (see paragraph 51 below). It also stated, inter alia:

“After the conversation with the complainant it is obvious that he submitted his objection in ignorance of the ... laws pursuant to which the judicial police act and the objection concerns a person that was several times transported for psychiatric examination.

The complainant accepted the explanation regarding the conduct of the officers of the judicial police and the objection was resolved by non-formal means.”

  1. THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

44.  In the meantime, on 22 November 2010 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court of the length of the criminal proceedings concerning him. On 28 February 2013 the Constitutional Court established that the length of the criminal proceedings had been excessive and ordered the Municipal Court to finish the proceedings urgently. In particular, the court found it unacceptable that it had taken the Municipal Court more than three years to conduct a psychiatric examination of the applicant after it had become aware that he suffered from “psychological problems” (see paragraphs 8 and 10 above), and that it had taken more than four years for it to appoint him a legal representative of his own choosing (see paragraph 7 above).

45.  On 14 June 2013 the applicant lodged another constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court, complaining under Article 3 of the Convention of his ill-treatment in the continued criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 20-38 above). The applicant argued that the Municipal Courts repeated orders for the judicial police to transport him by force to involuntary expert examinations – in particular the one on 6 June 2013 (see paragraphs 33 and 34 above) – had violated his rights under Article 3 of the Convention.

46.  On 21 July 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants constitutional appeal as manifestly ill-founded. It concluded that the applicant had failed to prove that he had been exposed to treatment that had reached the minimum level of severity necessary to fall within the scope of Article 3.

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

  1. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

47.  The relevant provisions of the 2003 Criminal Procedure Code (Zakon o krivičnom postupku), published in the Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, nos. 35/0337/0356/0378/0428/0555/0627/07, 53/07, 9/0912/108/13 and 59/14, read as follows:

Article 17
Accusatory Principle

“Criminal proceedings may only be initiated and conducted upon the request of the prosecutor.”

Article 124
Psychiatric Expert Evaluation

“(1)  If a suspicion arises that the accountability of the suspect or the accused has been diminished, or that the suspect or the accused has committed a criminal offense due to the drug or alcohol addiction, or that he is not capable of participating in the proceedings due to a mental disturbance, expert evaluations consisting of examination of the suspect or the accused by a psychiatrist shall be ordered.

...”

Article 139
Arrest Warrant

“(1)  The court may order [the issuance of] an arrest warrant [naredba da se optuženi dovede] if a decision on detention has been issued or if the accused, having been duly summoned, has failed to appear without justification, or if the [relevant] summons could not be properly served and the circumstances obviously indicate that the accused is evading the service of a summons.

...

(3)  The arrest warrant shall be executed by the judicial police.

...

(5)  The person authorised to execute the arrest warrant shall hand the arrest warrant to the accused and instruct the accused to follow him. If the accused refuses, he shall be apprehended by force.”

Article 221
Mental Disorder Suffered by the Suspect or Accused in the Course of the Proceedings

“If in the course of criminal proceedings it is ascertained that since the criminal offence [in question] was committed the accused has become mentally ill, a decision shall be delivered ... adjourning [those] criminal proceedings. (Article 409).”

Article 409
Adjournment of Proceedings in the Event of a Mental Illness

1.  If the accused becomes so affected by a mental illness after the commission of a criminal offence that he or she is unable to take part in the proceedings, the Court shall, after a psychiatric forensic evaluation [is carried out], adjourn the procedure and send the accused [for treatment] to the body responsible for issues regarding social care.

2.  When the health condition of the accused has improved to the extent to which he or she is capable of taking part in the procedure, the proceedings shall resume.

...

Article 410
Procedure in the Event of Mental Incompetence

“1.  If a suspect has committed a criminal offence while in a state of mental incapacity, and if legally prescribed conditions for ordering the mandatory placement in a health institution of seriously mentally incapacitated persons exist, the Prosecutor shall propose in the indictment that the Court establish whether the suspect has committed an unlawful act while in a state of mental incompetence and that he be subject to a temporary order on mandatory placement in a health institution, with the health institution in question being informed about [that order].

2.  Upon a reasoned proposal by a prosecutor, the detention of the suspect or accused under paragraph 1 above may be ordered for reasons [listed] under Article 146 of this Law [listing the general grounds for custody]. When the detention of a suspect is ordered or extended, he shall be confined in a health institution for a period that may last as long as [provided] under Article 146 exist, but no longer than the [relevant period of] time [specified] under paragraphs 2 and 3 of Articles 149 and 151 [respectively], of this Code, or until the temporary order on mandatory placement in a health institution has become final and binding.

... ”

48.  The relevant provisions of the Mental Health Act 2001 (Zakon o zaštiti osoba s duševnim smetnjama), published in the Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, nos. 37/0140/0252/1114/13, and 20/13, as in force at the relevant time, read as follows:

Section 22

“1.  A person with severe mental disorders who seriously and directly threatens his/her own life or health or safety, or the life or health or safety of others, may be placed in a health institution without his or her consent, under the procedure for forced detention and forced accommodation prescribed by this Law.

... ”

Section 43

“Against a perpetrator who committed a criminal offence while in a state of insanity or significantly reduced sanity a court in the course of criminal proceedings shall order as a security measure [his] compulsory psychiatric treatment and custody in a health institution, or ... compulsory psychiatric treatment while still at liberty, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 63 and 64 of the Criminal Code of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Articles 475-480 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Official Gazette of FBIH, no. 43/98).”

49.  The relevant provisions of the Non-contentious Proceedings Act (Zakon o vanparničnom postupku), published in the Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, nos. 2/9839/0473/05 and 80/14, read as follows:

Section 18

“An appeal may be lodged against a decision rendered in first-instance proceedings within fifteen days of its delivery, if the law does not provide otherwise.”

Section 19

“An appeal suspends the execution of the decision, if the law does not provide otherwise.

The court may, on the basis of important reasons, decide that the appeal does not suspend the execution of the decision.

... ”

Section 45

“1.  ... A court [may] decide to retain [that is to say hold – zadržati] a mentally ill person in a health institution when, owing to the nature of a disease, it is necessary for that person to be restricted in his freedom of movement or contact with the outside world, as well as to release such a person when the reasons for detention cease to exist.

2.  The procedure referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article must be completed as soon as possible – at the latest within seven days.”

Section 58

“An appeal may be lodged [by the retained person] against a decision on retain him in or release him from the health institution by: ... within eight days of the delivery of that decision.

The appeal does not suspend the execution, unless the court decides otherwise for justified reasons ...”

50.  The relevant provisions of the 1996 Judicial Police Act of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Zakon o sudskoj policiji Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine), published in the Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, nos. 19/96 and 37/04, read as follows:

Section 7

“The judicial police shall assist the Constitutional Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and courts in cantons in securing information, the execution of court orders for the forcible escort of witnesses [and] the execution of court orders for the bringing in of accused persons [dovođenje optuženih osoba]...”

Section 20

“The judicial police, in undertaking their tasks, may use means of coercion – namely: physical force, a rubber baton, and other means of coercion – only when that is necessary to prevent a physical attack on judges and other employees of the court, [or] the ombudsman and other persons that they protect, [to prevent] a witness or the accused and convicts from absconding, or [to prevent] the causing of material damage to the court. Physical force may be used in particular when it is necessary to prevent a person resisting those to whom the order of the court is entrusted.”

51.  The relevant provisions of the Rules on the Use of Means of Coercion (Pravilnik o upotrebi sredstava prinude, no. Su-Sp-55/11), adopted on 2 March 2011 by the President of the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, read as follows:

Section 2

“The judicial police officers of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina use means of coercion for the purpose of attaining lawful goals, proportional to the level of resistance of the individual [in question].

The judicial police officers shall, in [well-defined] circumstances, only use means of coercion that guarantee the successful implementation of official orders with the least severe consequences for the individual against whom they are used.”

Section 3

“ ...

During the use of means of coercion, judicial police officers shall take account of the life, health and human dignity and of the property of physical and legal persons.”

Section 17

“judicial police officers use means of binding (sredstva za vezivanje) for the purpose of limiting the bodily movements of the individual – particularly his hands and legs.

The following are understood as means of binding: handcuffs for hands, handcuffs for hands with a belt, cuffs for legs, cuffs for hands and legs, plastic binders and straps.

The judicial police officers are obliged to apply binding measures during the conduct of operations to bring in (radnje dovođenja ili sprovođenja) temporarily retained, detained or convicted persons.”

  1. INTERNATIONAL TEXTS, INSTRUMENTS AND DOCUMENTS

52.  In its Recommendation Rec(2001)10 on the European Code of Police Ethics adopted on 19 September 2001, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe stated its conviction that

“... public confidence in the police is closely related to their attitude and behaviour towards the public, in particular their respect for the human dignity and fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual as enshrined, in particular, in the European Convention on Human Rights.”

It recommended that the governments of member States be guided in their internal legislation, practice and codes of conduct in respect of the police by the principles set out in the European Code of Police Ethics appended to the Recommendation, with a view to their progressive implementation and the widest possible circulation of the text setting them out.

53.  The Code states in particular that one of the main purposes of the police is to protect and respect the individuals fundamental rights and freedoms, as enshrined, in particular, in the Convention (paragraph 1). In the section on “Guidelines for police action/intervention” it stipulates that “[t]he police shall not inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under any circumstances” (paragraph 36) and that they “may use force only when strictly necessary and only to the extent required to obtain a legitimate objective” (paragraph 37). Furthermore, “in carrying out their activities, [they] shall always bear in mind everyones fundamental rights” (paragraph 43) and “police personnel shall act with integrity and respect towards the public and with particular consideration for the situation of individuals belonging to especially vulnerable groups” (paragraph 44).

54.  On 22 September 2004 the Committee of Ministers adopted Recommendation Rec(2004)10 concerning the protection of the human rights and dignity of persons with a mental disorder. In the relevant part the Recommendation provides:

Article 32
Involvement of the police

“1.  In the fulfilment of their legal duties, the police should coordinate their interventions with those of medical and social services –if possible, with the consent of the person concerned, if the behaviour of that person is strongly suggestive of mental disorder and represents a significant risk of harm to him or herself or to others.

2.  Where other appropriate possibilities are not available, the police may be required, in carrying out their duties, to assist in conveying or returning persons subject to involuntary placement to the relevant facility.

3.  Members of the police should respect the dignity and human rights of persons with a mental disorder. The importance of this duty should be emphasised during training.”

THE LAW

  1. SCOPE OF THE CASE

55.  In response to observations submitted by the Government, the applicant reiterated his complaints under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention, which he had raised in his application form.

56.  The Court notes that these complaints have already been declared inadmissible, and thus fall outside of the scope of this case.

  1. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

57.  The applicant complained, under Article 3 of the Convention, of his repeated forcible escort to involuntary psychiatric and psychological examinations during the criminal proceedings against him in 2013, which had caused him mental suffering.

58.  Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380/09, § 55, ECHR 2015), the Court finds it appropriate to examine the applicants allegations under Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

  1. Admissibility

59.  The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

  1. Merits
    1. The parties arguments

60.  The applicant complained under Article 8 that the court orders for his involuntary psychiatric and psychological examinations, and his forcible escort by the judicial police on the basis of such orders and subjection to those examinations, had been unlawful and had exposed him to “mental suffering”. The orders had been unlawful, given the fact that the decision terminating the non-contentious proceedings had not become final at the time of the issuance of those orders (see paragraphs 17-19 above); moreover, the criminal proceedings against him had been “pointless”, as they had ultimately been adjourned.

61.  The Government limited its reply to this complaint, referring only the incident of 6 June 2013 (see paragraph 33 above). They argued that force had had to be used in transporting the applicant to the psychiatric examination because the applicant had failed to comply with a duly served court order that had been issued in the course of the relevant criminal proceedings, and that given the circumstances there had been no interference with his rights under Article 8. They furthermore contended that even if there had been any interference, it had had its basis in national law, thus complying with the required quality of domestic law, and moreover that it had not violated his rights under Article 8, as the interference had been aimed at determining whether it was justified to conduct court proceedings against the applicant.

  1. The Courts assessment

62.  The Court notes that the applicant was taken by force to involuntary psychiatric and psychological examinations on 5 February, 8 May, 6 June and 19 June 2013 (see paragraphs 252933 and 35 above) on the basis of court orders issued on 30 January, 7 May, 5 June and 18 June 2013, respectively (see paragraphs 242832 and 35 above).

63.  The Court has previously held, in various contexts, that the concept of private life includes a persons physical and psychological integrity (see, for example, A. v. Croatia, no. 55164/08, § 60, 14 October 2010) and that mental health is a crucial part of private life (see, for example, Bensaid v. the United Kingdom, no. 44599/98, § 47, ECHR 2001I, and Dolenec v. Croatia, no. 25282/06, § 165, 26 November 2009). Furthermore, it has held that the involuntary examination of a person by a psychiatrist from a State-run clinic or a hospital amounted to an interference with his right to respect for his private life (see Matter v. Slovakia, no. 31534/96, § 64, 5 July 1999, and Fyodorov and Fyodorova v. Ukraine, no. 39229/03, § 82, 7 July 2011). In line with those principles, it finds that the applicants forcible escort and subjection to involuntary examination by a psychiatrist and a psychologist from a State-run institution – on four occasions (see paragraph 62 above) – constituted an interference with his private life.

64.  The Court furthermore reiterates that an interference will contravene Article 8 unless it is “in accordance with the law”, pursues one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2, and is furthermore “necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve the aim in question.

65.  The Court notes that there is a dispute between the parties as to whether the interference with the applicants Article 8 rights was “in accordance with the law”. The Court reiterates that the expressions “prescribed by law” and “in accordance with the law” in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention not only require that the impugned measure should have a legal basis in domestic law, but also refer to the quality of the law in question, which should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], no. 37553/05, § 108, ECHR 2015, and the cases cited therein). In that respect, the Court notes that on 6 November 2012 the Municipal Court terminated the non-contentious proceedings, holding that upon that decision becoming final the procedure would be continued under the rules of criminal proceedings. The applicant appealed against that decision on 21 February 2013 (that is to say within the statutory deadline). It furthermore notes that, under section 19 of the 1998 Non-contentious Proceedings Act, an appeal has suspensive effect (see paragraph 49 above). Nevertheless, the criminal proceedings were continued on 21 December 2012 (that is to say while the non-contentious proceedings were still ongoing) and the Municipal Court repeatedly ordered the applicants psychiatric and psychological examinations and his forceful escort to those examinations, in accordance with Articles 124 and 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The orders therefore had a basis in domestic law. However, in the particular circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that the domestic authorities have complied with the law as the continuation of the criminal proceedings was unlawful. The Court notes that the Cantonal Court had ruled that the Municipal Court could not have lawfully continued the adjourned criminal proceedings of its own motion, and by extension could not have lawfully issued any orders for the applicants forcible examination within the context of those continued proceedings, as that would have run contrary to the applicable rules on criminal procedure (see paragraph 38 above). The interference with the applicants right to respect for his private life was therefore not “in accordance with the law”, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.

66.  That being the case, the Court is not required to determine whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim and, if so, whether it was proportionate to the aim pursued (see Mockutė v. Lithuania, no. 66490/09§ 105, 27 February 2018).

67.  There has therefore been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

  1. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

68.  The applicant complained, under Article 3 of the Convention, about the treatment that he had been subjected to on 6 June 2013, when he had been handcuffed by the judicial police during his forcible escort to an involuntary psychiatric examination. The provision at issue reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

  1. Admissibility

69.  The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

  1.       Merits
    1. The parties arguments

70.  The applicant reiterated his complaints. He submitted that, without warning, one of the above-mentioned judicial police officers had twisted his right arm in order to handcuff him, as attested by the injury report (see paragraph 34 above). He rejected any contention that he had offered resistance or had attempted to abscond, as that would only have further disturbed his sick parents. He furthermore argued that his withdrawal of his objection in respect of the impugned incident had been conditional upon the judicial police officers involved in the incident being reprimanded and their superiors being informed thereof (see paragraph 42 above), which was not done. Finally, citing the case of Shchiborshch and Kuzmina v. Russia (no. 5269/08, 16 January 2014), the applicant indicated that the actions of the police officers had not reached the required level of care expected of them when dealing with individuals suffering from mental illness, and he expressed his belief that they had not undergone any training in that respect.

71.  The Government argued that the applicants handcuffing had been necessary because he had refused to comply with the lawful court order that had been duly handed to him prior to its enforcement. Moreover, they argued that no physical force had been used against the applicant and that he had consequently not suffered any physical injuries during his forcible escort to the psychiatric examination. They also considered that the applicants injury report to have been submitted belatedly, so there was no conclusive evidence that the impugned injuries had been inflicted by the judicial police officers. Lastly, they argued that the applicant had effectively withdrawn his objection in respect of the impugned incident, and that the judicial police officers superiors had been informed of the incident (see paragraph 43 above).

  1. The Courts assessment

(a)   General principles

72.  The Court has stated on previous occasions that measures of restraint such as handcuffing do not normally give rise to an issue under Article 3 of the Convention where they have been imposed in connection with lawful arrest or detention and do not entail the use of force, or public exposure, exceeding what is reasonably considered necessary in the circumstances. In this regard, it is of importance, for instance, whether there is reason to believe that the person concerned would resist arrest or try to abscond or cause injury or damage or suppress evidence (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541/08 and 43441/08, § 117, ECHR 2014 (extracts), and the cases cited therein). In any case, the Court attaches particular importance to the circumstances of each case and examines whether the use of restraints was necessary (see Gorodnichev v. Russia, no. 52058/99, § 102, 24 May 2007, and Stoleriu v. Romania, no. 5002/05, § 74, 16 July 2013).

73.  Moreover, as the Court has pointed out previously, where an individual is deprived of his or her liberty or, more generally, is confronted with law-enforcement officers, any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by the persons conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 of the Convention (Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no. 23380/09, §100, ECHR 2015). The Court has emphasised that the words “in principle” cannot be taken to mean that there might be situations in which such a finding of a violation is not called for because the severity threshold has not been attained. Any interference with human dignity strikes at the very essence of the Convention. For that reason any conduct by law-enforcement officers vis-à-vis an individual which diminishes human dignity constitutes a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. That applies in particular to their use of physical force against an individual where it is not made strictly necessary by his conduct, whatever the impact on the person in question (ibid., § 101).

74.  Lastly, the Court has recognised the special vulnerability of mentally ill persons in its case-law (see Fernandes de Oliveira v. Portugal [GC], no. 78103/14, § 113, 31 January 2019) and has held that the assessment of whether the treatment or punishment concerned is incompatible with the standards of Article 3 must, in particular, take into consideration this vulnerability (see Bureš v. the Czech Republic, no. 37679/08, § 85, 18 October 2012, and the cases cited therein).

(b)   Assessment in the present case

75.  Turning to the circumstances of the case before it, the Court notes that there is no dispute between the parties as to whether the applicant was handcuffed in his home when he was forcibly escorted, by the judicial police, to his involuntary psychiatric examination on 6 June 2013. The Government made no comment regarding the applicants allegations that he had been handcuffed in front of his parents. Nevertheless, from the Confirmation it appears that at least the applicants father was present during the incident (see paragraph 33 above).

76.  The Court will examine whether the applicants handcuffing falls within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. The Government justified the handcuffing of the applicant by arguing that it had been necessary because he had refused to comply with the lawful court order that had been duly handed to him prior to its enforcement. In the Courts view, for the reasons indicated above, it cannot be said that the applicants handcuffing was “imposed in connection with lawful arrest or detention” (see paragraph 65 above).

77.  In respect of the Governments argument that the applicants injury report was belated, the Court notes that in the past it has accepted a certain delay in seeking medical help (see Balogh v. Hungary, no. 47940/99, § 49, 20 July 2004), but that the above-mentioned four-day delay is excessive and undermines the applicants claim as to any injuries that he may have sustained during his handcuffing. Nevertheless, the Court reiterates that within the context of handcuffing, the relative brevity of the treatment – as well as the absence of any damage to the applicants health and the lack of any particular severity – is not decisive (see, mutatis mutandisRadkov and Sabev v. Bulgaria, nos. 18938/07 and 36069/09, § 32, 27 May 2014). Rather, the Court must also examine whether the measure complained of could reasonably be considered necessary, given the circumstances of the case (see paragraph 73 above).

78.  The Government based their conclusions on the report filed by the four police officers that had enforced the order of the Municipal Court for the applicants forcible escort to the above-mentioned involuntary psychiatric examination (see paragraph 35 above). The Court notes that that version of events was contradicted by the applicant, who stated that he had offered no resistance (see paragraphs 41-42 above). As to the applicants demeanour during the incident, the Court furthermore remarks that even the impugned report twice stated that there had been no problems (nije bilo negativnosti) during the applicants forcible escort to the examination, and that the applicant had immediately complied with the order to put his hands behind his back so that he could be handcuffed (see paragraph 35 above).

79.  The Court observes, as regards the alleged necessity of his handcuffing, that even though the applicant repeatedly refused to undergo psychiatric and psychological examinations it was still possible to forcibly take him to those examinations on three occasions – including the one that took place after the incident in question – without the use of handcuffs. Moreover, the Court cannot overlook the fact that on the occasion of his being handcuffed the applicant was clearly outnumbered by the four police officers, who were placed in a considerably superior position in terms of controlling the situation (see, mutatis mutandisFyodorov and Fyodorova, cited above, § 65, 7 July 2011); in any case, such a situation was of course not new to the police and they should have been able to foresee that they might be faced with some resistance from him and should have prepared accordingly (see, mutatis mutandisShchiborshch and Kuzmina, cited above, § 239).

80.  Lastly, the Court notes that there is no indication in the file that the applicants special vulnerability as a mentally ill person was taken into account when the decision was taken to handcuff him (see paragraph 74 above). As the Court has previously pointed out, the police, specifically, must “not inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under any circumstances” (European Code of Police Ethics, § 36; see paragraphs 52-53 above). Furthermore, Article 3 of the Convention establishes a positive obligation on the State to train its law-enforcement officials in such a manner as to ensure a high level of competence in their professional conduct so that no one is subjected to torture or treatment that runs counter to that provision (see Bouyid, cited above, § 108).

81.  As to the Governments argument that the applicant withdrew his objection in respect of this complaint on 10 June 2013 (see paragraphs 42 and 71 above), the Court notes that the Government has not offered evidence that the officers involved in the incident were reprimanded in any way, as requested by the applicant in his statement. More importantly, the Court considers that, in view of the fundamental importance of the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, no waiver of the right not to be subjected to such treatment can be accepted, as it would be contrary to an important matter of public interest (see, mutatis mutandisKonstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], no. 30078/06, § 150, ECHR 2012 (extracts)).

82.  In the instant case, having regard to the applicants mental health, the fact that the handcuffing was not imposed in connection with lawful arrest or detention, and the absence of any previous conduct giving serious cause to fear that he might abscond or resort to violence, the Court considers that the use of handcuffs was not made strictly necessary by the applicants conduct. The applicants handcuffing thus diminished his human dignity and was in itself degrading (see, mutatis mutandis, Radkov and Sabev, cited above, § 34, and Ilievska v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 20136/11, § 63, 7 May 2015). The Court notes that the fact that the applicant was handcuffed in front of his parent, which may well have caused him to feel humiliated in his own eyes, would only be a further aggravating factor in this regard.

83.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

  1. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

84.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

  1. Damage

85.  The applicant claimed 220,310.03 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

86.  The Government contested the applicants claim as unsubstantiated and excessive.

87.  The Court is of the view that the applicant must have sustained nonpecuniary damage as a result of the breaches of his rights under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. As to quantum, judging on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR 3,900.

  1. Costs and expenses

88.  The applicant also claimed EUR 17,213.13 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and for those incurred before the Court.

89.  The Government considered that the claim was unsubstantiated and excessive. In particular, they submitted that most of the costs and expenses had not actually been incurred, because the amounts claimed had not been paid by the applicant, who had been self-represented in domestic proceedings and before the Court. Moreover, his costs and expenses did not exclusively concern the proceedings before the Court

90.  According to the Courts case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the fact that the applicant was self-represented, and to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 70 covering costs and expenses under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.

  1. Default interest

91.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

  1. Declares the application admissible;
  2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention;
  3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;
  4. Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final, in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i)  EUR 3,900 (three thousand and nine hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii)  EUR 70 (seventy euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points;

  1. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 June 2020, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Ilse Freiwirth                           Jon Fridrik Kjølbro
Deputy Registrar                      President

Copyright © 2021 Pravosudna akademija, Srbija